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I. Introduction
According to the understanding of most Europeans, pro-
ducts liability actions in United States courts are charac-
terized by the tremendous amounts of money which a plaintiff
might recover as damages for her claims. This picture does
not tell the whole truth, but provides an opportunity to
raise some questions. Should the foreign victim always try
to sue the American manufacturer in the United States? Be-
cause of the changes which the new Directive on products
liability in the European Communities will bring, this ques-
tion assumes increased significance.
In Europe, the new EC Directive on products liability
was recently promulgated on July 25, 1985. According to the
Directive, the various member states of the EC1, have until
August 1, 1988 to adopt the new Directive.2
The Directive, which contains elements of French and
United States laws and rules governing products liability,
is supposed to implement a system which is more directed
towards 'strict liability' than the most current legal sys-
tem in Europe. So far, some states - like United Kingdom
and Spain - have already enacted laws consistent with the EC
1
2standard. 3 The declared goal of the Directive is to move
farther towards a uniform european legal system. The EC
Directive is merely a step on this route.
In transnational actions, in lawsuits where parties
from different nations are involved, there is always the
question of where a lawsuit should be brought. The impor-
tance of this question lies in the fact that the laws of the
forum might decide whether the plaintiff succeeds or looses.
Today, the possibility of getting involved in a transnation-
al legal dispute is increasing, due to the constant rise in
international trade between the nations.4 The goods which
are sold to private consumers5 in a country are often im-
ported or, at least, contain parts from foreign manufac-
turers. Sometimes goods, although manufactured abroad, are
labeled with the name of a home producer or trader. A pur-
chaser of goods who is injured by a defect might have sever-
al options on the forum in which to bring his lawsuit.
Depending on which part was defective and what exactly
caused the injury, the assembler, the part-manufacturer, or
the various sellers can be the potential defendant of such
claims. Provided that the defendants are from different
countries, actions might be brought abroad and at home.
Seeking the most favorable country in such a situation is
known as 'forum shopping,.6 This term was first used in the
US legal literature7, where, due to the fact that the 50
states of the United States have different rules of torts
and contract law, 'forum shopping' is a commonplace
3phenomena. 8 However, until recently, this problem has hard-
ly received any attention in Europe.9 This is quite aston-
ishing in light of the importance of this problem even in
the European context.10 The prevailing view in Europe of
forum shopping is a quite negative one.11 However, since
efforts on harmonization of the international law of con-
flicts have been thus far unsuccessful, 'forum shopping'
cannot be avoided. The chance that an international legal
system for transnational disputes will be established is
rather unlikely.
For certain groups of countries, for instance the mem-
ber states of the European Community, the chance for har-
moni~ation of products liability laws is more likely, but
only to a certain degree. Even in the EC, however, where
the legal harmonization is one of the major goals, distinc-
tions between the various member states will not disappear.
Therefore, even in the future, in claims involving parties
from different countries, the lawyer will have to consider
where the institution of an action is the most favorable for
his client.
The answer as to which 'forum' should be selected depends
on different factors.12 First, two different countries with
personal and subject matter jurisdiction have to be found
for the action. The next step is to determine what 'con-
flicts of law rules' these courts should apply, in other
words, what substantive law will they apply. This leads to
the major question: which country provides the most
4
favorable laws? This depends primarily if not only on the
substantive law, but also on the procedural provisions. Not
only the particular standards, but also the rules of evi-
dence can be crucial for a claim. Finally, the issue of en-
forceability and its prerequisite, the recognition of the
judgment, must be examined. A judgment, which the plaintiff
obtains in a foreign country, often has no actual value if
it can not be enforced in his home country.
Besides the above mentioned factors, other nonlegal
facts might lead to the selection of a certain forum. For
instance, the mere fact of not being familiar with an other
country and its law, might keep the victim's counsel from
looking for a better 'forum'. However, these factors are
not the major point of this thesis and will only be men-
tioned where they might be relevant.
The goal of this research is to state the current
situation concerning products liability in the United
States, the Federal Republic of Germany and more briefly,
France and to compare the different systems. Emphasis will
be given to the substantive laws, in particular to the new
EC Directive and its adoption in the Federal Republic of
Germany. Also, it will be dealt with the current German
law, since this will be valid for all claims initiated be-
fore the enactment of the new ProdHaftG. Further, based on
the previous analysis, it will be shown where a consumer is
in the most favorable position to make out a claim against a
foreign producer.13 Since the various parts of the chain of
5distribution are also subject to liability in products lia-
bility actions, their responsibility also will be described.
II. The new EC Directive on Products Liability
Since the Directive of the European Communities on pro-
ducts liability will be implemented in all member states of
the European Community, these rules will determine the
national laws concerning products liability in the future.
For this reason, the contents and the history of the Direc-
tive are briefly described in the following section.
A. History of the Directive
The EC Directive of July 17, 198514 is the result of
the "Draft Directive on Products Liability in 1976,"which
was presented by a working group of the EC, and later amen-
ded in 1979.15 However, the first steps were not taken by
the EC but by the other major european organization, the
Council of Europe.16
This first initiative among the european states arose
from the Committee on Legal Corporations (CCJ) of the Coun-
cil of Europe.17 Through its committee of Experts on the
Liability of Producers, a research program with the UNIDROIT
was launched.18 The initial report on products liability
6
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was received by the Council of Europe in 1972, which after
three more years of deliberation, led to a draft containing
rules on products liability for personal injury and death.19
On January 27, 1977 the European Convention on products
liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death, with
annex, was submitted for signature.20 But to date, it has
been signed only by Austria, Belgium, France and Luxem-
bourg. 21 This is partially due to fact that the members of
the EC were waiting for the result of a pending draft pro-
cedure of the European Community. The EC work on the
products liability began with a preliminary draft in August
1974, a second one in June 1975, and the final draft of Sep-
tember 1976.22 However, the draft was not approved by the
Council of Ministers of the EC until July 17, 1985.
The objective of the EC Directive on products liability
is to introduce a system of strict liability within all mem-
ber states.23 The delay in the adopting the directive was a
result of the attitude of the majority of the EC member
states, which prefer the less liberal Convention of the
European Council.24 But despite the reluctance of some mem-
ber states, the adoption finally occurred; a goal sought and
achieved by the various national consumer groups.25
B. The Substance of the EC Directive
The first questions in all products liability actions,
what is the applicable law and who are the parties according
to the regulations. The EC Directive is of particular im-
portance since it might lead to substantial changes.
1. Parties according to the EC Directive
a) Plaintiff pursuant to Art.4
According to the text of the Act, every person who
suffered injuries from a defective product is protected.
This also includes those persons who are bystanders, in
other word, who are not bound by a contractual link to the
potential defendant.26 The EC Directive is only applicable
for the protection of private persons; it offers no protec-
tion for the damages which occurred in the business use of
products. Hence, the law is limited to the private field of
products liability.
b) Defendant pursuant to Art.3 (1)-(2)
The Directive describes in its text the class of poten-
tial defendants by reference both to their role in the chain
of distribution, and, secondly, to the nature of their al-
legedly defective product. Art. 3 (I) establishes primary
liability of the producer of the defective product. But
according to Art.3(II)-(III) "importers" and also "branders"
can be proper defendants for a claim based on the Direc-
tive.27 However, distributors as wholesalers, retailers or
EC-importers28, are not in the primary line of liability.
Only when the producer of the product is not known or can
not be determined is the retailer exposed to strict liabi-
lity. Under such circumstances he will be treated as the
8
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producer of the defective product "unless he informs the
injured person, within a reasonable time, of the identity of
the producer or of the person who supplied him with the
product.", Art.3 (III). As a consequence of this rule,the
retailer can not avoid his liability after the time has
lapsed in which he was supposed to name the producer.29
2. Standard of Liability according to Art.6 of the EC Direc-
tive
a) Product according to Art.2 EC Directive
Art. 2 of the Act determines the definition of "pro-
duct" under the rules of the Directive.3D The provisions
especially excludes all immoveable goods and agricultural
products and game, but only if they have not yet undergone
industrial processing. After such processing the producer
is liable for their defectiveness. It is still questionable
whether artistic products are covered by the Directive;
also, other things like natural gas are difficult to subject
to the Directive.31 Things can also be human 'organs' and
'blood,.32 But the general tendency of the Directive is to
create a broad definition of product. As the preamble33
states, 'product' should be given a comprehensive meaning to
guarantee the most protection possible to the consumer.34
Due to this extensive understanding of product, product com-
ponents are also included in the term.35
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b) Types of Defects
What is regarded as a defect under the Directive is
regulated in Art. 6 and 7. For the crucial determination of
product defectiveness, a combination of different factors is
given by the law. Generally speaking, it has to be observed
that in principle total safety from defects cannot exist.
Therefore, only a certain grade of safety can be required of
a product.36 The Directive has decided to determine the
meaning of defect through an objective test.37 Basically,
the Directive follows a 'consumer expectation' test theo-
ry.38 The view which the Directive has adopted, and which
is similar to the US consumer 'expectation test', might lead
to parallel difficulties. Especially in design defect cases
the question arises whether the consumer was able to form an
expectation at all.39 As the terms used in the Directive
show, the standard is not one based on the expectations of
an individual but of the general pUblic.40
Art.6(I)&(II) of the EC Directive describes those cir-
cumstances in which an article can be considered to be
defective. 41
(1) Presentation of the Product
Under this provision, the presentation of a product and
its result concerning to the use of the product and the re-
sulting expectation of the users are covered. The manufac-
turer's presentation includes the presentation of a product
in the written instructions, e.g.warnings, etc.42, but also
all other presentation that are authorized by the by him.
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(2) Presumable-Reasonable Use of a Product
The use of a product which could be reasonably expected
has to be taken into account. This does not limit the con-
sumer only to the use for which the product was designed but
also to such use which could have been foreseen by the pro-
ducer. The extent of the producer's liability in such a
case is still questionable. There must be at least a limit
in liability for use which is beyond any expectation or im-
agination or which is absolutely unreasonable. Unaffected
by this rules is the duty of the producer to warn of such
misuse of his products which can be reasonably expected and
anticipated.
(3) Time product was put into Circulation
The above mentioned elements must be considered in
light of the time , when the manufacturer put the product
into circulation. The moment of putting the product in the
trade determines the reasonable expectations of the consumer
regarding the safety and security of this particular object.
3. Defense under the EC Directive
a) Exception of Art. 6 (II) and Art.7 (e)
Art. 6 (II) of the Directive provides a defense which
can be described by the term 'state of the art' .43 Accord-
ing to that provision a product should not be considered
defective for the mere reason that a newer product offers
more safety than the old one did at the time it was put into
circulation. But certainly this provision clarifies more
12
than it creates a new defense. The decision on whether a
product is defective or not is one which could be made, even
in the past, by considering the expectations and standards
at the time the product was introduced into the trade. This
is a basic legal principle which does not have to be created
by a new provision.
The other defenses of Art. 7 speak for themselves.
That the producer is not liable if he did not put the pro-
duct into circulation is basic to any notion of product lia-
bility. Therefore, the producer is not liable for goods
which are stolen and then sold or articles which are not yet
delivered. Art. 7(b) allows a defense in the event that the
defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time
product was put into circulation. This provision frees pro-
ducer from responsibility for defects which are the result
of the mistreatment by the buyer. Also, when the product
was not manufactured for sale or distribution, nor sold in
the course of his business, the manufacturer will not be
held liable. Further, there is no liability when the de-
fect was due "to compliance of the product with mandatory
regulations issued by the public authorities". This defense
gives the producer protection if the reason that his product
failed is because of his obligation to fulfill state regula-
tions and other rules. The Directive also contains a de-
fense for the manufacturer of component parts. In case the
defect is attributable to the design of the product in which
the component has been fitted according to the instructions
13
given by the manufacturer of the component, the producer
himself is not liable.
b) Other Defenses
Besides these defenses related to the substantive law,
the Directive also offers a defense based on the statute of
limitations. According to Art. 10 the time limit is three
years, beginning with the day "...the plaintiff became
aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of the da-
mage, the defect and the identity of the producer."44
Pursuant to Art. 8, the contributory negligence of the
victim results in a reduction or disallowance of recovery.
Thus, the conduct of the claimant, for instance a misuse of
the product, can result to a loss of his claims.
4. Derogations pursuant to Art. 15 EC Directive
Art 15 (1)(a) allows the member states to expand the
definition of the term 'product' in Art. 1 of the Directive
to primary products and game.
This provision permits the member states to impose
stricter liability upon the producer by deviating from the
rule of Art. 7(e).45 Thus, it is possible to hold a pro-
ducer even if he can prove that the defect could not have
been discovered according to the state of scientific and
technical knowledge at the time he put the product into cir-
culation.46
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5. Damages and Limits on Liability under the Directive
According to Art.9 of the Directive, recovery can be
granted for physical injury and death claims, as well as for
damage to property.47 But damage to the product itself is
not covered by the Directive.48 Also, the Directive only
allows recovery for if the 'lower threshold' of 500 ECU49
has been reached.50 In addition, the damaged goods have to
have a private character.51 This is the case if the object
is generally considered only for private use or consump-
tion.52 The reason for the introduction of this threshold
is to limit the claims based on the Directive to the cases
where substantial damages occurred.53 Further, Art. 14 ex-
cludes liability from nuclear accidents, which are
"...covered by international conventions ratified by the
Member States".
Art. 16 of the Directive permits the various member
states to set a ceiling on the total amount of damages, re-
sulting from death or personal injury and which are
"...caused by identical items with the same defect". The
limit, however, may be not less than 70 million ECU. This
ensures, under European circumstances, a nearly unlimited
guaranty for those claims.54
C. Effect of the EC Directive
Generally speaking, the EC Directive is the first at-
tempt to introduce in all member states a standard of
15
'strict liability,.55 However, this new standard is not a
real 'strict' one. The manufacturer still has some means to
escape his liability.56 The EC Directive still contains
elements which take into account the conduct of the produ-
cer. The goal of the Directive is to apply the same stan-
dard of liability in all different member states and thereby
promote the exchange of goods and advance the trade within
the Community. At least, that is the announced aim of the
Directive, which might happen in the long run. Distinctions
in methods of production of safe goods will be equalized,
and the resulting differences in production prices will
vanish. However, other discrepancies will still endure.
Since national courts will interpret the various elements of
the EC Directive, true harmonization of products liability
law in the Community will not occur very soon. This might
not happen until the European Court of Justice renders a
decision on the interpretation of the Directive.57 But also
with regard to the Directive itself, the changes which will
occur in the close future are only small ones. The provi-
sions of the Directive are not more than a mere codification
of the current systems, at least in France. and Germany.58
Due to their expansion of the consumer protection in the
past the changes in there countries will be only slight
ones. In other countries, which have a consumer protection
system solely based on the principles of negligence, the
changes will be more significant.59 The EC Directive cre-
ates for countries with a developed consumer protection
-------------- ...
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system, like France and Germany,60 another new problem. The
EC Directive is not only a minimum standard, but the stan-
dard itself.61 Thus, it is not possible for countries to
impose an even stronger liability on the producer.62 How-
ever, it remains questionable if this is really desirable.
Concerning the question whether the implementation of
the EC Directive will lead to a uniform standard of products
liability within the various member states of the European
Community, the answer can be only a negative one. Even if
all states transform the provisions of Directive into their
national laws, the problem of different interpretations will
not disappear. These differences might even survive a de-
cision of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Although such
a decision will determine a standard of interpretation man-
datory for all national courts, such a hOlding can not de-
termine all details. In addition, the Directive itself al-
lows for inconsistence interpretations, through the option
of derogation of its provision already built in.63 Due to
the different cultural and social background of the various
national courts, it will still be possible to shop around
for the best forum within the European Community. But the
distinctions will become smaller; the Directive will have
the effect of making the principle standard of liability
similar.
III. Products Liability in the United States, Federal Re-
public of Germany and France toda~
The first question which a lawyer faces in a transna-
tional claim is whether his client is entitled to bring suit
in the potential 'fori'. This might differ depending on the
relationship to the other party. Also, the consideration of
possible defendants is of great interest. The claimant usu-
an interest in suing as many defendants as possible
because the more defendants he names the more likely it is
that there is one with the financial resources to pay the
compensation that the claimant seeks.
A. Parties to a Products Liability Claim
Basically, there are only two types of parties, defen-
dants and plaintiffs. A further distinction can be made
among plaintiffs between those who are in a contractual re-
lationship with a potential defendant and those who are not.
Similarly, defendants can either be in contractual relations
to the plaintiff or not. Further distinctions among the
defendants can be made in terms of entities legal, such as
corporations, versus private persons.
17
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1. In the United States
a) Plaintiff
The question who is a proper plaintiff in product lia-
bility actions depends on the type of action which the
claimant initiates. The basic types of actions are breach
of contractual warranty; implied as well as expressed war-
ranty; liability for negligence; and, finally strict lia-
bility in tort.64
A plaintiff can be anybody who might be reasonably an-
ticipated to use or consume a certain product and who is
injured by doing that. In actions based on contractual lia-
bility, the claimant has to be a party to the contract, or
at least a beneficiary of the contract.65 However, this
rule was abandoned by the US courts in their endeavor to
grant protection not only to the buyer, but also to the con-
sumer of goods.66
§ 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts, which indicates a
rule of strict liability67, speaks only of a "consumer" or
"end user,,68, but does not impose a real limitation. Those
terms have to be broadly construed, referring to anybody who
be expected to use or consume the product. Otherwise,
interpretation of these terms would lead to the
of a certain range of victims injured by the
product. 69 Thus, courts have included passengers
of cars, and also innocent bystanders in the scope of claim-
ants under § 402A of the Restatement (2nd).70
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In claims based on breach of warranty most courts allow
bystanders to sue for recovery on strict liability, but a
clear line cannot yet be identified.71 It is still not ge-
nerally acknowledged that bystanders can recover claims
based on products liability.72 But after comparing the
situation of a bystander with that of a user or consumer,
making a recovery dependent on the particular theory of re-
covery, seems to be unfair. Unlike the user or consumer the
bystander does not have the chance to avoid contact with
those dangerous products.73 However, in cases based on the
breach of warranty bystanders are, according to § 2-318 al-
ternative (c) of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter
UCC), possible claimants.74
b) Defendants
In a case based on strict liability, the seller of
chattel is the primary defendant. 75 With regard to the ori-
gin of a product, the first in the chain of liability is the
manufacturer of the defective good.76 Manufacturers, who
only assemble goods, are also liable for the defects of
their component producers.77 However, liability can only be
imposed on the producer of components for injuries caused by
the particular defective component in contrast to the manu-
facturer of the whole good.78 The liability does not differ
with regard to the professional or accidental seller. Even
one, who is not in the business of selling, might be there-
fore subject to products liability.79 However, in some
states, statutes have been enacted to relieve the retailer,
20
and sometimes also the wholesaler, from strict liability.80
However, in some states statutes has been introduced to re-
lieve the seller of a defective good from strict liabi-
lity.81
Under certain circumstances claims can be made against
the successor of the original producer of the defective
good.82 This is an exception to the general rule of cor-
porate law, which provides, that the succeeding company does
not assume the liability of the original entity.83 The ge-
neral rule is based on the assumption that the purchaser
obtains no direct benefit and that he did not create the
risk.84 But in some cases, the succeeding company will be
held liable by the courts. For instance, where the purchas-
ing corporation agrees to assume the responsibility of the
original corporation, or where a merger or consolidation of
a buying and selling firm occur~85 However, it should be
noticed that most of the acquisitions of companies are
mergers, and, thus, lead to a liability of the newly suc-
ceeding entity.86 Therefore, in most cases, and despite the
general rule of nonliability, US courts will recognize a
'piercing of the corporate veil' by placing liability on the
succeeding corporation.
2. In the Federal Republic of Germany
a) Plaintiff
As in the United States the primary plaintiff in Ger-
many is the person who was injured by the defective product
21
itself, regardless of whether he was the user or end the
consumer, or if he was a bystander in such an action. But
this is only with regard to claims based on torts. The Ger-
man laws, similar to the US system, recognize both tortious
and contractual liability.87 Thus, these laws limit the
range of the persons who can make the appropriate claims.
People who are in 'direct privity' with the defendant, usu-
ally the buyer of the goods, can sue based on the contracts.
Also, members of the family, dependants and other bystanders
have a claim, but only under certain circumstances.88
However, unlike the French laws, the German law system
allows the plaintiff to sue in torts and contractual liabi-
lity at the same time; one action is not excluded by the
other. 89 Although a successful action can be made by the
party only if she has a valid claim against the defendant,
procedurally the claimant can sue simultaneously.90
Under the new ProdHaftG, the scope of potential clai-
mants will be similar to those under tort laws. To es-
tablish a claim of liability pursuant to § 1 ProdHaftG, the
only requirement is that the claimant was physically in-
jured.91 Therefore, a claim can be brought by any injured
person. Herein included are employees, private consumer,
but also mere bystanders as well as professional buyers.
However, concerning claims for damages to things, profes-
sional buyers are excluded.
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b) Defendant
Concerning the liability of a producer, the same basic
distinctions between contractual and tortious liability
creates some differences. As in the US and France, the
'privity of contract' theory determines that a claim can be
brought only against a defendant within such a relationship.
Due to the lack of contractual relation, the manufacturer
usually cannot be made a party of such a claim.92 Also,
someone who sells products which are not manufactured by
him, but only under his name, is not considered to be a
sound defendant. 93
Actions based on torts can be brought against both manufac-
turer and distributor of the defective product, but their
degree of liability might be different.94 Manufacturers who
only assemble goods, can also be held liable.95 Even the
'head of the production' within a company can be held liable
according to the German courts.96 Under certain circumstan-
ces, a claim against the successor of the original manufac-
turer can be made, but only if the new company is a succeed-
ing company pursuant to § 25 HGB.97
The new ProdHaftG provides in § 4 the range of the
potential defendants.98 Pursuant to this provision, the
liability is not restricted to the actual manufacturer, but
includes other parties in the distribution chain. Even the
producer of parts or of basic materials for the creation of
the final product is subject to this liability. This res-
ponsibility encompasses also the assembler and the 'brander'
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of a product, who is not currently subject to liability.99
'Brander' is the distributor who puts his label on the
goods, thus creating the impression that they originate from
him. Such distributors, who are deemed to be the producer
of the goods, are called 'quasi-producer' ("Quasi-Herstel-
ler,,).lOO
3. In France
a) User/End Consumer as Plaintiff
As in the German or American legal system, the answer
to the question of who can be a proper party depends on the
kind of action. Claims can be based on contractual or tort
law, but both claims cannot be made at the same time.lOl
This is required by the French rule of "non-cumul", which
states that a victim cannot choose between the two bases of
liability, tort or contractual re~ponsibility.102 According
to that precept, the contractual party, usually the buyer of
the defective product, only has the right to sue in con-
tracts, rather than in torts.103 But the French courts have
expanded that role to the subsequent buyers.104 Those per-
sons can sue the manufacturer in an 'action directe' for
contractual liability even though they purchased the object
from a retailer.lOS
Injured persons who are not in such a direct relation
with the defendant, especially bystanders but also the mem-
bers of the family of the buyer of the defective product,
are treated as bystanders. lOG Therefore, the only remedy
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which they have against the seller or manufacturer , is the
right to sue in tort.107
b) Defendant
Potential defendants in products liability actions are
the seller, the supplier, and the manufacturer of the defec-
tive merchandise. lOB Art. 1645 of the French Civil Code
requires privity of contract between the plaintiff and the
seller for an action based on warranty liability. According
to French procedural law, the defendant in such an action
may bring a third party proceedings for indemnity against
his own seller.109 As a result of these indemnity claims,
the manufacturer will ultimately be held liable for the de-
fect. Therefore, despite the 'privity requirement', the
French courts allow the victim to bring actions directly
against the manufacturer.110
Because actions in tort are not based on a contractual
relation between the parties, claims can also be made
against the producer and distributor at the same time.
4. Differences and Conclusions
By comparing the different legal systems it can be
noted that the courts by trying to establish an efficient
consumer protection, have expanded the scope of the poten-
tial parties in products liability cases. However, with
regard to the position of bystanders and retailers, there
are still some differences. The broadest range of potential
defendants exists in the united States. Here, all links in
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the chain of distribution are subject to liability for a
product's defectiveness and therefore can be sued. The re-
tailer as well as the producer are included in this liabili-
ty; even the producer of components or a mere retailer can
be held liable. However, differences also exist between the
various states; some might deviate from the broad scheme,
others, for instance, have enacted statutes relieving the
retailer from strict liability.
In contrast, the French and German laws still have re-
strictions regarding the potential defendants. These re-
strictions especially limit the possibility of bringing
actions where the claims are based on contractual liability
in case the plaintiff is a bystander. With contractual
claims, both the French and the German system demand privity
of contract between the plaintiff and defendant, thus limit-
ing the range of the possible defendants to the seller of
the defective product. But the French laws allows one ex-
ception; the manufacturer might be sued in a 'direct ac-
tion'. In torts actions, the German law allows claimants in
principle to bring claims against all different parties in
the chain of distribution. This result will be explicitly
stated by the rules of the new German ProdHaftG. The US law
and the German law, as opposed to those of France, allow
claims to be brought based on different causes of action,
for instance on torts and contracts, at the same time. This
allows the plaintiff to bring actions on all possible
grounds and does not require a selection process which might
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result in the wrong cause of action. Under US laws a suc-
ceeding company may, under certain limited circumstances, be
forced to assume the liability of its predecessor. But most
of the time, the 'corporate veil' protects these new com-
panies. The situation in Germany is similarly resolved, for
as in the US, the liability of the original company will be
imposed on the succeeding corporation under certain cir-
cumstances.
Considering the different countries, it has to be
noticed that products liability laws in all three countries
are similar. However, the French laws are more restrictive
with regard to contractual liability and also compel the
claimant to choose between contractual or tort actions.
Bystanders under the new German ProdHaftG are explicitly
entitled to bring lawsuit. I~ contrast, some states in the
United States are still reluctant to recognize such a cause
of action of mere bystanders.
B. Standard of Liability
The major point of interest for the victim in a trans-
national action is what country provides the most favorable
substantive law for his claim. The laws of one state might
allow recovery while in the other forum's statutes of limi-
tation, rules of evidence or simply a different legal stan-
dard prevent the redress of the injured party.
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Hence, the claimant has to compare the available laws
to make his decision.
1. In the United States
As already stated, consumers can bring an action in
products liability on three different grounds: breach of
contract, negligence and strict liability in tort. In most
jurisdiction all three theories are available as means for
recovery. 111 This requires defining the term 'product', be-
cause this sets the starting point for such claims.
However, the exact definition of this term is still
disputed. 112 In the past, only chattel was considered a
product, but this understanding had been extended by the
courts to secure an effective protection of the consu-
rners.113 Today, for instance, electricityl14, and live
animalsl15 (but not bloodl16) are considered 'products';
however, those decisions are not recognized in all jurisdic-
tions. Another attempt at clarifying the definition of pro-
duct is found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
lists the items which can be considered as a 'product,.117
Some statesl18 have enacted products liability acts contain-
ing definitions; also, the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act gives a definition.119 Thus, whether an object can be
considered a 'product' for a product liability action de-
pends on the particular case.
The definition of a 'defect' faces the same difficul-
ties. The existence of a 'defect' can be assumed in cases of
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faulty manufacturing or production, improper design, and
also the manufacturer's improper instructions to the con-
sumer on the product's use, or where the producer made a
misrepresentation concerning the quality of the good.120
But these descriptions are not complete, and the question of
which standard should be applied remains. Thus, consumer
expectations can be a crucial point in determining whether
the product is defective,121 especially since the Restate-
ment gives support to this understanding.122 However, other
courts differ from this understanding and use other stan-
dards, for instance, they ask if the product was 'unreasona-
bly dangerous,.123 In areas like design defects, other
approaches based on a more economic understanding of the
defectiveness of a product, for instance the 'risk-utility-
test', have been used to achieve a fair result.124 In
design defect cases, the adjudication in general has even
been questioned.125 However, all of the different standards
are encumbered by the general obstacle to find a certain
clarity in using them. But here again, the question of
defectiveness depends on the individual case and on the
various jurisdictions.
a) Breach of Warranty
Breach of warranty as basis for recovery is recognized
by all states in the United States, except Louisiana.126
The liability arises from the seller's expressed or implied
representation to the buyer or user of the particular good.
If the resulting warranty does not comply with the actual
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condition of the good and lead to damages, these can be re-
covered under this theory.
Originally, claims for breach of warranty, whether
implied or expressed, required a 'privity of contract' bet-
ween the parties.127 But after World War I, the courts for-
sook this condition with regard to Product Liability
cases.128 This was necessary because the seller usually did
not have the means to compensate and thus was not a valuable
defendant. Today, only a few jurisdiction still demand a
'privity of contract' relation between the parties.129
A warranty by the seller or manufacturer can be given
explicitly or impliedly.130 An expressed warranty can simp-
ly be the result of an advertisement stating the quality of
the product.131 An expressed warranty exists, because, the
manufacturer made the public believe in the qualities of
their products.132 The kind of statement, that establishes
an expressed warranty is determined by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC).133 Thus, an expressed warranty, needs to
contain an "affirmation of fact or promise".134 Hence, the
issue of whether a representation made by the seller is an
expressed warranty depends on whether the statement was too
vague. 135 However, a general trend among court judgments
cannot be deduced because the decisions only refer to
single, unique cases.
The second form of warranty is an implied warranty.
Contrary to an express warranty, affirmative misrepresenta-
tions are not required. According to the UCC § 2-314,
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warranty "...is implied in a contract if the seller is a
merchant. ,,136
Section 2-314 UCC provides for an implied warranty of
merchantability for goods, and § 2-315, in addition, regu-
lates the implied warranty concerning the "fitness for a
particular purpose". A warranty of 'merchantability' is
usually given only by merchants, who are defined in
§ 2-104(1) UCC. In general, such a warranty is not given in
isolated sales by nonmerchants.137 In contrast a warranty
of 'fitness for certain purpose' may be given by any
seller138, regardless of whether he is a merchant or not.
For both warranties, the point in time to which the warranty
refers is the same. The moment the-product leaves control
of the seller or producer, the guaranteed conditions have to
be present.139
A particular impediment concerning the recovery under
breach of warranty rules is the requirement of notice. The
buyer has to give notice of breach to the seller within
reasonable time, § 2-607(3). This appears to be a major
hindrance for recovery. Thus, the consumer, who was simply
unaware of this duty, will be barred from recovery if he
forgot to comply with the notice requirement.140
b) Negligence
Before the well-known decision of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor co.141, the US courts did adhere to the old English
law rule of 'privity in contact,.142 This rule denied lia-
bility [for negligence] of the producer or seller against
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persons not within 'privity of contract'. In MacPherson v.
Buick Motors Co., the court dispensed with this privity
obstacle, allowing claims for negligence against even a
remote producer of a product. The standard for negligent
liability with regard to defective products is that of a
reasonable, careful person who is in the position of a
seller or producer.143 The seller's or producer's duties
include the obligations to warn of foreseeable dangers, to
inspect and test new products completely, and, also, to keep
the design and manufacturing of the products in compliance
with the industrial or legal standards. In determining the
standard for the duty of care, most courts take into consi-
deration the compliance with 'state-of-the-art' technolo-
gies.144 But this standard is only relevant evidence, not
the decisive factor.145 This standard of evidence should
not be confused with 'current standard' of the industry.146
Nowadays, the scope of duties is sometimes described by
statutes or other regulations; for instance, the Consumer
Product Safety Act and the National High Way Traffic and
Motorvehicle Safety Act.147 However, this is only a trend,
and such statutes do not provide the complete standard.
Generally speaking, it can be said that the manufacturer or
seller has to build or handle treat a particular product by
using due care.148
c) Strict Liability in Torts
The first decision where strict liability was explicit-
ly recognized by a court was in Greenman v. Yuba Power Pro-
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ducts, Inc.149 In this case, despite the judgement of the
lower court based in breach of express warranties, the Ap-
pellate Division held that the mere act of placing a
defective product on the market can establish liability. In
any case, where this is done with the knowledge of the manu-
facturer that the product will be used without inspection
for faults, and where such use resulted in injuries, the
producer is subject to liability.150 In Greenman, the court
not only denied the prerequisite of a 'privity of contract'
between the parties, but also the need of giving notice in
breach of warranty cases.151 The developments following
this case finally lead to the draft of a strict liability
provision by the American Law Institute. The basic elements
of this liability are described in § 402A Restatement (Se-
cond) of Torts.152 This provision explicitly imposes a
strict liability only on the seller of a product. Section
402A has not resulted in a restriction of liability because
it is not a prerequisite that the seller engages primarily
in the sale of the particular product, although § 402A usu-
ally does not apply to an isolated sale by an occasional
seller.153 Strict liability gives a certain guaranty in
favor of the buyer of a product, but it still has to be dis-
tinguished from a warranty pursuant to the uee or any kind
given in the sale of goods.154 Also, 'strict liability' is
not absolute liability. As stated in § 402A (1), liability
applies only to 'defective' products which are 'unreasonably
dangerous,.155 A product is considered to be 'unreasonably
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dangerous' in a case where it is regarded as dangerous
beyond the extent which can be contemplated by an ordinary
consumer. 156 But some states do not apply the standard of
'unreasonably dangerous,.157 These states apply different,
but somewhat similar standards. New York uses a standard of
being 'not unreasonably safe,158, Pennsylvania uses a stan-
dard of 'safe for its intended use,.159 Most but not all
states have adopted the standard of § 402A Restatement
(Second) of Torts.160 Some states, like Michigan161 or
Massachusetts162, are using principles other than strict
liability in torts, however they achieve the same re-
sults.163 With regard to the issue of whether the product
was 'unreasonable safe', the defendant can introduce evi-
dence showing that he complied with the standard of science
and technology (proof of state-of-the-art).164 But it
should be noted that 'state-of-the-art' is an ambiguous
term, regarding to its definition as well as to its use in
trial.165 Today, in states with products liability laws,
statutes usually regulate the 'state-of-the-art', in general
as a defense.166 In states where such provisions are not
available, the issue is whether this defense is permissible
evidence. 167 In the past it was generally considered to be
relevant evidence168, but after the Besheda v.Johns-Manville
products169 case the question of admissibility arose again.
In this case of an asbestos-caused disease, the New Jersey
Supreme Court imposed 'strict liability' for failure to warn
on the defendant.170 The court held that this liability
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could be inflicted on the manufacturer, however the risks of
which the producer failed to warn, were "...undiscoverable
at the time of the manufacturer".171 The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that this defensive evidence has to be excluded
because of the nature of strict liability.172 Since in
'strict liability' cases, unlike in actions for negligence',
the conduct of the manufacturer is not relevant but the
quality of the product, thus his knowledge of the defect is
irrelevant. 173 The court justified its holding on policy
reasons, like 'risk spreading', 'deterrence' and also to
avoid possible difficulties in the 'fact-finding pro-
cess,.174 Although other courts175 have agreed with the New
Jersey Supreme Court concerning the clear distinction bet-
ween 'strict liability' and 'negligence', it has been criti-
cized that the court considered the 'state of the art' de-
fense necessarily linked to negligence but not to 'strict
liability,.176
However, later in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories177
the New Jersey Appellate Division impliedly held that such
evidence can be admissible.178 In its decision the court
first stated that 'strict liability' is also applicable to
the manufacturers of prescription drugs179, since failure to
warn can be held to be a kind of 'design defect,.180 Then
the court concluded that under a 'strict liability' theory,
'failure to warn', and 'design defect' cases command for the
same examination: "...whether, assuming the manufacturer
knew of the defect in the product, he acted in a reasonably
35
prudent manner. in marketing the product or in providing the
warnings given. Thus, once the defendant's knowledge of the
defect is imputed, strict liability analysis becomes almost
identical to negligence analysis in its focus on the reason-
ableness of the defendant's conduct.,,181 Hereby the court,
applying a 'strict liability' theory, turned away from an
only product orientated view, and took into account the
defendant's conduct.182 Based on this analysis, the court
stated that 'state-of-the-art' evidence would be relevant
for measuring the reasonableness of defendant's conduct.183
Eventually, the court held that this was not meant to over-
rule Besheda, since Besheda did not mean that in all cases
which involve 'failure to warn', the knowledge of the manu-
facturer is without relevance.184 The reason for this
decision was, according to the court, that the strict liabi-
lity theory does not make the producer to an insurer against
all possible injuries arising from the use of a his pro-
duct.185 Therefore, not foreseeable risks have to be
excluded from his liability, and thus, a defense like state-
of-the-art, has to be permitted.18G Comparing Besheda with
Feldman, the result is that, besides in cases similar to
Besheda (asbestos caused disease)187 'state-of-the-art' will
result in a bar for recovery if the producer is able to con-
vince the jury that he had no knowledge about the risks when
he put the product into the market.188 But the future will
show, whether Besheda was more than a unique case of an at-
tempt to establish a theory of 'absolute liability' or not.
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Another development of expanding the liability of the
manufacturer, which in Europe has been noticed with great
concern189, are presented by the theories of 'industry-wide
liability theory', and the 'market-share-liability' .190 The
former applies where the specific manufacturer could not be
identified, but a industry-wide standard leads to the con-
clusion of a joint liability of the producers.191 The lat-
ter, which has also been developed in DES cases192, shifts
the costs for the injuries to the industry in case no par-
ticular defendant can be identified, but the market-share of
the defendant companies is so large, that it is likely that
the product was produced by the defendant.193 However,
these theories have not been widely followed, and it has
been proposed that this issue should be solved by the legis-
lation.194
2. In the Federal Republic of Germany
Today the German legal system knows two different types
of liability for defective products, contractual liability
and liability based on torts. Although in practice the Ger-
man Law concerning products liability is that of torts,
rather than of contractual responsibility.195 The reason
for this posture is a practical reason since under the law
of contracts, the recovery of damages is limited and also
the short statute of limitation period makes it more dif-
ficult to recover under these laws.196
An other reason for such attitude is the different in-
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terpretation of 'products liability' in German Law. In
cases where the damages is closely linked to the agreed
qualities of a product, only the contractual remedies apply,
but not those in torts.197 Contract laws are determined to
establish a contractual guarantee of the seller or producer
for the possibility to use the product in the intended'
way.198 In contrary hereto, tort law is supposed to protect
the consumer from damages to this property and his person
which are the results of hazards and failing safeguards.199
Only in case that both interests are different, tort law is
applicable. 200 Thus, such liability can be described as one
which arises from the use of the defective product; it is
primarily concerned with the damages to persons and proper-
ty.201 Contractual liability covers mainly damages to the
product itself; although, under certain circumstances it can
cover other damages as well.202 However, even the different
remedies might lead to different results, the German 'Bun-
desgerichtshof' upheld a case where a tort action was
brought to evade the contractual limitation period and a
disclaimer clause.203 The crucial elements in actions for
'Product Liability' are the range of the protected products
and the existence of a defect. Therefore, these two con-
cepts are dealt with first.
a) Under Current Law - until August 1988
(1) Breach of Warranty
Any item which is according to German law a 'thing', a
tangible item ("Sache"), can be the subject of a contractual
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warranty.204 Pursuant to § 90 of the German civil code (her-
einafter BGB), 'things' are all material objects.205 The
scope of protection depends on the sort of representation
which was made.
According to German warranty laws, the seller of a
product has to guarantee the absence of latent defects,"
§ 459 I BGB, and the presence of explicitly promised
qualities, § 459 II BGB.206 However, the warranty of the
product's quality according to this provision does not pro-
vide 'real' products liability. Section 459 II 1 BGB im-
poses only liability for damages to the product itself, and
it guarantees the obligation of the buyer to make pay-
ment.207 Pursuant to § 459 I BGB, the seller has to guaran-
tee that his product is free from defects that diminish or
terminate its fitness for the"general or specific use pro-
vided for in the contract.208" Besides this implied war-
ranty, § 459 (II) BGB provides an additional remedy in case
of an expressed warranty.209 Pursuant to § 459 (II) BGB,
breach of this contractual expressed warranty triggers the
seller's liability, regardless of his negligence.210
The contractual liability, based on the breach of war-
ranties, provides only limited remedies. According to
§§ 459(1), 462 BGB, the plaintiff only has the possibility
of reducing the price or rescinding the sales contract.211
He can recover damages only if the seller made an expressed
warranty regarding certain qualities of the product, § 459
(II) BGB.212 Thus, the query, of whether a contractual
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claim for damages can be made depends on the decision of the
individual court in every single case. In case the court
finds an expressed warranty according to § 459 II BGB, the
plaintiff will be able to obtain compensation. Due to a
liberal posture of the German courts regarding this issue, a
court will quite often find such explicitly promised quali-
ties.2l3 However the requirement of 'privity of contract'
and the restrictions concerning the recovery of damages
limit the practical use of contractual products liability
claims.2l4
(2) Positive Breach of Contract
Originally the German law recognized only two basic
forms of irregularity in contractual relations, "impossibi-
lity" and "delay".2l5 Later, this proved to cover not all
possibilities in contractual relations.2l6 According to
German law, every contract establishes additional duties
beyond those which can be described as the main duties or
obligations of a contract. These main duties are the vir-
tual reason for the conclusion of the contract.2l7 A breach
of these extra obligations can establish liability of a
seller, if he or the producer was negligent. The required
'fault' element of such claim is defined according to the
general contractual standard. Pursuant § 276 BGB, someone
acts negligently if she fails to comply with the standard of
care which is required in regular transactions.2l8 These
additional obligations are not codified but are the result
of the general principle for contractual performance, stated
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in § 242 BGB, the so-called 'good faith' clause.2l9 Because
these duties are not codified, their scope has been
determined by case law.220 Also, the application of this
theory of liability is restricted by the fact that it is
only a subsidiary remedy.22l Therefore it can be applied
only if no other cause of action exists, under tort law, or
contractual theory. This, and the fact that the scope of
the 'additional' duties is sometimes difficult to determine
explains why 'positive breach of contract' is not used more
often for recovery.222
A recovery based on a contractual remedy provides some
advantages for the consumer concerning the liability of the
other party. According to § 278 BGB, the parties of a con-
tract are responsible for the negligence of any assisting
party, so-called "Erflillungsgehilfe".223 But liability only
arises when this assistance is provided in fulfillment of
the contractual obligations of the parties.224 Like the US
principle of vicarious liability225, but unlike the situa-
tion in German torts law226, the seller or producer who was
using such aid, cannot escape his liability for the negli-
gence of his "Erflillungsgehilfe".227
(3) Extra-contractual Products Liability - § 823 BGB
This part of the German law which also governs the lia-
bility of producer for the defective products belongs to the
law of tort, §§ 823 BGB (Civil Code).228 In order to fur-
nish the consumer with a workable protection against defec-
tive products, the courts have modified these rules.229
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Every tangible object is subject to this extra-contractual
liability, regardless whether it is suppose to be consumed
or serve as means for production, but services are excluded
from liability.230 Possible defects includes manufacturing
and design defects, and failure to warn or instruct the con-
sumer in an appropriate way.231 A product is considered not
defective only if it fits the intended or agreed purpose and
is safe.232 Additionally, the product's use has to be
safe233 and has to comply with minimum principles of safe-
ty.234 The standard is not defined by the expectation of
the individual consumer, but rather by the reasonable expec-
tations of the public at large.235 Since the product liabi-
lity is only considered to be a category of violating the
'general duties of care' ("Verkehrssicherungspflichten"),
the standard of defectiveness has to be an objective one,
hence taking into account the reasonable expectations of the
public. 236 In determining whether the product is defective
the judge will take into account additional factors. For
instance, in case the product is a dangerous one, but the
risks are unavoidable, he will consider all circumstan-
ces.237 In such case the manufacturer is only liable for
damages, in case the failure to warn properly has been the
certain cause of the damages; the mere likelihood is not
sufficient to impose responsibility upon the producer in
such situation.238 This concept of different duties in-
cludes a very flexible notion; thus it allows to take into
account all particularities of each case.239
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The basic provision, § 823 I BGB, provides for liabil-
ity for any wilful or negligent damage or injury to life,
body, health, liberty, property or other protected inter-
ests.240 The first element which has to be substantiated is
the occurrence of damages; and secondly, that it was caused
by the defendant.241 Further the defendant has to be shown
to have acted wilfully or negligently242, and unlawfully.
Negligence is defined, pursuant to § 276 BGB, as nonobser-
vance of care which is customary under the circumstances.243
However, this requirement of fault is difficult to prove.244
In torts actions against the manufacturer where the defect
was due to an incident in the manufacturing process, it is
particularly difficult to recover. In these actions, the
producer could, based on § 831 BGB, avoid his liability.245
According to this provision, the employer (master) is liable
for the damages caused by his servant (employee) if the em-
ployer was at fault in the selection or supervision.246
Section 831 BGB provides for a presumption of fault concern-
ing this selection and supervision, but this presumption is
a rebuttable one. If the sued manufacturer proves that he
has properly selected, trained and supervised his employ-
ee247, he will escape liability. In the past, therefore, it
was not very likely to be successful in suing manufacturers.
Since the company usually could show that it had carefully
selected the staff which supervised the manufacturing of a
product, the employer could escape liability.248 The answer
of the courts to this limitation on liability was the
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formation of specific case law which generally limited the
effect of this provision.249 The case law, has imposed a
general obligation on the manufacturer to protect others
from injuries and damages, the general duties of care ("Ver-
kehrssicherungspflichten"). To those duties correspondent,
in case of their violations, the resulting defects.250 The
courts assumed a duty of the manufacturer to avoid manufac-
turing defects ("Fabrikationsfehler") 251, design defects
("Konstruktionsfehler")252 and failure to instruct the con-
sumer properly or to warn against dangers of the product
("Instruktionsfehler").253 Furthermore, there is also the
duty of the producer to monitor his products, thus creating
a duty to react to the accident record of recently released
goods.254
Besides the basic tort provision, § 823 II BGB, creates
liability for damage caused by, the violation of laws pro-
tecting the rights of third parties.255 A great number of
protective statutes in the spirit of § 823 II BGB have been
enacted. 256 These kind of statutes include all those civil
and public law regulations whose major purpose is to protect
an individual or a group of people rather than the public as
a whole.257 Thus, if the producer has violated a particular
statute which is a 'protective law' according to § 823 II
BGB, the plaintiff does have to substantiate that the defen-
dant's conduct directly caused his injuries.258 But § 823
BGB, does not mitigate the claim of the injured victim very
much. Since, it has to be observed that even though, certain
44
'protective laws' state that they can be violated without
fault, § 823 II BGB requires 'fault' on behalf of the
defendant. 259 Hence, § 823 II BGB limits the effect of the
'strict liability' of such protection laws by demanding for
the existence of 'fault'.
(4) Special Acts: Pharmaceutical Act260
As a special law261, which provides a strict liability
for the producer of pharmaceutical products, this statute
introduced such a standard of liability for a manufacturer
for the first time.262 Thus, no negligence has to be
proven, and the only requirement for a valid claim is to
establish that the drug, even properly used, had a harmful
effect, and that the resulting damages are beyond the stan-
dards set by medical science.263 Considering the scope of
the liability which is determined by this law, it is remark-
able that even in case where the manufacturer did not act
negligently, he is held liable; the same is true for dangers
which could not be foreseen, so-called 'development
risks,.264 But liability is only incurred when the product
was used in the intended way.265
b) Under the new 'ProdHaftG'
By the 1st of August 1988 a German law implementing the
rules of the EC Directive has to be adopted. The first
draft of this new piece of legislation has already been
finished. Briefly, the new German ProdHaftG will result in
the following changes. A major change that the new law will
introduce is a basic form of 'strict liability,.266 This
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particular principle of liability which, until now, has been
enacted only in special laws267, will not lead to many
changes because most of the results, with regard to the
scope of liability, have been already forestalled by the
jurisdiction of the German 'Bundesgerichtshof,.268 The new
law imposes a more rigid liability on the manufacturer for a
product defect. The potential defendant is primarily the
manufacturer of a product, but also can be the importer of
goodS269 and sometimes, under particular circumstances, the
seller.270 The current German law does not impose a liabi-
lity for defectiveness of products which could not been
avoided even under utmost care and control of the manufac-
turing process.271 The new Act, however, charges the pro-
ducer with this liability, since the 'strict liability' is
not related to 'fault'. The definition 'product' follows
the previously used categories, but 'electricity' is now
explicitly mentioned as to be a 'product,.27Z The standard
for 'defectiveness' of a product is consistent with the cur-
rent standard.273 Basically, the manufacturer is respon-
sible for all kind of defects. But consistent with the
previous jurisdiction of the German courts, the new Act will
exempt the manufacturer from liability for defects in de-
velopment under 'state-of-the-art' defenses.274 With regard
to the interference of third parties, another improvement
consumer protection has been enacted. A claim of an injured
consumer will not be reduced because the harm was not only
caused by the product but also by an action of a third
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person.275 Damages can be claimed for under the new Act in
cases of death, injuries, and damages276.
For agricultural production, a special exception will
be included in the new law.277 Further, the German draft
contains a ceiling of the amount of money for which the pro-
ducer is liable.278 The proposed ceiling is be 160 billion
Deutsche Mark.279
3. In France
The French law like the German law provides two dif-
ferent bases for the liability of a manufacturer for his
defective products - contractual and tortious respon-
sibility.280
a) Contractual Liability
Contractual compensation can be claimed based on Art.
1641-1649 of the French Code Civil.281 According to Art.
1641 the seller of a product is required to warrant against
hidden defects, so-called 'vice cache' in his goods.282 A
product is defective if the defect renders it unfit for the
intended use or diminishes the product's value in a way that
the purchaser would not have acquired it if he had known
about the defect.283 The intended use must be a normal one,
or a use establishes in a special agreement on.284 Also,
the defect does not have to be an obvious one, but rather
may be latent; a defect which could be discovered by a su-
perficial examination is not subject to the seller's war-
ranty.285 But the seller who is unaware of the defect has,
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as declared in Art. 1646 C.Civ., only limited liability.
This means the purchaser can only ask for the restitution in
the amount he paid for the item. In contrast, the vendor
who knows about the fault at the time he sold the product is
obligated to pay all the damages and losses which are suf-
fered by the buyer.286 Because of the limitations of lia-
bility which are created by Art. 1646 C.Civ. and the practi-
cal difficulties to establish the 'male fides', the seller's
knowledge of the defect, a buyer was not likely to make out
a successful claim based on contractual liability.287 To
answer that problem, the French courts modified the inter-
pretation of those statutes. 288 As a result of that modi-
fication, the scope of products has been expanded by the
courts.289 In addition, the extent of liability of a pro-
fessional seller29O, usually a merchant, for product de-
fects, has been extended.291 The courts now require the
professional seller to know of any defect; thus, he has to
warrant the absence of even latent defect.292 This liabi-
lity does even abate if the professional seller can prove
that she had no knowledge of the defect, nor could reasonab-
ly have been expected to know about the defect, nor had the
necessary capability to discover the defect.293 Due to that
judicial development, a French professional seller is
'strictly liable' for latent defects of her goods. But de-
spite this particular liability, the plaintiff in this kind
of case still faces another problem. Art. 1648 C.Civ. allows
for only a short time to bring such an action.294 The
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length of the time is based upon the discretion of the
courts.295 However, a very short period of time could lead
to quite unfair results. To answer this problem, the courts
have held that period in which to bring a claim can be a few
days to several months; it always depends on the single
case.
b) Extra-contractual Compensation (Code of Obligations)
Because of the rule of 'non-cumule', the injured per-
son who is not a buyer must seek relief in a tort claim,
pursuant to Art. 1382-1384 C.Civ.296 According to Art. 1382
C.Civ., the claimant has to substantiate and to prove the
negligence of the manufacturer.
In comparison to the buyer of a product, this seems to
be an unjust impediment, because the purchaser does not have
this duty; he only has to establish the defect of the
product. 297 In light of this situation, the French 'Cour de
Cassation,298 has been willing to equate the requirements
for contractual liability with those for non-contractual
parties. This was necessary to provide a mere bystander and
a contracting party with the same basic protection in
products liability cases.299 Based on this posture, the
French courts decided that even the 'marketing,300 of a
defective product establishes 'per se' the fault on the part
of the producer or seller.301
Besides Art. 1382, Art. 1383 C.Civ. allows for the re-
covery of damages arising from the misuse of a product.302
Art. 1383 C.Civ. imposes on the manufacturer or seller the
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duty to take all precautionary measures which are necessary
to avoid damages caused by the product.303
But the French courts do grant remedies which are even
more consumer orientated. Art. 1384 (1) C.Civ.304 imposes
on the persons having "control" over a certain product
liability for any damages caused by it.305 The interpreta-
tion of this provision has been expanded by the court to
provide a useful device for establishing comprehensive
liability, inter alia, in products liability cases.306 This
liability is imposed on the producer as the 'custodian' who
has control over the object at issue.307 This 'garde de la
chose,308, can be, according to the French Cour de Cassa-
tion, divided in a way that one person is the "gardien du
comportement" (responsible for the conduct of a person) and
another individual is the "gardien de la structure" (liable
for the quality and the struct~re of a product).309 The
producer is responsible for the quality of a product, and
thus, he is liable for damages caused by the product.310
This understanding of Art. 1384 C.Civ. gives the court a
means to impose a strict liability311 on the producer or
distributor of defective goods.312
c) Special Laws in France
Besides the general civil laws special laws exist which
impose a 'strict liability' for defective products upon cer-
tain people.313 For instance, special laws provide for
'strict liability' with regard to 'aerial cable cars,314 and
aircraft-carriers. 315
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4. Conclusions and Differences
In contrast to the strict liability of the United
States, the EC Directive does not impose liability on
'professional distributors', nor does the 'German Prod-
HaftG,.316 A claim based on a design defect still requires
the manufacturer to be at fault since Art.? of the EC V1rec-
tive permits the manufacturer to invoke the 'state-of-the-
art' defense, as long as the EC member state did not dero-
gate from this principle. Due to the fact that France
already has imposed a rigorous standard of liability upon
manufacturer and distributor, it is expected that they will
opt out of the EC's Directive state of the art defense.
Thus, lacking this defense, the French manufacturer faces
liability which is even more rigid than in the United
States.
As opposed to the US rules of contributory negligence,
the EC Directive follows the theory of comparative negli-
gence. These rules will be followed by Germany and, probab-
ly, France, since the Directive is according to the current
position of the courts of both countries.
The various systems offer similar standards of liabi-
lity which lead in general to the same results. The current
German system, through the presumption of fault, as the new
German 'ProdHaftG', will usually provide the same results
because the basic principles as stated in the new law, have
been already foreshadowed by the German courts. In addi-
tion, contractual remedies (breach of warranty) are not
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abolished by the new law. Those principles can be used
together with the new act to bring an action. However, the
new law clarifies the consumer's situation and the protec-
tion available for him. Also, it makes it easier for a in-
jured party to bring claim, since the consumer does not have
to establish the fault of the manufacturer.
Some elements are required under all schemes, for in-
stance with regard to a tort claim for product defect, all
systems require that the defect exist when the product was
put into circulation and that the plaintiff substantiate the
causal link between the damages and the defect.
Breach of warranty actions in all three countries face
the initial problem of differentiating between implied and
expressed warranty. In addition, the remedies under German
law for such a breach are limited, since compensation is not
the usual remedy. Here, an action based on 'Positive Breach
of Contract' might be helpful, but due to its subsidiary
character such theory will not be applied very easily.
c. Defenses
The manufacturer, as a defendant in a products liabi-
lity action, is naturally seeking to avoid the claim. Thus,
the consumer who wants to shop for his best forum has to
consider the possible defenses as well. The defendant's
defenses can be decisive to the success of the plaintiff's
claim.
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1. In the United States
Defenses have to be affirmatively pleaded and are
defined in the Federal Rules of Civil procedure317 as well
as in state laws.318
a) Product Modifications and Subsequent Repairs
The defendant, whether a manufacturer or seller of
product, might avoid liability if the product was modified
after it left his control. These cases often involve equip-
ment or machinery which someone attempted to alter or
improve319, for example, to increase the utility of a de-
vice.320 Modification or alteration of a product estab-
lishes a defense in strict liability, negligence and also in
breach of warranty.321 Concerning strict liability the de-
fense is explicitly mentioned in § 402 (I)(b), of the Res-
tatement (Second) of Torts.322 However, not all alterations
relieve the manufacturer of liability. In strict liability
cases, the modification has to be a substantial one.323 But
the courts have difficulty determining what exactly a 'sub-
stantial' alteration means. In some jurisdictions, the
courts use the standard of foreseeability, while in others
they ask if the modification made the product unsafe.324
But in general, foreseeability plays the decisive role in
determining liability.325 Based on the elements of 'fore-
seeability', a modification will not free the producer from
liability if it is foreseeable.
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b) Misuse
'Misuse', a use which was not intended nor foreseeable
by the manufacturer, is a frequently raised defense.326 In
actions based on negligence, as well as in actions based on
breach of warranty, this defense results in a barring or
disallowing of the recovery.327 In strict liability ac-
tions, the result can also be to bar the plaintiff's
recovery328, or to reduce the possible amount of recovery
according to the state's comparative negligence doctrine.329
To establish misuse the product has to be handled in such
unusual way that no average consumer would have expected the
product to be designed for.330 Misuse ( or 'abnormal use',
or 'unforeseeable use') has generally been considered to be
a superseding cause; in a few cases even where the product
was defective.331 According to the majority of the US
courts, the decisive test in these cases is whether the
'misuse' was foreseeable for the manufacturer. 332 Thus, a
defendant can escape liability if the 'misuse' or 'abnormal
use' was not foreseeable to him.333
c) Proximate Cause
Another possible defense is based on the interference
of third persons: also, particular events can relieve the
defendant of liability. With regard to the causation of the
injury, the producer can defend himself by alleging that an
intervening act of a third person caused the damage. For
instance in negligence actions, the manufacturer can escape
his liability by showing that the claimants actions were the
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proximate cause of the injury.334 Although this is not a
valid defense, if the plaintiff's alleged negligence was
only the failure to detect the defect or to take safeguards
against its conceivable existence.335 In actions on breach
of warranty, negligence and also strict liability, the al-
teration of a product can result in an intervening or super-
seding cause, thus freeing the producer from his liabili-
ty.336 Nevertheless, in case this alteration has been an-
ticipated, or where it is not a causal link to the damages,
the liability is still imposed on the manufacturer.33? Con-
cerning a defense based on proximate cause, the decisive
point is whether the intervening action was foreseeable.338
However, this foreseeability must not refer to any par-
ticular intervening act, but only to a similar conduct in
general. 339 c) Assumption of Risk, Contributory and Com-
parative Negligence
Another defense, which might bar or diminish the re-
covery is the 'assumption of risk' allegation. Because the
plaintiff voluntarily assumes a risk, and thus was using the
product at his own peril, it is considered to be a de-
fense.340 An implied 'assumption of risk', unlike the
expressed form341, is a important defense in products lia-
bility actions.342 Assumption of risk requires at first
that the claimant's conduct has been voluntary.343 Thus, in
case the claimant's conduct is inadvertent, or he has no
choice than to expose himself to the dangerous product344,
this will not result in an assumption of risk situation.345
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Linked to the voluntariness of the victim's conduct is the
prerequisite that he knows about the potential risks.346
Basically, the standard of knowledge is a subjective one,
and requires that the person does not only know the facts347
creating the danger, but also understand what kind of danger
it is.348 Thus, in case a person is lacking the necessary
comprehension, assumption of risk is not applicable.349
Assumption of risk requires further that the claimant has
been unreasonably exposed to the risk350, with other words,
the claimant has to have a reasonable chance to subject him-
self to the changes or not.351
If the court recognizes the assumption of risk defense,
the result in actions based on negligence will lead to a
complete bar of recovery352; but only if the court still
applies the common-law rule of contributory negligence.353
In jurisdictions which have enacted comparative fault laws
this defense only results in a reduction of the amount which
is recoverable.354 This principle has also been used in
actions based on breach of express warranty.355
In strict liability actions, assumption of risks is a
valid defense.356 Thus, it will lead, similar to the situa-
tion in negligence actions, to a complete bar, or where
'comparative fault' principles have been enacted, to a re-
duction of the possible recovery.357
As shown, connected with assumption of risk are the
theories of contributory negligence and comparative negli-
gence; all are based on the plaintiff's conduct.358
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Contributory negligence359, has as a basic notion that no
one can claim damages from somebody else if his own failure
to exercise due and reasonable care, proximately contributed
to the harm.360 Thus, this principle amounts to an "all or
nothing" rule, because even a very slight failure to exer-
cise the necessary duty of care will result in a total bar
for the plaintiff's recovery. Contributory negligence is
considered a valid defense even in strict liability actions,
thus altering the notion of 'absolute' strict liability;
since it leads to a complete bar of recovery.361
Because of the harsh results of the contributory negli-
gence rule, most states have adopted the comparative negli-
gence theory.362 Pursuant to this rule, the individual
liability of each party will be determined according to its
proportionate fault.363 However, this theory faces the pro-
blem how the apportionment of the relative fault should be
done, sine a precise measurement is not possible.364 But
because it amounts not in the same rigid results as the con-
tributory negligence theory, it is the more favorable_theo-
ry.
d) Disclaimer and Limitations on Liability
In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc.365, the court
declared a disclaimer of liability invalid for public policy
reasons. 366 The bargaining power between the car buyer and
the car manufacturer was too unequal; in such a situation
the buyer only has the choice to accept the offer, and thus
the warranty conditions, or abandon his buying
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intentions. 367 However, at least in the jurisdictions where
the UCC is the governing law, US courts do allow the
producer to limit his liability by the use of disclaimers,
or other forms of liability restriction.368 The major pro-
vision, indicating the validity of such disclaimer, is
§ 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code.369 This provisiori
enables the disclaiming of the implied warranty of merchan-
tability, if the required form is satisfied; for instance
the necessary writing has to be conspicuous.370 Also, the
implied warranty is excluded in case where the buyer has ex-
amined the product (or refused to do so), but only with
regard to defects which an examination would have revealed
to him.371 In addition, the course of dealing or course of
performance or trade usage can lead to a modification or
even exclusion of an implied warranty. 372
Besides the disclaimer, the UCC offers in § 2-719 the
possibility for a manufacturer to limit the remedies "... as
by limiting the buyers remedies of return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-
performance or goods or parts." According to this
provision, the parties are basically free to form their par-
ticular remedies with regard to their needs and inten-
tions.373 However, a minimum amount of adequate remedies
must be available. Thus, § 2-719 [3] does not allow the
limitations of consequential damages for injury of persons
in cases of consumer goods.374
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Today, with regard to consumer products, the Magnusson-
Moss Act375 limits the possibilities of a disclaimer or
restrictions concerning 'any implied warranty', but only if
it is a 'written warranty. ,376 Some states also have
enacted laws which bars the modification of implied warran-
ties by a seller of consumer goods and services.377
In cases where the warranty disclaims responsibility
for negligence or strict liability, the reaction of the
courts is in general a negative one.378 Disclaimers in
strict liability actions are usually not recognized by the
courts. This is especially true in situations where the
claimant is an ordinary consumer.379 The negative posture
of the courts on the object of disclaimer is reflected in
Comment m to § 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts.380 How-
ever, in a contract between enterprises the courts might
uphold the validity of a disclaimer.381 In that case, a
need to protect the buyer does not exist, since the
enterprises are, with respect to their economic bargaining
position, on the same level.
2. In the Federal Republic of Germany
a) Under Current Law
The manufacturer's defenses are especially limited in
the area of tortious liability. Because of the fact that
the manufacturer is presumed to be at fault, he has to prove
that he was not negligent. To do this, it is necessary to
show a compliance with all obligations required by the law.
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Using the state of the art defense, a producer may declare
that a product's defect is due to an unforeseeable develop-
ment risk ("Entwicklungsrisiko")382 and hence claim that he
is not liable for the defect.383
Further, as a defense, the manufacturer can show that
his business was well organized.384 Manufacturers, as well
as the distributors, have to organize their various busi-
nesses to secure the greatest amount of control possible
over the product. Thus, a distributor has to establish a
system which allows him to monitor the quality of the pro-
ducts that he is selling.385 This includes proof that the
defendant did not act negligently in the selection of his
employees. 386 The defendant must further prove, that he
always gave correct instructions to his staff, who were al-
ways under his control.387 In addition the manufacturer has
to show that he sufficiently tested the product before
starting the actual production and a later sale.388 Because
of the fact that a defect usually springs out of the pro-
ducer's business organization, he has to show that the
defect was not due to deficiencies therein.389 Concerning
assembled products, the manufacturer must prove that he ex-
amined the reliability of his supplier; hence, he did comply
with the necessary standard of care.390
b) Under the ProdHaftG
Art 6(II) excludes the manufacturer from liability
arising from certain developmental risks; this defense is
also known as the 'state of the art defense'. The issue is
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whether the producer should be responsible for defects of
his product which already existed when he put it into cir-
culation even though the defect was not discoverable under
the technological standards of that time. The adverse
effects caused by medicines, which only appear after a cer-
tain period of time, are especially subject to that pro- .
blem. Criterion of the possibility to discover the parti-
cular defect is hereby the generally available standard of
technology and science, not the standard of the single
producer. 391
c) Comparative Fault392
The German law provides a special rule for comparative
fault; according to § 254 BGB in these cases the damages
must be allocated according to the different degrees of
fault.393 Thus, when the manufacturer can prove that the
plaintiff, the claiming consumer, was also responsible for
his damages, the manufacturer's liability will be re-
duced.394 This decrease depends on the degree to which
plaintiff's fault contributed to the damages. Section 254
BGB applies to contractual as well as tort actions395 and
leads to an apportionment which is described in mathematic
factors (percentages).
In some cases, the plaintiff manipulations of the pro-
duct, or his other actions lead to his injuries. Here the
defendant can invoke the issue of causation as a defense.
Cases where the plaintiff misused or altered the product are
judged in accordance with these principles. In such a case,
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liability depends on whether the plaintiff's misuse was the
cause of his damages.396 The same is also true when a pro-
duct has been altered. If the plaintiff has altered a pro-
duct, the courts will jUdge it based on the same grounds as
the misuse cases. Thus, where alternation is the only
ground for the cause of action the defendant is freed from
liability. However, if the plaintiff's action is only an
additional cause for the accident, he is still entitled to
recover. This is true even if the defendant's acts were not
the major cause of the injuries.397
3. In France
a) Defenses of the Manufacturer
In contractual actions, the professional seller usually
cannot escape liability; even if he proves that he did not
know or was unable to know of the existence of the defect,
liability will attach anyway.398 Allegation of plaintiff's
misuse and pleading provided by Art. 1641-49 C.Civ. are
other available defenses.399 According to these provisions,
the manufacturer is not liable if the defect was already
manifest or if the buyer was an expert in the same business
field as the seller.400 However, where a consumer is buying
a product this defense will be hardly successful.
Against a claim based on Art. 1382 or 1384 C.Civ.401,
the manufacturer or distributor who is a 'gardien' of the
product, only has a few potential defenses. He can allege
that a 'force majeure' interfered, or that the action of a
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third party intervened thus breaking the chain of causation,
and finally, that the plaintiff was contributory
negligent. 402 A break in the chain of causation arises when
the damages occurred a long time after delivery of the
products. 403 Thus, in case the defective product consists
of a number of parts and it is not possible to detect the.
exact defective part, the courts will deny liability.404
Also, when a third party's actions are found to have caused
the damages, the manufacturer can invoke defense of ,inter-
vening cause'. Further, force majeure let the manufacturer
escape liability since in this case the damages are actually
due to a fortuitous event.405 Finally, in case the defen-
dant shows that the plaintiff is the main or only cause for
the damages, the defendant will escape liability based on
the contributory negligence of the claimant.406 But the
defendant cannot, for instance, defend himself by showing
that he has complied with all mandatory requirements or ad-
ministrative obligations.407
b) Disclaimer of Liability
The defendant has no right to use a disclaimer of lia-
bility in torts or contracts. Although Art. 1643 C.Civ.
explicitly states that a limitation can be agreed on, the
courts' general posture concerning the knowledge of defects
makes this provision obsolete.408 A manufacturer is pre-
sumed to know any hidden defect, and this presumption cannot
be limited, otherwise it would be destroyed.409 However,
this approach has recently been challenged, particularly
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with respect to relationship between manufacturers and com-
mercial seller; thus, its justification is increasingly
questioned by French authorities.410
4. Summary
A comparison of the defenses recognized by the three
countries shows that especially in France the manufacturer's
defenses are limited.
In contrast to Germany and most states in the United
States, the state of the art defense will not be recognized
in French courts. This position of the French courts will
not change after the implementation of the EC Directive,
since France is expected to derogate this defense. In Ger-
many, and France, and, to a certain degree, in the United
States, product misuse can be a valid defense. But while
the alteration or the misuse 'per se' excludes the liability
of a manufacturer in Germany and France, some US courts put
limitations on this defense by using 'foreseeability' as a
criterion. Common to all three countries is the general
limitation on allowing a manufacturer or seller to use a
disclaimer or other methods to restrict his liability.
D. Statutes of Limitations
In products liability cases, all three countries pro-
vide different bases for bringing suit; thus the question is
what statute of limitation prevails.
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1. In The United States
a) Statutes of Limitations
In an action for breach of a warranty the UCC regulates
the time limitations. According to § 2-725 (1) UCC, such an
action must be commenced within four years. Section 2-725(2)
states that the period of limitation begins "..•when tender
of delivery is made"; regardless of any knowledge by the
other party. Actions for injury which are based on negli-
gence follow the time limitation of tort actions for per-
sonal injury or damage to property.411 These time limita-
tions are usually shorter, in general 2-3 years, than those
under the UCC.412 But unlike the statute of limitation pro-
vided by the UCC, the period for tort actions commences at
the moment the injury or damage occurs.413
Products liability claims based on negligence414 or
strict liability415 are regulated by the general statutes of
limitation for tort injury. The length of time varies bet-
ween one and six years;416 however, most states have a
period of 2 or 3 years.417 Also, these statutes are effec-
tive only if particular provisions concerning this subject
exist.418
b) Statutes of Repose
Another bar for an action in torts might be a statute
of repose. As opposed to the statutes of limitations, this
time period in which to bring action is not related to the
occurrence of the actual cause of action.419 After this
time period runs, the plaintiff is barred from bringing a
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claim, even if the damages occur later or the defect is de-
tected at a later point of time. These statutes served as
an answer to the issue of an otherwise open-ended liability
of the manufacturer.420 In those states which have statutes
of repose in their codes, two different approaches are used,
one based on the 'date of sale,421 and tne other using a
'useful life,422 criteria. However, these methods lead to
inflexibility and to non uniform results, in the various
states. This is the reason why some states have abolished
these kind of statutes; also, statutes of repose were re-
garded to be unconstitutional.423 Still in some states,
statutes of repose are currently in force and have to be
taken into consideration.424
2. In the Federal Republic
a) Under Current Law
The German laws concerning statutes of limitation take
a different approach than the us law does. The German law
refers only to "Ansprlichen", and not to 'absolute' rights
like ownership.425 Also, it should be noted that the German
statutes of limitation do not extinguish a right after the
expiration of such period, but simply entitle the debtor to
refuse the owed performance.426
If the action is based on tort, the limitation period
pursuant to § 852 (1) BGB is three years.427 The time
period begins to run from the moment the victim has know-
ledge of the damage and the person who caused it. But
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regardless of any knowledge, all claims are barred after 30
years, according to § 852 I BGB.428 The beginning of this
limitation period is not the occurrence of the damages, but
the tortious act itself.429 Thus, the time begins running,
even though damages can occur or can be detected only
later.430
The statute of limitations with regard to contractual
claims is usually a period of 30 years.431 However, this is
effective only for claims based on "positive breach of con-
tract" since special provisions exist for the sale of goods.
Additionally, only in case the damages are the result of a
breach of a so-called 'collateral duty' and if they are
unrelated to any defect covered by tort law.432 According
to § 477 BGB, the limitation period is merely six months
from the delivery of the purchased good in the case of mov-
ables.433 b) Under the ProdHaftG
According to § 12 of the proposed ProdHaftG, claims
have to commenced within three years. The starting point of
the time period is same as the one for torts; knowledge of
the damages, the fault and the responsible person tolls the
statute of limitation. But, unlike the general limitation
period in torts, the time period also starts running in
cases where the claimant could have had such knowledge.434
Thus, constructive, not actual knowledge of damages, fault,
and responsibility tolls the statute of limitation. In
addition, § 13 I provides a final limitation period similar
to the US statutes of repose. According this provision, all
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claims based on the ProdHaftG expire 10 years after the
manufacturer has put the product into circulation.
3. In France
Concerning the general contractual liability, Art.
1150 of the French 'Code Civil' allows the claimant to sue
within 30 years from the time of the sale. But due to the
requirement of a 'bref delai' for claims based on the sel-
ler's warranty, Art. 1648 C.Civ., the buyer of a product is
usually limited in his ability to bring suit.435 This par-
ticular time restriction depends on the discretion of the
courts; thus, it can run from several weeks up to a number
of months.436 The time limitation in which to bring an ac-
tion based on tort law, pursuant to Art. 2262 C.Civ., is the
same period of 30 years.437 In tort actions, the statute of
limitation tolls at the moment the damages occurred.438 In
cases of breach for warranty for latent defects, the start-
ing point is the discovery of the defect.439 But in case
the breach or the tort also resulted in a criminal act, the
statutes of limitations of the criminal laws are controll-
ing.440 Despite this extraordinarily long limitation period
of 30 years, French courts face no flood of products liabi-
lity actions. The difficulties of obtaining the necessary
evidence after such a long period of time, limit successful
claims.
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4. Summary
Unlike the US and Germany, France has a very long
limitation period of 30 years for actions based on torts; as
long as no criminal acts are involved. The US, current Ger-
man law and the proposed ProdHaftG provide a shorter period
of up to three years. The German statute of limitation in
the sales of goods is extraordinary short, only a 6 month
period. The same restriction arises from warranty claims in
France due to the requirement of a 'bref delai', which might
result in an even shorter time period.
All countries have provisions which forfeit product
liability claims, regardless when the claimant gains the
knowledge, or the damages occur. However, these time pe-
riods usually are quite long; between 10 and 30 years.
E. Burden of Proof
Among the various theories of liability in the three
countries, the question of 'burden of proof' arises. Since
some of the liability theories are based on principles of
fault, proof can be the decisive element for a successful
claim. Because the unproved allegation of a specific cause
of action is not sufficient for a successful claim, this
issue can be crucial in determining where to commence an
action.
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1. In the United States
The general rule is that the plaintiff has the burden
of proof, at least in the beginning of the action.441 In
strict tort liability actions, the user only has to prove
that the product was in dangerous and defective condition
when it left the control of the producer442, and that it was
the unreasonable condition of the product which proximately
caused the injury.443 Also, in those cases, proof of the
consumer's reliance on a certain quality is not required.444
The basic elements of proof are similar among the different
theories of liability in products liability actions. 445
However, in certain situations the evidentiary rule of 'res
ipsa loquitur' might be helpful. In product liability cases
based on negligence, this theory allows an inference or pre-
sumPtion446 of the defendant's negligence, even the evidence
does not directly establish how the injury occurred.447 Res
ipsa loquitur requires that the defendant had an exclusive,
either actual or constructive control over the product which
allegedly caused the harm.448 Despite re~ ipsa loquitur the
burden of proof remains with the plaintiff; hence, he has to
prove the necessary elements449, and he also has to prove
that the product was defective when it left the defendant's
control. 450 In case the plaintiff is able to prove the re-
quirements under res ipsa loquitur, thus allowing to draw
the inference that the defendant is liable for the accident,
the burden of rebutting this presumption will be shifted to
the defendant.451
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Concerning actions on strict liability, the question
arises whether 'res ipsa loquitur' is applicable. Since
this rule is based on negligence, and strict liability is
not based on fault, the rule cannot be applied in these
cases.452 However, according to some decisions the in-
ference which is the result of 'res ipsa loquitur', can be
used to establish a defect.453 But since this rule can have
different procedural results, it depends on the jurisdiction
whether this concept is applicable in strict liability ac-
tions. In jurisdictions where 'res ipsa loquitur' results
in a rebuttable presumption of negligence, it is not ap-
propriate to apply this rule in strict liability actions.454
But where 'res ipsa loquitur' is merely used to establish a
prima facie case of negligence, this theory can be ap-
plied.455
In cases against multiple defendants, in which it is
not clear who is responsible for the injuries, 'res ipsa
loquitur' allows a claim without isolating one single and
certain injurer.456 However in cases where a plausible al-
ternative still exists, this rule might not help the plain-
tiff.457
In strict liability actions the basic notion is to
relieve the victim of a defective product from as many dif-
ficulties of proving his claim as possible.458 Thus, in
Barker v. Lull Engineering459, a design defect case, the
court shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. However,
this was partly due to the fact that the identification of
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design defects is more difficult than the discovery of a
manufacturing defect. In the latter the product "...differs
from the manufacturer's intended result[s] or from other
ostensibly identical units of the same product line," in
contrast hereto, design defects are not identifiable by a
comparison between the defect product and "... the manufac-
turer's plan or with other units of the same product line,
since by definition the plans and all such units will re-
flect the same design.1I460 But this decision has not been
widely followed by other courts.
In breach of warranty actions, the claimant does have
to prove the existence of the warranty and the breach of
that guarantee. In express warranty claims involving the
safety of the product, it is not necessary to prove that the
product is being 'unreasonably dangerous' or 'unmerchant-
able,.461. The situation with regard to the burden of proof
is therefore more favorable for the consumer in breach of
warranty actions, than in strict liability claims.462 Only
where claims are based on breach of warranty of fitness for
particular purpose this has to be proved by the plain-
tiff.463 In actions based on implied warranty for merchan-
tability, the claimant has to prove that the good was not
'merchantable' at the time of the sale.464 But, unlike
strict liability actions, the plaintiff does not have to
prove that the product posed an unreasonable danger.465
Also, under certain circumstances, for instance if the
strict liability claim is time barred, the claim based on
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implied warranty can be more promising.466 In an action
based on breach of the implied warranty for a particular
purpose, the injured party has to prove that he communicated
to the seller the particular purpose for which the product
was required.467
2. In Federal Republic of Germany
a) Under current Law
In German law, the general rule is that the plaintiff
has to prove all the elements of his claim, and the defen-
dant has to prove all the elements which are in favor of his
defense. Hence, the plaintiff has to prove the existence of
a defect, damages and the causation.468 Concerning causa-
tion, the plaintiff must establish that the manufacturer's
fault or negligence led to the product's detective state,
and that the defect caused the damages.469 Because of the
difficulties, especially concerning the proof of fault, the
general rules of proof have been adapted to the particular
characteristics of products liability cases.470 As a re-
sult, the burden of proof depends to the various 'areas of
risk,471, and the plaintiff does not have to prove the exact
cause of the damages.472
Here, the plaintiff can show that the defect, and thus
his damages, arise out of circumstances which were in the
defendant's area of control. In the Foulpest-case473 the
German court decided that if someone uses an industrial
product according to its intended use and suffers damages,
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the producer has "... to elucidate the events which caused
the defect and to establish that they did not involve any
fault on his part."474 Since this jUdgment, the manufac-
turer of a product is actually presumed to be at fault for
the defectiveness of his products. He bears the risk of not
being able to establish the cause of the defect.475 But
this 'presumption' regarding the burden of proof applies
only in cases where a producer is involved; it does not
apply to actions against the distributor.476
In cases based on the breach of contractual warranty,
the burden of proof follows the general rule. The plaintiff
has to prove all the necessary facts to establish a prima
facie claim.477 This also includes proof of causation; it
is essential to prove that the defendant's conduct was an
'adequate' cause of the damages. The cause of injury has to
beyond any general expectation.478 Only in cases where the
intervening act of a third party is beyond the general ex-
pectation, can the causation chain be broken.479
b) Under ProdHaftG
This law follows the general rules of proof current
being used. Art.4 of the Directive, which provides the
standard of proof, has been not transformed into German law,
at least not according to the proposal. Thus, the same
basic rules, like those stated above will apply. However,
§ 1 IV ProdHaftG states that the manufacturer has the burden
of proof in cases where his liability is in dispute accord-
ing to § 1 II and III ProdHaftG. This rule, which follows
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the EC Directive, was promulgated because the manufacturer,
with regard to the manufacturing process, has the best means
to produce evidence.480
3. In France
Pursuant to Art. 1645 C.Civ., the plaintiff has to
prove the existence of a 'vice cache' in a claim based on
contract. 481 To avoid evidentiary difficulties, the courts
have imposed a presumption of fact, regarding the profes-
sional seller.482 A seller acting in the ordinary course of
his business is to be presumed to have knowledge of the
defectiveness of his products at the time of the sale.483
But in case where two professionals are involved, this rule
does not apply since none of them has, in principle, super-
ior knowledge.484
In an action based on torts, pursuant to §§ 1382, 1383
C.Civ. the plaintiff usually has to prove the defendant's
fault. According to this rule, the plaintiff has to prove
product defect and also the particular tort that caused the
defect and the damages.485 Unlike contractual claims, this
would have resulted in different standards of proof for
bystanders in tort claims. To secure similar treatment of
the bystanders and the contracting party, the French courts
have harmonized the burden of proof in contractual and non-
contractual actions.486
According to Art. 1384 (1) C.Civ. a presumption of
fault is placed on the manufacturer because he had control
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over his products.487 Thus, the plaintiff in such a case
only has to prove that the manufacturer was the 'gardien' of
the defective product and a causal link to the damage.488
All the above mentioned presumptions are usually
irrebuttable489, since the consumer is usually not "..in the
same trade or field."490
4. Conclusion and Differences
In product liability actions, the German Law and the
French Law presume the fault of the manufacturer to achieve
an efficient consumer protection. In case of the French
professional seller (merchant), and also manufacturer, the
presumption is irrebuttable.
The US law, in general, as far as strict lability and
breach of implied warranty are applicable in the particular
case, imposes a very broad liability on the manufacturer.
However, the French Law, and also the German law put the
burden to prove the defectiveness of the product on the pro-
ducer. Thus, in case difficulties concerning the proof of
the existence of a defect exist, German and French laws are
the better for the consumer.
Theoretically, the current German law, with its rebut-
table presumption, is less favorable to the consumer than
the French one. However, since the courts are very strict
in allowing such a presumption to be rebutted, it is very
difficult for a manufacturer to escape his liability. Usu-
ally, he will be held to be at fault. The new ProdHaftG
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clarifies this situation by explicitly imposing the burden
of proof upon the manufacturer.
E. Compensation and Damages
One reason why a claimant might choose a particular
forum is because of the compensation which he expects to
obtain. Especially in the United States, the question of
recovery, and in particular the potential size of the award
is of very importance. Thus, the available means of recov-
ery in the various countries and the possible amounts have
to be compared.
1. In the United States
a) Damages in general
The damages a plaintiff can claim for in products lia-
bility actions are basically the same as in any negligence
or tort action.491 Thus, the amount of damages is deter-
mined by the doctrine of proximate cause. The damages in-
clude losses resulting from the injury caused by the defec-
tive product.492 This encompasses also damages for pain and
suffering493, future pain and discomfort.494 Also included
are past49S and future496 lost earnings; also expenses for
past497 and future498 medical treatment are recoverable.
In addition, courts have recognized recovery for physical
impairment, such as disfigurement499, and also loss of con-
sortiumSOO or enjoYment of life. SOl
l
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The amount which can be awarded depends on the discre-
tion of the jury, and a court can only reduce a jury's
award.502 Another issue is redress for 'pure economic
losses' if the plaintiff is a mere bystander. The tradi-
tional approach is that a tortfeaser is not responsible for
'economic 10ss.,503 However, this rule has become consumed
by exceptions504, and there is a developing national consen-
sus that strict liability and negligence are not appropriate
remedies when the loss is purely economic. 505
In an action for breach of warranty, the UCC allows
recovery of consequential damages, and thus economic loss;
§ 2-715(2)(b) UCC.506 But only if the injury or damages
proximately resulted from a breach of warranty.507 In a few
cases, the courts have recognized damages for the reasonable
fear of 'contracting future diseases,.50B However, the mere
fact that the plaintiff has an enhanced risk does not allow
recovery. 509 Rather, he has to show that he is suffering
from present mental distress.510
With regard to the amounts which US courts award, it
should be noted that the average tort claim, which is not
car accident, results in an award of about $5,000511, but
products liability claims are estimated to be even
higher. 512 In a few cases, the amounts which plaintiffs
were able to obtain was tremendously high and can reach into
the millions of dollars.513
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b) Collateral Source Rule
This rule allows a plaintiff to compensate for his in-
juries even though they are already paid for by a third
party. 514 Thus, the plaintiff can recover for his medical
bills even though they were already paid for by his health
insurance carrier.515 Until recently, this rule has been-in
effect in every state.516 Given the fact that the plaintiff
had paid his insurance premiums, the question is whether the
defendant should benefit from this precautions. For reasons
of fairness, it can be argued that the burden should be put
on the tortfeasor and not on the injured party, since the
former should not be allowed to benefit from the precautions
of the victim.517 However, it has to be taken into account
that the application of this rule leads to additional costs
for the insurance system.518 Because of the additional
costs, the efforts to abolish this rule seem to be appro-
priate.519 Since those costs will result in higher premiums,
the collateral source rule burdens the whole of the popula-
tion. Thus, the result of this rule benefits only a few, but
is a detriment for the majority of the population. The
basic idea that the tort system should grant fair compensa-
tion, but not to award more than that in one case, and less
in the other,520 speaks in favor of the abolition of the
rule. Nowadays, as a result of the "liability insurance
crises", some states have already modified or even abolished
the 'Collateral Source Rule' .521
79
c) Punitive Damages
This kind of damages is something unknown to most Euro-
pean legal systems. Punitive damages ( or exemplary
damages) are granted as a penal surcharge in addition to
compensatory damages.522 Punitive damages will be awarded
only where the conduct of the tortfeaser shows evil motives
or the reckless indifference to the rights of others.523 In
practice, this situation occurs only where the defendants
conduct encompasses elements, such as insult, fraud, malice,
or wanton disregard for the safety of others.524 In a few
number of cases the amount awarded as punitive damages has
greatly exceeded the amount of compensation.525 In products
liability cases, even awards which exceeds the amount of
$ 1,000,000 are usually affirmed on appeal.526 This kind of
damages poses a great risk for the producer not only because
of the huge amounts, but also because of the lack of predic-
tability. Although the courts generally instruct the jury
that a particular 'malice' or 'willful' conduct is required
to award punitive damages a clear definition of this conduct
is still lacking.527 In the course of the torts reform ef-
forts, different proposals have been made with regard to
punitive damages.528
Some jurisdictions, however, have already abolished the
award of punitive damages.529
d) Multiple Defendants
In case the plaintiff has sued a number of defendants,
for instance the various manufacturers and distributors, the
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common law rule of joint and several liability is ger-
mane.530 According to this theory both tortfeasors are li-
able, and thus each of them has to pay in full, although the
claimant can recover only once.531 But after more and more
states have enacted laws on comparative fault, joint and
several liability has been criticized on the grounds that·it
is difficult to reconcile both theories. Another problem
with joint and several liability is that often the minimally
liable tortfeasor had to pay all the damages because the
other joint tort feasor is not able to pay at all.532 As a
result, some state courts have refused to apply this theory,
but the majority of courts have not abandoned the principle
of joint and several liability.533
2. In the Federal Republic of Germany
a) Under Current Law
The scope of recovery is governed by the general rules
of § 249 BGB and special provisions of the tort law.534
Pursuant to § 249 BGB, the plaintiff is entitled to compen-
sation which restores him to his old situation, before the
injury occurred.535 Thus, the basic compensation is, unlike
in the US, not by payment of money; however the law states
some exception from this basic rule.536 According to § 249,
2 BGB, the claimant can choose between compensation in kind
and compensation in money; however, this right islimited.537
Damages, according to German law, basically encompass all
disadvantages caused by a person, whether to all kind of
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property, or to interest not connected with property.538 As
a special feature § 253 BGB indicates that monetary compen-
sation can not be granted for damages to interest not
connected with property.539 But, pursuant to § 252 BGB the
loss of future profit can be recovered.
This includes recovery for damages which resulted
directly or indirectly from the injury, thus economic loss
is recoverable under this provision.540 If this is not pos-
sible, monetary compensation will be granted.541 This is in
effect a contractually based claim because an action solely
based on torts does not cover pure economic loss ("Vermo-
gensschaden").542 In torts, only those damages which were
inflicted by the rights protected by § 823 BGB, can be re-
covered.543 The rights and thus the correspondent damages,
defined in § 823 I BGB, are life, health and certain types
of property.544 Under certain circumstances, economic loss,
as far as it is a result of a tort, can be recovered pur-
suant to § 842 BGB.545 Pursuant to § 843 BGB, the compensa-
tion for impairment of earning capacity has to~be paid
generally in periodical paYments or annuities.546 Depen-
dents of the victim can even ask for damages for loss of
support; however, according to § 844 II BGB, this is only
possible if the victim was under a legal duty to render sup-
port.547
Redress for pain and suffering will be awarded only if
the action is based on a tortious claim, §§ 823, 847 BGB.548
But it should be noted that these provisions apply only if
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the damages occurred in connection with personal injury and
death, but not mere economic 10ss.549
Pursuant § 840 BGB, defendants who are both responsible
for the damages of the plaintiff are jointly and severally
liable. Thus, the plaintiff can ask for the compensation
from all tortfeasors but only one time, § 426 BGB.
Further, the amount of damages the plaintiff seeks can
be reduced for reasons of comparative negligence according
to § 254 BGB. Using this statute, the courts also impose on
the defendant a duty to diminish the damages as much as pos-
sible.550
In case the plaintiff has obtained payment from his
insurance carriers for his damages or medical bills, the
German court is prone to deduct these amounts from the
claimed compensation.551 The deduction is exercised if
there is, at first, a causal link between the accident and
the payments to the plaintiff.552 Further, the deduction
must be reasonable and should not favor the defendant in an
unfair manner.553 However, this does not give the defendant
a real advantage since the claim for damages, as far as they
were already paid by the various insurance carriers, are
assigned to the insurance carriers who made the payment.554
Also, damages for loss of wages follow the same principles
as the general 10sses.555 The amounts which German courts
grant for personal injuries are substantially lower than in
France or the United States. According to § 287 Zivilpro-
ze~ordnung (hereinafter ZPO) the German court determine the
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amount based on its free discretion. Hereby, the special
circumstances of each single case will be taken into ac-
count.556 The highest amount so far was just recently
awarded and was about OM 500,000.557 General "tariffs"
exist, for the loss of an leg, for instance are about 20,000
to 60,000 OM; paraplegia was compensated with amounts bet-
ween 100,000 and 200,000 OM.558
b) Under the New ProdHaftG
Pursuant to § 7 ProdHaftG, in case the victim dies
after the accident, the recoverable damages include the
costs of an attempted cure, but also the losses which the
victim suffered because he was unable to work. The defendant
has to pay the costs of the funeral. Further, the loss of
support which result from the death of the victim can be re-
covered by a third person. But, as in the case of § 844
BGB, a loss of support claim arises according to a legal
duty. This claim can be made out only by person, including
those already pronated but not yet born, who were entitled
to such support.
If the defect generated a personal injury , the costs
of the cure and the loss of earnings due to the injury can
be recovered.559 According to § 9 ProdHaftG, such damages
can be only recovered through an annual payment if the in-
jury resulted in a decrease or termination of the victims
ability to earn his living. The same principle prevails if
a loss for future support by a third party can be redressed,
or the victim has additional needs due to the injury.
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The draft on the new ProdHaftG does not contain a stat-
ute regulating the recovery of damages for pain and suffer-
ing, and thus follows the text of the EC Directive. But
pursuant to § 15 II ProdHaftG, other provisions regulating
the recovery of damages are not superseded by the new law.
Hence, § 847 BGB, which allows recovery for pain and suffer-
ing can be used to gain redress for those damages.
3. In France
Concerning contractual liability, Art. 1150 C.Civ. pro-
vides that, the plaintiff can only recover such damages
which were foreseeable to the defendant at the time the con-
tract was made. In tort actions, however, full compensation
can be recovered by the claimant.560 A strict liability
claim against a merchant seller allows for a recovery beyond
the mere expenses of the sale; it includes all damages suf-
fered by the purchaser.561
Pecuniary loss, which is economic loss, encompasses
damages suffered by the buyer, such as costs of medical
treatment, loss of future earnings, incapacity, and even the
inability to continue a sport or a profession.562 Even
purely commercial loss, ' prejudice commercial' which is the
reduced value of the product without actual damages, can be
recovered. But this is only possible under a claim based on
the warranty for a hidden defect, 'vice cache', or in a suit
claiming that the product was not in compliance with the
conditions of the contract.563
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Nonpecuniary loss includes 'domage moral' caused by
physical and mental suffering and also loss of enjoYment of
life.564 The French laws require the damages, which a
plaintiff seeks to recover, to be certain, in other words
'assessable'. Therefore, future loss can be recovered, but
only if such loss can be assessed with certainty at the time
of the claim. This includes also loss of an opportunity,
the so-called 'perte d'une chance,.565 In cases where the
victim dies, the heirs can proceed with a claim for two dif-
ferent types of damages; 'prejudice morale' (loss of a loved
one) or for 'prejudice materiel' (loss of maintenance).566
4. Summary
All three legal system have basically the same kinds of
damages and compensation: compensation, economic loss, and
damages for pain and suffering. Economic loss can be reco-
vered only based on contractual claims, and pain and suffer-
ing requires an action in torts. Due to the collateral
source rule in most US states, the recoveries can be higher
than in Germany, where paYments of third parties concerning
the damages are usually deducted from the awarded compensa-
tion.
Punitive damages, which can be recovered in the United
States, are not known in Germany, nor in France. However,
even in the United States the possibility of recovering
punitive damages depends on the individual state since some
states have already enacted laws limiting this kind of
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damages. The biggest difference between Germany and France,
on the one hand, and the United States, on the other hand,
are the amounts which can be recovered in these countries.
Awards which are much higher in the United States, than in
Germany and France, are possible; however, they are not the
rule. The United States in general has a higher level of.
compensation, thus a higher amount can be usually recovered.
French judges are also more generous than their German
counterparts. But here the awards are still lower than in
the United States.
However, considering the different size of possible
recovery, it should be taken into account, that in Germany
and also in France the health insurance and the social in-
surance pay for most of the costs which American plaintiffs
have to payout of their pockets. The medical bills will be
paid by the insurance carrier, which will seek compensation
from the tortfeasor, who quite often has liability insurance
to cover these expenses.
F. Cost and General Procedure
1. In the United States
One of the factors which makes it easier for plaintiffs
in the United States to find a qualified lawyer for their
claims is the 'contingent fee' system, which provides the
basis for the attorney's fees. Under this system, the
lawyer that he will represent the client for a certain
87
percentage of the amount recovered in the lawsuit.567 In
general, the percentage, which varies with the kind of
claim, amounts in products liability actions to 40% in ordi-
nary tort litigation.568 Despite this general advantage,
the system also has some detriments. Due to the high trans-
actions costs in product liability lawsuits, there is an _
increasing disparity between actual losses and actually ob-
tained compensation, especially in cases where higher losses
are involved.569 Thus, the victim might receive a fairly
large award, but his actual litigation costs consume a major
part of it.570 Some states have tried to address this pro-
blem by introducing caps on the attorney's fee, but so far
this has not been very successful.571 Unlike in Germany and
in France, the successful plaintiff cannot recover his own
attorney's fee as damages.572
Another peculiarity of the US system, in comparison to
the French and German one, is the participation of juries in
the proceedings. Unlike ordinary torts cases, juries tend
to award higher amounts in product liability actions.573
This is partly due to the fact that often "deep-pocket,,574
defendants are involved in these types of actions.575 Also,
it has to be noted that juries tend to favor the consumer
and not the manufacturer.576
The scope of pretrial discovery is another factor that
might establish the United States as a more favorable forum
than France or Germany. This seems particularly appropriate
in product liability cases, since it is necessary for a suc-
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cessful claim to obtain essential information from the other
party. The available means for acquiring this evidence con-
sists of a broad variety of different measures.577 Thus, a
party in the US could ask the German or French company for
evidence, by using a letter rogatory from the court. Now-
adays, this is simplified by the Hague Convention on Taking
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (1970).578
However, Germany and France and most other members of the
Convention have "reserved" their right to refuse "pretrial
discovery of documents".579 As a result, obtaining evidence
in countries like the two mentioned for pretrial discovery
purposes is hardly possible. Thus, one advantage with US
system, the pretrial evidence rules, has only a limited
value in transnational lawsuits.580 Besides in a pretrial
stage, obtaining evidence has been improved and accelerated
since the enactment of the Hague Convention among the
various countries. Also, the general US rules of discovery
are in favor of the consumer. Since the evidence which the
plaintiff can require from the defendant goes very far in
comparison with French or German laws. Additionally, the
Hague Convention allows the plaintiff to obtain evidence
from the European countries, since the reservations against
US demands of evidence are only with regard to the pretrial
discovery process. Another advantage of litigating products
liability claims in the United States, is the availability
of attorneys and experts, specialized in products liability
actions. While these specialist are not available in other
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countries, they are quite expensive and will raise the costs
of litigation.
2. In the Federal Republic of Germany
Unlike their American counterparts, German attorneys
are not permitted to work on a contingent fee basis; their
fees are regulated by statutes.581 A scale, which depends
on the amount in dispute, determines the fee. This scale
provides basic units for a certain amount in dispute. The
number of basic units which the attorney receives as his fee
depends on the stages the proceedings run through. Another
principle of German law which is contrary to the US rules,
is that the loser has to pay the winning party's costs and
the attorney's fee, § 91 ZPo.
Thus, the winner can claim all the litigation costs
from the other party. This includes expenses for witnesses
and experts582, and his lawyer's fee.583 But the cost are
determined by the court; thus they can be lower than antici-
pated. It is not necessary for a case to be presented by at-
torneys if the amount at dispute is below DM 5,000. This
type of claim has to be brought before the local court, the
'Amtsgericht584,. However, if the claimed damages exceed
this amount, the 'Landgericht585'has jurisdiction and an
attorney has to represent the plaintiff.586
For those people, who are too poor to bring action, or
who can not afford to pay a lawyer for their defense, legal
assistance is available.587 Such legal aid can even be
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granted to foreigners, but only if reciprocity between their
laws and the German legal system exists, and the foreign
country's procedures are similar to those used in Ger-
many.588 Another element in the German judicial process,
which is unlike the us one, is the absence of a jury. In
German trials, the decisions are made by professional jud~
ges. LaYmen only participate in decisions involving a few
commercial matters.589
One disadvantage in Germany is the lack of lawyers who
are specialized in products liability. Also, no specialized
expert witnesses are available, at least not in such numbers
as in the United States. This however is a result of the
rules of evidence according to which the judge, not the par-
ties, determines whether a expert witness is necessary.
3. In France
Here, the lawyers are also not allowed to act on the
basis of contingent fees. But the government provides a
financial assistance to help people with financial needs.
Even foreigners can participate in this program, but they
have to be residents of France. 590
French courts do not use juries, and, like in the Ger-
man system, the decisions are made by professional
judges.591 A French attorney is only needed if the action is
brought in the "tribunal de grande instance" but not in the
"tribunal d'instance".592
The French legal system, like the German system, also lacks
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specialized attorneys and expert witnesses for product lia-
bility claims.
G. Summary and Conclusion
A comparison of the three legal systems shows that the
scope and range of the consumer protection in the different
legal systems is determined by the intention of the court to
guarantee a effective protection. The expansion of the
liability to a form of strict liability, whether in the form
of a shift in the burden of proof (as in FRG) , or as an ir-
rebuttal presumption (as in France), can be only justified
by the fact that the producer is still in an economically
more powerful position and the fact that the consumer has no
real choice. He cannot realistically bargain for warran-
ties, because the producer does not depend on the single
consumer. As a simple buyer of ordinary goods he does not
have the possibility nor the power to force the producer to
guarantee a certain quality of the goods. In this light,
the different elements of a cause of action, especially the
term 'defect', has to be understood. The courts use the
interpretation of these terms as a vehicle for their true
purpose, to grant the consumer a certain level of protec-
tion. This is also the reason why in France and also in
Germany the term 'product' as well as the term 'defect' has
been interpreted sometimes in a very broad way. In Germany,
the courts were able to expand the liability of the producer
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solely by using a presumption of fault. Therefore, under
German law, the existence of a 'defect' in a product is con-
nected with the duty of a producer to build a product which
is as safe as possible. This principle allows the German
courts, unlike their US counterparts, to be very flexible
with regard to the assumption of a defect. But because of
the notion that the safety and the utility of a product are
factors which have to be balanced against each other, the
courts did allow some exceptions to liability, for instance,
the so-called "Ausrei~erhaftung,"and also state-of-the-art
has been recognized as valid defense of the manufacturer.
However, after the implementation of the new German
ProdHaftG, those exceptions will be more limited. The new
law imposes a basic strict liability on the producer, simi-
lar to that in the United States. The "Ausrei~erhaftung"
will be abandoned, but the defense of 'state of the art'
will still be possible. Thus, even in the future, elements
of fault will be relevant in these cases.
Besides under the new law, the seller, if identical
with the producer, is still liable under the contractual
warranty rules. In addition, the consumer has, as a sub-
sidiary remedy, a claim based on "positive breach of con-
tract" against the manufacturer. However, these rules are
only of limited practical use.
The French Courts are more strict, and unlike the Ger-
man courts, they even refuse to recognize a 'state of the
art' defense, or a "Ausrei~erhaftung" defense; hence, even
...•
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defects that cannot be avoided in a regular production lead
to liability.
Liability has been expanded because of the various
'special laws' imposing strict liability in France and Ger-
many, for instance, the 'Pharmaceutical Act' in Germany.
These regulations inflict true 'strict liability', on the-
producers or operators of certain goods, without referring
to elements of fault.
The us courts usually favor the consumer; but this
position is intensified by the fact that in the United
States a jury quite often decides a case. But jury members
are usually also consumers; thus, they tend to deliver ver-
diets in favor of the injured plaintiff. Representatives of
the interests of the insurance companies or producers are
hardly found on the jury bench.
Regarding damages, one difference in the United Sates,
as compared to France and Germany, is that only the United
States allows punitive damages, all the other states do not
recognize such kind of damages. But it has to be borne in
mind that there is a trend in some US states against puni-
tive damages. Economic loss and damages for pain and suf-
fering can be claimed in all three fori. Economic losses
are generally only recognized in contract actions; pain and
suffering are only allowed in claims based in tort.
One difference which might be decisive for the election
\of a forum is the size of the possible awards. Here, the
general trend is that the French courts are more generous
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than the German ones, but in the US the highest amounts can
be recovered. However, the average US award is only slight-
ly higher than those in France and Germany, if take into
account the that there a lot of the victim's costs are
covered by the social welfare system. Under certain cir-
cumstances, however, the amounts which can be recovered in
the US greatly exceed that which is possible in France or
Germany. But still, extreme large awards are the exception
and not the rule. Also, the EC directive has introduced a
ceiling on the national level. This could, in mass actions,
result in reduced compensation. However, in general the
ceiling will not be reached by the various claims.
IV. Jurisdiction
The question of what substantive law is the most favor-
able has already been examined. The following discussion of
transnational jurisdiction examines the major issue of forum
shopping. Since this issue only arises in cases where two
different jurisdiction are available, the plaintiff has a
real choice between different 'fori'.
-Transnational jurisdiction means that the courts have
'international jurisdiction' over the potential defendants,
thus the authority to adjudicate actions with foreign par-
ties.
1. In the United States
For a court to have jurisdiction, it must have the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the power to hear the particular
kind of case, and the personal jurisdiction, the authority
to render a decision over the parties.593 The main question
here is whether a foreigner can be sued in United States
courts by the US consumer. Conversely, can foreigners sue
US-manufacturer in the United States without limitation?
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a) In General
With regard to the subject matter jurisdiction, it
could be difficult to find the right court in which to bring
suit. But this usually does not create a final impediment
for the claims of foreigners in the US, nor for US actions
brought against the foreign manufacturer. This lack of dif-
ficulty is because every state has, at least, one trial
court of unlimited civil jurisdiction, which is competent to
adjudicate any action and to render a judgement for any am-
ount.594
Jurisdiction 'in personam' refers to the court's power
over the parties involved in a lawsuit. Here, two different
situations are possible: the US consumer can sue the foreign
manufacturer in a US court, or the US producer can be sued
by a foreign consumer. Foreigners can sue in the US courts
due to bilateral treaties, or based on constitutional
guarantees. 595 According to the structure of the American
legal system, two different courts, federal and state ones,
can have jurisdiction.596 The federal court has jurisdic-
tion, if a diversity of citizenship between the parties in-
volved exists597, and the amount in dispute exceeds the sum
of $ 10,000.598 Because of the different nationalities of
plaintiff and defendant in transnational actions, and also
the size of the amounts usually at dispute in products
liability cases, these conditions are in generally met.
State courts also have original jurisdiction in those
cases, but based on other grounds. Tort and contract law is
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state law; thus, a state court has the authority to adjudi-
cate products liability cases where defendants are involved
who are residing in its district.599
The situation is different if a foreigner is sued in a
US court. Because the courts theoretically only have power
over the people who are living within their districts, an-
other reason for extending US jurisdiction has to be
found. GOO
In some states so-called long arm statues exist, allow-
ing the courts to expand their jurisdiction over foreig-
ners.GOl There are two basic forms of long-arm statutes: one
which indicates that jurisdiction over foreigners can be
exercised if it is permitted under the US Constitution.G02
Other state laws provide a long-arm statutes, which specify
when such jurisdiction may be exercised.G03 Those state
rules have also been to applied by federal courts, because
these courts must use the procedural laws of the state in
which they reside.G04
In states where no long-arm statutes exist, or where
these statutes only contain a reference to the Constitution,
the common law has to decide whether the US court might
impose jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. In Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. State of washingtonG05 standards for
determining when a foreigner could be drawn into US courts
were set.GOG According to that decision, a foreigner has to
have a minimum contact with the forum states, or the United
States.G07 This requirement can establish a US court's
I
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jurisdiction unless, due to certain circumstances, this re-
sult would violate "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice".608 Thus, the resulting twofold stan-
dard requires 'minimum contacts' and 'reasonable fair-
ness,.609 These conditions are satisfied, in general, where
a manufacturer's goods create the necessary contact with -the
forum by establishing a "stream of commerce" contact.610
Later the courts even asserted personal jurisdiction based
on the fact that major interest of the us were violated.611
But in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson the Supreme
Court denied the Oklahoma's courts personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident regional distributor and retailer from
the east coast.612 The court noted that the mere foresee-
ability of a possible contact with the forum of Oklahoma was
not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Only
where the foreigner could reasonably have foreseen to be
haled into court there,613, such extension of jurisdic-
tion can be justified. When the defendant purposely trans-
acts business to the new foreign market, he knows that he
might become subject to litigation.614 Later, the courts
facing situations where products only eventually reach the
US, used the International Shoe approach to render different
decisions. 615 Courts rendered different decisions by plac-
ing the focus on the different elements of the International
Shoe test. Some courts primarily considered the question of
whether the foreigner simply put the goods into the stream
of commerce, thus allowing them to reach the United
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States.616 Other jurisdictions emphasized the issue of
whether the foreigner, while putting the goods into the
stream of commerce, did this on purpose and directed this
action to the 'forum state,.617 In Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, the court stated that if the defendant purposely
avail himself of the privilege to engage in activities in
the 'forum', he thus invokes the protection and benefits of
the forum laws.618 In Helicopteros Nacionale de Colombia v.
Hall619 the Supreme Court stated that jurisdiction can be
based on either of two grounds: that certain contacts with
the forum state exist and that from these activities the
cause of the action arises; or that a sufficient commercial
relation between the forum and the foreign company ex-
ists.620
The latest development concerning personal jurisdiction was
the US Supreme Court's decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court of California.621 According to the Court,
the mere foreseeability or knowledge of a company that some
of its products will end up as goods sold in a US state does
not constitute personal jurisdiction.622 Jurisdiction only
exists in cases where there is an additional contact which
manifests the intent to serve the market of the forum
state.623 However, the decision in Asahi should be care-
fully considered since there was only a slight majority
which sustained the opinion of Justice O'Connor.624
Usually a foreign company can not be sued when the
alien corporation has its own subsidiary in the United
m_~----~l
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States625, as long as the US sUbsidiary is acknowledged as
being independent.626 But according to the rules of the Re-
statement (Second) Conflicts of Law, § 52, the jurisdiction
over the subsidiary can lead to the jurisdiction over the
parent company.627 Decisive to jurisdiction is whether a
'control relationship' between the parent and the subsidiary
exists or not.628 Such 'control relationship' exists if the
parent controls the majority of the subsidiary's Board of
Directors629, or where an underlying 'unity of purpose' did
exist630, thus, the parent is be subject to the personal
jurisdiction as well as the subsidiary.631 Wherefore,
despite formal separation between parent and subsidiary,
where the parent exercises- continuing supervision and inter-
vention in the subsidiaries affairs, the latter's activities
are still attributable to the parent.632 Hence, a foreign
company is not safe even after Asahi.633
The mere fact that a possible foreign defendant has
property in the US-forum does not allow a court to exercise
jurisdiction over him. In this situation, the state courts
also apply the International Shoe test.634 However, the
Supreme Court indicated in a note that they did not consider
whether quasi-in-rem jurisdiction635 was sufficient to bring
foreigners before US courts636, when no other forum was
available. This led to a discussion that the mere existence
of US property might lead to jurisdiction,637 although so
far no court has decided in this way.638
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b) Forum non conveniens
But even where the court finds personal jurisdiction,
the action still can be dismissed on 'forum non conveniens'
grounds. 639 According to this principle, a court can dis-
miss the action640, if it finds that the 'balance of con-
veniens' weighs heavily in favor of another forum.64l The
elements considered when forum non conveniens is at issue
includes: "•.ease of access to source of proof, availability
of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses"
and other factors which are supposed to ease the performance
of judicial process.642 In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyn0643
all decedents and beneficiaries were foreigners and only the
defendants (and the appointed administratrixes of the es-
tate) were Americans. The District Court explicitly stated
that US courts are not so reluctant to dismiss on 'forum
non conveniens' grounds if the foreign plaintiff "...seeks
the benefits from more liberal tort rules provided for the
protection of the citizen and the residence of the United
States.,,644 The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
inter alia because a non-conveniens dismissal is not pos-
sible if the laws of the other forum are less favorable to
the plaintiff than those of the US.645 Finally, the Supreme
Court held that, the plaintiff's choice of 'forum' is given
less deference if they are foreigners. Also, the fact that
the other forum's laws are less favorable was not considered
to be enough in itself to bar dismissal.646 Despite these
rules, there is no unlimited authority of the courts to
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dismiss claims based on 'forum non conveniens' grounds.647
As in the Gulf-Oil case, the Supreme Court explicitly stated
that such dismissal presupposes at least two 'fori' in which
the defendant is amenable to proceed. If this is not the
case, a dismissal would result injustice, and be inap-
propriate.648 A reason for dismissing a case can even be
found in the effort to "...avoid unnecessary problems of
conflict of laws and the application of foreign law".649 In
other words, the mere convenience of the courts might be
reason enough for a dismissal. Foreign claimants should be
aware that their choice of the United States as forum state,
is not given heavy weight by discretion of the US-courts.650
A definite prediction as to when a foreign claim might be
dismissed, cannot be given.651 In Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster at Bophal, India, in December 1984652 the
Court used the test according to Piper v. Reyno.653 Because
India provided an appropriate legal system and most of the
witnesses and the heirs were living in India, the balance of
the analysis was in favor of India as forum.654 Whether in
the future, such claims will likely be dismissed, depends on
the intention and attitude of US courts towards the US manu-
facturer. Especially, at issue is whether the courts will
show a particular interest in monitoring the manufacturer's
conduct with regard to the foreign markets or not.655
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2. In the Federal Republic of Germany
If a foreigner wants to bring a lawsuit in Germany he
has to follow the general rules. Unlike the US laws which
follow the common law distinction between 'in rem', 'quasi
in rem' and 'in personam' jurisdiction, the jurisdiction
provided by the German laws is basically a personal one.656
In principle, the German law requires a plaintiff to
bring suit in the residence of the defendant. For instance,
for individuals, pursuant to § 12 ZPO, the proper court is
the one in the district where the individual has his resi-
dency.657 Section § 32 ZPO provides that tort claims
against the alleged tortfeasor can be filed at the place
where the tort occurred. Jurisdiction can also be estab-
lished where corporations or other commercial enterprises
have their site(§§ 17 & 21 ZPO).658 When the defendant is a
corporate branch, § 21 (1) ZPO expands the range of juris-
diction over such legal entities, regardless of whether they
have foreign parent.659 When a number of courts have juris-
diction the claimant can chose to sue in any of them.
The answer to the question of when a foreigner can be
sued in German courts depends on the international jurisdic-
tion of the German courts. In Germany, the jurisdiction of
the courts is governed by the rules of the German civil pro-
cedure law, the Zivilproze~ordnung (ZPO).660 Those regula-
tions does not contain special provisions regulating the
international jurisdiction, though they are regarded as an
implied regulation of this subject matter.661 Therefore, it
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is generally aCknowledged that in case a German court has
local jurisdiction according to the general rules, it also
has international jurisdiction in that lawsuit.662 The
conditions, which give a certain court the power to adjudi-
cate a claim, are subject matter and personal jurisdiction.
The subject matter jurisdiction of German courts is -
regulated according to the provisions of the German Court
Organization Act.663 Section 71 and § 23 ZPO indicates that
the subject matter jurisdiction of a German court only
depends on the amount in dispute, in determine whether a
lower or a higher court has jurisdiction.664
In transnational disputes, the personal jurisdiction of
the German Courts is determined according to §§ 17, 21, 23
ZPo. Other provisions also allow a court to gain jurisdic-
tion over defendants, but they are not relevant for trans-
national disputes.
Section 23 ZPO grants personal jurisdiction over absent
aliens, natural or legal persons, when the foreign person or
legal entity has some property in Germany. The -latter pro-
vision has been construed very broadly by the courts665;
even very small values can be sufficient to establish juris-
diction over monetary claims.666 This rule, as held by the
Civil Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), explicitly applies
to transnational transactions and thus to foreign parties.
The reason for this posture of the German courts is the fact
that often the enforcement of judgment and also their recog-
nition abroad cannot always be guaranteed.667 Thus, this
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provision is mainly important to claims against aliens.668
This provision cam lead to a surprising situation of
expanded jurisdiction; A US tourist who forgot parts of his
clothes in a German hotel room, is, based on this fact, sub-
ject to German jurisdiction and might be sued in a German
court for the hotel bill.669 This extreme expansion of
jurisdiction670 has been widely criticized by some autho-
rities67l, and this has lead to a more narrow interpretation
of the personal jurisdiction.672 If no other connection to
the court's district exists except for the assets, then this
forum lacks the necessary jurisdiction.673 But since these
judgments were not rendered by the highest courts, this
jurisprudence is not binding and most courts will still fol-
low the broad interpretation of § 23 ZPo.
Unlike the US legal system, 'forum non conveniens' is
not a helpful means to mitigate the effect of § 23 ZPo. The
German legal system still does not recognize this doc-
trine.674 The German courts strictly follow the view that
if jurisdiction was conferred upon a court according to the
ZPO, this court has to adjudicate the matter, regardless of
whether the plaintiff is foreigner or German.675
But sometimes § 23 ZPO can be useful to foreigners,
too. This situation occurred in Morgan Guarantee Trust Compo
v. Islamic Republic of Iran676, where the German court is-
sued an attachment order for the stockholding of Iran in a
major German steel company (Krupp AG); the american bank was
hereby taking advantage of the fact that the Iranina
106
Goverment had some assets in West Germany. Thus, if a for-
eigner wants to sue another foreigner in German courts, this
can be done as long as the defendant has some assets in Ger-
many.
2. In France
The French system is similar to the German one; however
the scope of jurisdiction is even broader. The French courts
tend to claim extensive jurisdiction in all cases where
French citizens are involved.
a) Foreign Defendants in French Courts
The situation in France is determined by of Art. 14 and
Art. 15 C.Civ.; they are the only provisions in the French
legal system which deal with the question of foreign recog-
nition.677 Especially Art. 14 C.Civ. furnishes the French
courts with a broad authority over foreign defendants. It
allows French courts to summon foreigners who are not even
residents of France, if the action is based on a dispute
concerning an obligation concluded in France with a French
individual. French courts also have jurisdiction if the
contractual relation results from an action in a foreign
country, as long as the foreigners contracted with a French
resident or citizen. Thus, jurisdiction depends solely on
the French nationality of the plaintiff. French courts
have, in addition to the wide power given by Art.14 C.Civ.,
broadly interpreted of the application of this rule.678 For
instance, the expression 'obligation' has been construed to
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include torts and various other legal duties.679 Most
interpretation even neglect the need for any relationship
between the rights which are at dispute and France Only a
few exceptions to this broad interpretation of personal
jurisdiction are acknowledged; for instance, if the real
property which is the object of the litigation is located in
another country, the 'situs' becomes the determining factor
in evaluating jurisdiction.
Art. 14 gives a French citizen the right to sue an
alien in French courts even if he is not a resident or is
not residing in France. Thus, this provision allows a French
citizen to sue practically any foreign producers products
liability cases.
b) Foreign Plaintiffs
Foreigners also have far reaching possibilities of
suing French citizen in France. The main principle of
French civil procedure is that a suit has to be brought in
the defendant's domicile. Thus, if an American or a German
plaintiff wants to bring action against a French resident,
they have to do this in the district court where the defen-
dant lives.680 The same principle governs when the claim is
based on a noncommercial contract, for example, between a
seller and buyer.681 But even if a French citizen has no
domicile or residence in France , he can be sued there.
Art. 15 C.Civ. permits a foreigner to sue French nationals
without domicile or residence in France. But this provision
usually has no importance in products liability cases
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because the manufacturer usually has a site in France. How-
ever, it allows suit against a manufacturer who is a French
citizen, but, who, what will be a very rare case, has no
site in France. A French court can always claim to have
jurisdiction over French citizen.
--------------
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However, this protection is subject to further 1imi-
tations.688 But despite these limitations, the Convention
basically allows a consumer the choice to sue in any member
state within the European Communities.
5. Service of Process
Besides finding the personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, a valid jUdgement must comply with other proce-
dural conditions. For instance, for a court jurisdiction to
have over a defendant, the proper service of the defendant
is required under the US Constitution.689 Service of pro-
cess is a mandatory procedural precondition, which has to be
complied with to avoid dismissal.690
In the case of the foreign defendant who is not a resi-
dent of the United States but is sued in a US court, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the extraterritorial
service apply.691 According to those rules, service can be
made according to the Federal statutes or by the rules and
statutes used by the state courts.692 The rules also pro-
vide for personal service by individual delivery or by an
agent or officer of the court.693
Regarding France and Germany, which are signatories of
the Ha ue Convention on the Service Abroad of JUdicial and
Extra'udicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters694
as is the United States, additional means of service are
available. Pursuant to Art.5 of the Convention, service has
to be made through a central authority which each country
110
must designate.695 The procedure usually requires trans-
lation, payment of certain fees, and the use of special ap-
plication forms.696 Under the Convention, the service of a
foreign defendant can be simplified and accelerated. How-
ever, even if the Convention applies the other means of
service still are available, since these are excluded by -the
Convention. 697
The German law, like the US law, requires the service
of a defendant, but it is only a mere notification of the
defendant. 698 Service in Germany will be done according to
§ 166 ZPO and usually initiated by the court itself. Under
certain circumstances, such service can be also brought by
the plaintiff himself, but only in a few cases. Under Ger-
man law, the consequences of improper service are quite dif-
ferent from' the US posture concerning improper service.
According to the German law, improper service only has some
procedural detriments, but the claim will not be dismissed
on such grounds.699 Besides this, the lack of proper ser-
vice can be cured during the trial.700
French law also demands that the defendant receive
notice of the action against him. However, like the German
law and unlike the US system, the improper service will not
result in a dismissal of a case. But the lack of service
still imposes some detriments upon the plaintiff; however,
here also, improper service can be cured according to the
French civil procedure law.
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Both countries, France and Germany, are also member
states of the above mentioned Convention, and thus they have
the same means to obtain service as in the United States.
Another considerable difference between the United
States and the civil law countries France and Germany exists
with regard to the lack of jurisdiction. Because in the -
United States, according to the § 4 of the Restatement (Se-
cond) of Judgments, Tentative Draft 1978, a judgement ren-
dered by a court which lacked jurisdiction will be subject
to collateral challenge. In Germany and in France, however,
the current rule is that the rendering of such a judgment is
final and binding once the time for appeal has run out.701
But both countries, France as well as Germany, recog-
nize that such a judgment - without jurisdiction - might be
not recognized in another country, and therefore enforcement
might be rejected.702
6. Conclusion
All three countries allow plaintiffs to commence law-
suit against foreigners in their courts. Most states in the
United States have established far reaching jurisdiction,
due to the existence of long-arm statues, or through cor-
respondent court decisions.
The German Courts have also a far reaching authority
under to § 23 ZPO. But compared to jurisdiction in the
United States, it is only a limited one, since some property
or other assets are presupposed for German courts to have
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jurisdiction. But because the value or amount of this pro-
perty can be, very small, the jurisdictional rules can lead
to surprising results. Especially foreigners usually are
not aware what small piece of property can lead to jurisdic-
tion of a German court.
The French courts, when a French national is involved
in the claim, exercise an even more far-reaching jurisdic-
tion than the US courts. They claim to have jurisdiction
over all French people, thus haling foreigners, who have
business contacts with French nationals, into their court.
Regarding the possibilities of foreigners suing in a
foreign court, some limitation apply in all states.
A particular restriction, of which every foreigner suing in
an US court has to be aware, is the existence of the forum
non conveniens doctrine. Since this theory allows the US
courts to dismiss cases, where the major reason for initiat-
ing the action in the US was to seek higher compensation or
other benefits from the American forum, this creates a real
danger for foreign forum shoppers.
The more liberal discovery rules in United States,
especially with regard to pretrial discovery, usually favor
the plaintiff. But pretrial discovery are not advantageous
when the evidence is abroad. Because the European countries
( Germany and also France) do not assist litigants in US
pretrial discovery.
The costs of litigation are higher in the United States
than in Germany or France, due to the higher amount US at-
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torneys obtain and the costs which arise from the use of
highly paid expert witnesses. In Germany and France, the
attorneys are usually only allowed to charge a amount which
is fixed by the laws. Also, the costs for experts are much
lower, since they are also subject to state regulations.
The contingency fee system is also not a convincing .
reason for French or Germans to sue in the United States,
since both countries provide means of legal assistance.
v. Choice of Law/Conflicts of Laws
Another question of great importance in transnational
lawsuits is the issue of which law the foreign court will
apply. Due to the involvement of parties from different
nations, the place where events crucial to the litigation
occurred, can be different. For instance, the place where a
contract was concluded, and the place where the damages have
occurred could be different. Also, the place where the
cause for the damages was set, and the place where the dam-
ages finally occurred, can be different. Thus, two dif-
ferent legal systems are relevant to the incident at dis-
pute. Therefore, this conflict of laws question leads to
the problem what choice of law, the court will apply.
A. In United States
1. Traditional Approach
Here, the traditional approach to conflicts of law pro-
blems has been different depending on the form of liability,
contractual or torts.703
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Concerning a seller's choice of law clause, the
Restatement of Conflicts of Law (Second), § 187, indicates
that in general such a clause will not be given effect.
Since the enactment of the UCC, and its adoption by the most
US states, the rule of Section 1-105(1) has gained impor-
tance.704 Thus, choice of laws rules are possible, but only
if the choice of forum is embodies in a reasonable contact.
But in products liability cases, this clause only has a
limited importance because often the parties did not stipu-
late a choice of law clause in sales contract. However, the
foreign manufacturer might use these clauses in his standard
sales forms.
In contracts without choice of law clauses, the Res-
tatement705 indicates that in commercial cases, the law
which both parties have chosen may govern the case.706 Ac-
cording to § 1-105 UCC the party autonomy can determine the
applicable law up to a certain extent.
2. In Product Liability Actions
However, in products liability actions, the idea of
consumer protection establishes the need for a different
posture. In claims based on contracts, a choice of law
clause might be held invalid if it denies the consumer the
protection, provided by the UCC.707
Therefore, the law of the place of delivery usually
will govern a sale involving moveable goods.708 But the
provisions provided by the Restatement are not the law and
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cannot serve as a definite base to tell what law will be
applied.709
However, most product liability cases are based on
torts and not on contracts. The approach which US courts
take concerning this kind of actions is based on different
theories.
In general, the American courts follow the rule of 'lex
loci delicti'; thus, the place of the wrong determines the
applicable law.710 This traditional rule and its mechanical
method of defining the appropriate law is opposed by modern
approaches. One is the so-called 'interests-analysis' .711
According to this approach, the courts decides based on
the different interests of int parties in the various fori.
For instance, some courts simply count the 'contacts' made
by the parties in their forum. In Babcock v. Jackson, the
New York (N.Y.) Court of Appeals compared the relative con-
tacts and interests in the litigation between New York and
the place of the injury, a province of Canada.712 As a re-
sult, the court held that the contacts with New York_and
also the interest of New York in the claim were superior to
those of Canada. Both parties involved were residents of New
York; only the accident happened in Canada.713 Later, in
Neumeier v. Kuehner714 the court based its decision on the
'lex loci delicti' rule without the contact or interest
analysis.715 In Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., the California
court applied its own laws because California had a stronger
interest in the case than Mexico.716 This interest
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basically consisted of the fact that California law allows a
substantial recovery, but not the laws of Mexico.717
As a result of all the efforts of American courts to
solve the conflicts of law problem, it can be noted that a
clear and predictable general rule of law still does not
exist.718 However, the recent decisions of the courts, as
stated above, illustrate some general tendencies in the
judicial approach to the conflict of law issues. Courts
generally apply the law of the forum, the law of the United
States. But where the plaintiff is an alien, the US courts
have shown a tendency to solve conflicts of the law based on
the forum non conveniens grounds.
B. Federal Republic of Germany
1. The General Rule
German courts generally base their decisions in tort
cases on the rule of 'lex loci delicti' .719 This rule has
~been developed from Art. 38 EGBGB.720 According to this
provision, the courts have to apply the laws of the place
where the tort occurred. But in case the injuries and the
cause of these damages happened in different countries, the
question arises of what law should be applied. The German
courts have allowed both places to be regarded as 'lex
loci,.721 Since the decision of the 'Reichsgericht' the
German courts follow the 'elective concurrence rule. ,722
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In contrast to the 'lex loci' rules, Art.38 EGBGB ap-
plies the law of the 'lex fori'. This provision limits a
claim in excess of that permitted by German law.723 As
result of this provision, the law which is the most restric-
tive will apply in cases against the German tortfeasor.724
But Art. 38 EGBGB has been used as a public policy device to
favor German parties, and thus it has been criticized by
foreign authorities.
Today, the position of the courts in products liability
cases is still, as stated by the German 'Bundesgerichtshof'
in the Beromyl-case, to apply the law according to the 'lex
loci delicti' rule.725 This means that despite the interna-
tional.critics, which tend to favor an interest analysis,
the courts still apply the law according to the place where
the tort occurred.
In cases where contractual relations between the par-
ties exist, claims based on torts might be decided according
to the 'contractual law,.726 But in cases where the user
has been injured or his property has been damaged, the law
of the sales place is supposed to be ruling.727
2. Public Policy Exceptions
The application of foreign law can be further excluded
according to Art.6 EGBGB. This provision allows an excep-
tion to the general rule of 'lex loci fori' in extreme cases
where the foreign law is considered a violation of Constitu-
tional Rights and other German principles, the so-called
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'ordre pUblic,.728 But a violation of German 'ordre public'
is very rare in legal disputes in which US parties and Ger-
mans are usually involved.729 However, the 'ordre public'
becomes important in cases where the law which has to be
applied according to the conflict of laws rules violates
German 'ordre public'. For instance, this might be an issue
when the punitive damages allowed by u.s. laws are imposed
on a manufacturer. Punitive damages are usually considered
to violate principles of the German legal system since it
is, according to the German view, a fine which belongs to
the criminal law and not to the civil laws.
C. In France
1. Basic Approach
Like the German courts, the French courts use a theory
which follows the 'lex loci delicti'; this doctrine is
gathered from Art.3 (1) C.Civ.730
But exactly what is considered the 'loci delicti' is
not clear if the place of the action and the injury differ
from each other. In one of the few cases where French
courts had to approach this problem731, the court decided
that the issue of whether liability existed, had to be
decided according to foreign laws.732 However, in other
cases the French courts applied the law where the damages
occurred. 733 But the new Code of Civil Procedure, which was
introduced 1976, provided a twofold approach to this issue.
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In tort claims, according to the Code, the law of both
places, the place where the cause of the damages was created
or either the place where the damages occurred, can be now
chosen.734 There has been a trend in French decisions to
select French law in cases where at least two 'fori'
exist.735 The highest French court rendered a decision
reaffirming the 'lex loci delicti' rule even in torts in-
volving foreigners.736 The lower courts, however, have used
'public policy' grounds to avoid the application of foreign
law, hence applying the French laws.737 Since product lia-
bility claims are usually decided by the lower courts,
French courts are likely to apply French law.738
2. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Product
Liability
But France is also a member state of the Hague Conven-
tion on the Law Applicable to Products Liability (1973).739
The rules of that Convention apply even if no reciprocity
exists; for example, if the other state is not a signatory
state or even none of the parties are citizens of one of
these states.740 The applicable law does not even have to
be that of one of the member states.741 The rules of the
Convention are based on two basic ideas: first that no
single contact should be determinant but a combination of
these factors should be analyzed, and second, that the ap-
plicable law should always be foreseeable to the product
manufacturer. 742 The factors which decide what law is
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applicable in a conflict of law situation is primarily the
location of the injury and the residence of the injured con-
sumer.743 Thus, most French courts follow the 'lex loci
delicti' pattern. In addition to these rules, other factors
like habitual residence, and principal place of business are
taken into account.744 Despite the fact that the Convention
applies, even without any reciprocity, it has some limits
and provides for exceptions.745 The most important limita-
tion is due to the purpose of the Convention not to inter-
fere with national, existing laws, especially in the area of
sales.746 According to Art. 1(2) of the Convention, claims
between two subsequent links of the chain of distribution
are explicitly excluded from its the scope.747 The range of
the Convention is therefore restricted to claims based on
torts, but only apply if no contractual relation between the
two parties exists.748 Thus, this limitation has a far
reaching effect on the application of the Convention be-
cause, as a practical matter, a claimant will usually make
claim against the closest party in the chain of distribu-
tion, the seller of the product. But in this particular
case, the application of the Convention is explicitly ex-
cluded. However, in case the remote manufacturer is the
only defendant and the action is only on torts, the Conven-
tion applies.
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D. Conclusions and Differences
Summarizing the posture of all three countries, it can
be said that they still favor a 'lex loci delicti' approach;
Thus, the place of the wrong determines the applicable law.
But they also use an interest analysis technique to mitigate
the sometimes harsh results of the 'lex loci delicti' rule.
Nevertheless, the law which is applicable in all different
systems can be determined with certainty, and it also gene-
rally follows that the law which governs is that of the
place where the wrong occurred.
But all countries have certain means to find exceptions
the general rule, whether based on 'comity' or 'ordre
public'. These exceptions allow the courts of the various
countries to protect the interests of their own citizen by
not applying foreign laws.
Especially regarding the laws of the United States and
the possibility of punitive damages, countries like France
and Germany use 'ordre public' notions to avoid applying
these laws. The same is true about the large amounts of com-
pensation recoverable under US laws. A plaintiff should be
aware that in French or German courts, even when US law
might be applicable, extreme large damages or punitive
damages will not be granted by the courts. To obtain this
kind of compensation, the plaintiff has to sue in the United
States, and it has to be a case governed by us laws.
VI. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Another element to be considered of forum shopping is
the question of whether the foreign judgment will be recog-
nized and enforced in the plaintiff's country, or if an
award obtained in the home state will be recognized and en-
forced in the country of the foreign manufacturer. Depend-
ing on the place where the assets of the foreign defendant
are located, a favorable judgment can be worthless if it
cannot be used to recover.
A. In the United States
Although the US Constitution requires that full faith
and credit be given to judgments749 this does not encompass
the awards of foreign states.750 Thus, before a litigant
can enforce a foreign judgment, it is necessary for him
first to find a court which recognized it.751 Only then,
can the plaintiff use the judgment which he obtained in an-
other, foreign court. Considering the federal structure of
the United States, another question is whether state law or
federal law should govern this subject.752
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1. Basic Factor of Comity
In the United States the courts will recognize a for-
eign judgment, according to principles of comity753 and not
law, when such a judgment does not conflict with a jurisdic-
tion's public policy. In Hilton v. GUyot754, the United
States Supreme Court stated what remains a relatively ac~
curate statement of the US law and results in the general
recognition of foreign judgments. According to this case,
the plaintiff has to comply with the following requirements
for his foreign judgement to be recognized: a final judge-
ment; subject matter jurisdiction of the deciding court;
proper jurisdiction over the parties or the subject of the
dispute; proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity
to present a unbiased defense; and finally, regular proceed-
ings according to a civilized standard of justice.755 In
cases where a foreign judgement is based on personal juris-
diction, the US court will only recognize the award if the
foreign court exercised property jurisdiction over the par-
ties.756 Hence, the US court will not only consider the
proper application of the foreign laws, but also the prin-
ciples of American 'due process' rules.757 The other rele-
vant factors for the recognition of foreign judgments in-
clude absence of fraud758; lack of violations of United
States public policy and principle759; full reciprocity760;
adequacy of notice to the adverse party761; the absence of
res judicata762 and collateral estoppe1763 and the finality
of the judgement.
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The most disputed among this list of factors is usually
the issue of reciprocity that requires foreign courts to
recognize judgments of US courts which are similar to those
of its own country.764 However, even the lack of the re-
ciprocity will not preclude US courts from giving effect to
a foreign jUdgment,765 the judgment must be based on 'in
rem' or 'quasi in rem' jurisdiction or favorable to us
citizen.766 Some jurisdictions have also rejected the 'lack
of reciprocity' requirement, and also the Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act767, which does not require
reciprocity as a precondition for the recognition of a for-
eign judgment.768
2. The Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition
Act
The Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition
Act769 allows recovery of foreign judgments which provide
for the paYment of money if certain conditions are met.770
To be recognized and enforced under this Act the foreign
judgments must be final, conclusive, and enforceable where
it was rendered.771 The Act also contains mandatory grounds
for not enforcing a foreign judgment. Such reasons include
lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or lack of
due process compatible to that provided by the U.S. Con-
stitution.772 Also, § 3 of the Act provides that a foreign
judgment has to be enforced similar to the manner used by
the state that rendered it.773 But this position is not yet
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acknowledged by all courts; also, many courts still reject
registration as means for recognition according to the Uni-
form Enforcement of Foreign Judgement Act.774
B. In the Federal Republic of Germany
Unlike in the United States, German statutes and the German
courts strictly distinguish between recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. This distinction results
from different provisions, which apply to these two sta-
ges.775
1. Recognition according to § 328 ZPO
The enforcement of foreign judgments in the Federal
Republic is governed by the provision of the "Zivilproze~-
ordnung (ZPO)", § 328 (recognition) and §§ 722, 723 (enfor-
cement) ZPO.776
Unlike France, the recognition of foreign judgment does
not require a separate proceeding in the Federal Republic,
but enforcement does.777 The precondition to recognizing a
foreign judgement is that it meets the standard of § 328
ZPo. This dictates the following elements: the foreign
court must have had jurisdiction over the parties (§ 328 I
No.1 ZPO); due process must have been fulfilled (§ 328 I
No.2 ZPO); the decision shall not oppose a former German or
foreign judgment (§ 328 I No.3 ZPO) and cannot violate the
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German 'ordre public' (§ 328 I No.4 ZPO); finally
reciprocity is required (§ 328 I No.5 ZPO).778 If the for-
eign judgment meets these standards, it will be recognized.
However, when a foreign judgment allows a German defendant
to recover more than a foreign defendant could have
recovered in German courts, the issue of 'ordre public'
emerges. Since § 328 I No.4 ZPO does not allow the German
judge to examine the merits of a foreign judgement, the
issue emerges of whether the amount or the particular of
compensation, for instance punitive damages, can be recog-
nized. The 'ordre public', which sets the standard for the
recognition, is determined by the basic principles of the
German society and their structure.779 The posture of the
courts with regard to the recognition of punitive damages
and very high compensation awards is similar to their ap-
proach to the choice of law issues. Thus, such awards will
not be recognized, nor enforced. 780.
Regarding the relationship between the US and France
and Germany, the Uniform Foreign Money Judgment Recognition
Act usually satisfy the requirements of reciprocity between
the legal systems; thus, in general, recognition and en-
forcement between this countries are without problems.781
The recognition and enforcement of German judgments in
France are now governed by the Convention on Jurisdiction
and the Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters.782 According to this agreement, German judgments will
be usually recognized and enforced in France.
128
2. Enforcement pursuant to §§ 722, 723 ZPO
After the recognition of the foreign judgment, it
further needs a so-called "Vollstreckungsurteil", a parti-
cular decision which states that the foreign decision is
enforceable. 783 When the foreign judgment is not final, but
is subject to appeal, § 723 ZPO allows its enforcement, al-
though a bond has to be posted.784 The foreign judgment can
be held enforceable without researching the legality of the
foreign decision if that judgment meets the requirements of
§ 328 ZPO.785 But if a defense later emerges this can be
used to prevent the enforcement decision of the courts.786
The enforcement of a French judgment is, like the recogni-
tion, controlled by the "Brussels Convention" of the Euro-
pean community.787 There are only a few, explicitlyenu-
merated grounds for rejection.788 Considering the general
requirements, a money judgments of a US courts, which does
not violate German 'ordre public' will be usually acknow-
ledged by German courts.
C. In France
In cases where a French citizen is a party, French
courts have been quite reluctant to recognize the foreign
judgement. 789 The former posture of the French courts was
to examine the merits of the foreign judgments, thus basi-
cally question the lawfulness of the foreign decision.790
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But today, the French courts have abandoned this theory and
require only, in accordance with Art. 2123 C.Civ.and Art.
546 of the French Civile Procedure Code, an 'executoire'
proceeding. 791 By doing this, the plaintiff has to initiate
a proceeding to obtain a writ stating that the foreign judg-
ment can be enforced in France.792
The party asking for such a writ has to prove that the
foreign judgment has been rendered by a foreign court with
legitimate jurisdiction.793 Further, recognition is ex-
cluded where the French court had exclusive jurisdiction of
the matter.794 This exclusive jurisdiction allows pursuant
Art. 15 C.Civ. the French courts to deny the validity of a
foreign judgment against a French defendant (citizen or re-
sident); the French courts take a similar position towards
Art.14 C.Civ.
A recognition also requires that the foreign court have
used due process procedures; further, it had to apply choice
of law rules which are in compliance with the French one.
Also in France, the foreign judgment has to comply with
the French 'ordre public', and finally, the foreign judgment
has to be one that was enforceable in the foreign state.795
With regard to the 'ordre public', US judgments which award
very high compensation or punitive damages will face the
same problems in Germany, because the French courts do not
recognize such awards.796 Concerning the size of the com-
pensation, French courts may be not as likely as German
courts to refuse recognition and enforcement, since in
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France awards are usually higher than in Germany.797
D. Enforcement within the European Community
Both countries, France and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many are members of the European Community, thus, already
mentioned, the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, regulates
the recognition and enforcement involving the two states.798
The effect of the Convention results in the recognition and
enforcement of judgments of the various member states with-
out special procedure.799 In the case of an action brought
against the defendant in one member state, the Convention
allows such a defendant to utilize other judicial means in
another member state.800 The Convention allows a judgment
in certain cases to be rejected.801 Such refusal of the
recognition is permitted if the foreign judgment violates
public policy or the principles of international private
law.802 The main effect, however, is that the Convention
forces member states to abolish their judicial resistance to
each other. With regard to American plaintiffs, the Conven-
tion does not directly apply but can have still some advan-
tages. Provided that an American plaintiff achieved the
recognition of his judgement in one member state of the
European Community, he can enforce it in all the other
states. Thus, the US plaintiff whose US judgment was recog-
nized by a German court may seize the assets of the defen-
dant in France or United Kingdom.
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E. Conclusion
With regard to the relations among all three states, it
can be noted that the recognition and enforcement of money
jUdgment in products liability cases usually does not cause
difficulties. But this is not true for injunctions and, of
course, for US requests concerning pretrial discovery.
Also, a plaintiff obtains certain advantages by asking for
recognition within the European Communities, either in the
Germany or France. In such a case, the foreign plaintiff
has more freedom to act within all member states; he can
even obtain the injunction to freeze the assets in a state
different from the one in which he had brought suit.
All three states allow for the rejection of foreign
jUdgments, especially based on 'ordre public' (public
policy) grounds. But only in case of punitive damages and
extremely high awards of compensation will a foreign jUdge-
ment be rejected. For the US citizen suing in Germany or
France, this means that he cannot count on getting compensa-
tion for his US punitive damages award. The US courts,
however, will generally recognize German and French money
jUdgment, since there is seldom a 'public policy' reason for
their rejection. Also, the implementation of the Uniform
Foreign Money Judgment Recognition Act has facilitated this
procedure. However, all different 'fori' still face the
same practical difficulties; the money jUdgment has to be
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translated into domestic currency. Comparing the United
States and Germany and France, it seems that in the European
Community, due to the already accomplished harmonization of
laws, the recognition and enforcement is easier to achieve
than in the United States, where the various states still
lack a uniform posture. But the plaintiff with an US judg-
ment has to be aware that compensation, which are extremely
high according to European standards, and also punitive dam-
ages are not going to be recognized in Germany nor in
France.
VII. Forum shopping
After an analysis presentation of the different legal
systems, the question raises if there are any advantages of
one system that might encourage a foreign plaintiff to sue
in this 'forum'. Concerning the substantive law, prere-
quisite for any forum shopping is that the rules of con-
flicts of law, especially the rule of lex loci delicti, does
not prevent the selection of a better forum. Because if the
courts of the different countries adhered to this rule, all
courts would apply the same substantive. In such a case,
the plaintiff can only seek for better procedural laws in
the various countries, but not for the substantive law.
However, even then other factors than only the substantive
law might be more favorable in one country than in the
other.
A. The United States
Choosing the United States as a forum has certain ad-
vantages. The availability of strict liability and the more
developed interest in consumer protection might be
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incentives to bring a claim in a US court. The extensive
availability of evidence due to the pretrial discovery,
gives the plaintiff an advantage in comparison to countries
like France and Germany; however, only with regard to evi-
dence in the us. The fact that in the United States attor-
neys are available, who are specialized in product liability
might be an other favorable reason to bring a lawsuit in the
us. Also the possibility of having expert witnesses at hand,
who are also specialized in the various product liability
cases, speaks in favor of the us. The same is true with re-
gard to the us contingent fee system, which permits the
plaintiff without the necessary financial sources to in-
stitute a lawsuit against the producer. Not having to pay
the attorney's fee in the case of an unsuccessful action is
another incentive to sue in the United States. Also, the
role of juries in products liability cases is another factor
which speaks in favor of the American forum. Because juries
are usually composed of consumers, they have a tendency to
render judgments in favor of the harmed plaintiff. Especial-
ly with regard to the rendering of damages for pain and suf-
fering, the counsel who can seize the opportunity and influ-
ence the jury members gains a higher amount than is possible
in France or Germany.
On the other hand, a real problem for the foreigner,
who wants to sue in the US, is the possibility of dismissal,
based on forum non conveniens grounds. This risk is espe-
cially high in cases where the parties who are involved have
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no other relation to the United States except for the US
citizenship of the defendant.
Also, the statutes of limitations could have expired in
the plaintiff's home country because of an attempt to in-
itiate a claim in the United States. Even when the foreign
plaintiff might win, he has to be aware that attorney's fees
can be a very substantial part of the amount awarded, up to
40% of the amount granted. Also, the expenses for experts
and other costs might, substantially reduce the awarded
amount. The availability of punitive damages in the United
States should not be a real incentive, because recovering
such damages is not certain and states are introducing more
and more regulations to collect, or limit such damages.
Also, the damages for pain and suffering are often later
reduced by the courts.
But there is still a situation in which it might be
advantageous for the foreign plaintiff to sue in the United
States, when US citizens are also involved in the incident
which caused the injuries, for instance airplane accidents.
There, the danger of dismissal on 'forum non conveniens'
grounds is very unlikely. In such cases, the US courts nor-
mally will affirm the existence of US interests, thus al-
lowing to proceed the action. Here, it is almost certain
that the US forum is the best one. Because it is possible to
take advantage of the larger damages which can be granted
and still keep loss low, such as attorney's fees. Neverthe-
less, it should be always kept in mind that the various
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states of the United States do not have uniform laws. Even
though the basic rules of product liability are similar in
most states, there might be important differences which can
be crucial to the decision of whether to bring suit in a
particular US state or not.
But in most cases, particularly in ordinary cases with-
out extraordinary and severe injuries, the difficulties of
bringing a suit abroad must be balanced with the worth of
the effort. The hope of obtaining a high award is, in ordi-
nary products liability cases, hardly justified. Even
though US awards are higher than in Germany or France, there
are a lot of costs, which the US citizen has to pay by him-
self, what are covered by insurance and social benefits in
the two European countries.
B. Germany and France
In comparison to the United States, the possibilities
which exist in Germany or France are in most regards not
worse. In Germany, the situation for the consumer will
slightly improve with the enactment of the new 'ProdHaftG'.
This will expose the producer of goods to a true form of
strict liability. However, the responsibility of the manu-
facturer or seller in France already has the character of a
strict liability, because it rarely allows any means of
defense. Even the German courts seldom allow the manufac-
turer to escape his responsibility, and under the new
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ProdHaftG, it will be even harder for a manufacturer to es-
cape his liability. Unlike France, Germany allows, and will
allow under the new laws, the manufacturer a state of the
art defense. Another advantage with a German forum, in com-
parison with the United States, might be the different mean-
ing of the term 'defect' in the German laws. Since this·
term is very flexible and also very vague, under the German
law, it offers claims of defectiveness which are not pos-
sible under the laws of some US jurisdictions. The situa-
tion with regard to the burden of proof is also more
advantageous in the two European countries than in the
United States. Defendants in Germany, and also in France,
only have to prove that the defect did not exist when the
product was in control. At least, this is the result of the
EC Directive, but also under the current laws, the situation
is quite similar, due to the presumption of fault on behalf
of the manufacturer.
With regard to the relations between Germany and
France, the German plaintiff might have an advantage by
bringing his claim in France. Under the European Convention
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgment in Civil and
Commercial Matters, he can bring a lawsuit in France, bene-
fitting from the 'stricter liability' laws there.
Also, due to the existence of special laws which impose
a strict liability on the manufacturer, Germany and France
may have incentives for US citizen to seek recovery there.
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For instance, the German Pharmaceutical Act imposes a
real strict liability on the manufacturer.
The French legal system has, in contrast to the US and
Germany, the disadvantage that the plaintiff has to choose
between a contractual claim and one based on torts. Since
the recovery of economic loss is usually only possible under
contractual theories, this might prevent the recovery of a
part of the damages.
However, due to the fact that jury trials do not exist
in the German and French civil law system, the influence of
an attorney in a weak case might be less. The decision is
made by professional judges, who are normally not as likely
to become manipulated than a jury is.
Also, both countries offer damages similar to those in
the United States, but, as stated above, punitive damages
are unknown. Ceilings on compensation, as provided by the
new ProdHaftG or the Pharmaceutical Act, are not a real
threat to adequate recovery, since their actual size is high
enough.
In both Germany and France the discovery rules do not
allow the extensive request of evidence from the other party
before trial. Also, the kind of specialized expert witness,
as known in the United States, are not available in both
countries. However, professionals, named by the French or
German court as expert witnesses, are available.
Also, the fact that no contingency fee system is per-
mitted does not establish a real impediment to litigation,
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since both countries offer financial assistance for claim-
ants who cannot afford litigation.
c. The "Best" Forum
Usually, bringing a claim against the US manufacturer
in the Unites States is too troublesome for a foreign plain-
tiff to outweigh his risk and expenses which such under-
taking. Only in a few cases, where a dismissal because of
forum non conveniens grounds is not likely, and, according
to the practice of the courts, high compensation can be an-
ticipated can the United States courts be recommended. In
all the other cases, where the consumer's damages are not
extremely severe and extraordinary, France and also the
Federal Republic, allow actions which serve the interests of
the victims. Here, it also has to be kept in mind that the
French and German social welfare system, unlike the situa-
tion in the United States, covers most of the expenses with
regard to injuries. us citizens, instead, sometimes have to
sue and bring action to recover their medical bills.
VIII. Conclusion
In summarizing the comparison of the different systems,
it has to be said that there is no one forum for products
liability claims, which is the best. What is the best forum
depends on the facts of each single case. Also, the mere
possibility of getting higher compensation in one country
cannot always outweigh the accompanying difficulties.
Consumers in European countries, like France and Ger-
many, benefit from a well developed scheme of laws dedicated
to protect the consumer. This situation will be improved by
the implementation of the EC Directive in the various domes-
tic laws. But, French and German citizens benefit even more
from their better social security systems.
There are cases where forum shopping can be recom-
mended, but only in cases, where extraordinary circumstances
or extreme damages are involved.
French and German special strict liability laws, may
give an incentive for US consumers to initiate action in one
of the two countries.
Also, Conventions of the European Community, give
French and German citizens the possibility to shop for their
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best forum in the EC, and not necessarily in the United
States.
Summarizing the arguments with regard to the best forum
for American, French or German consumers, the following
points can be made:
It may be favorable for French or German consumers to
sue in the United States,
where he can expect to achieve a higher award of
damages, because the amounts for punitive damages,
pain and suffering, etc. can be much higher,
when property damages are involved, since under the EC
Directive this liability is limited,
where specialized attorneys and experts are necessary
to establish a claim, since in Germany and France
neither are available in such quality and quantity as
found in the United States,
where it is necessary to obtain extensive evidence,
since only the us discovery rules allow this,
where the large number of claims might meet the nation-
al ceilings according to the EC Directive,
where the German claimant is not able to bring claim
for economic loss, because the statutes of limitation
period for claims based on breach of warranty has al-
ready elapsed,
where the 10 year statute of repose of the EC Directive
has elapsed, and a us forum without this limitation
exists.
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It can be more favorable to sue in German or French courts,
where the special strict liability laws, for instance
the German Pharmaceutical Act, applies,
where it is difficult to prove fault on behalf of the
producer, since the EC Directive does not require this,
where assets of the defendant are in the various
countries of the European Community, since a Convention
makes the judgement valid and enforceable in all member
states,
where contributory negligence would disallow a compen-
sation in the US, since the German and French law is
based on comparative fault.
It can be favorable for a US or German consumer to sue in
France,
where a state of the art defense of the manufacturer
might prevent any recovery, since French law does not
recognize that kind of defense,
where the German or US standards for defectiveness do
not recognize the particular defect, since French
courts impose a very strict liability on the manufac-
turer.
However, it should be noted that the decision to initiate
suit, requires a careful balancing of the above mentioned
factors.
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ty") is technically not identical to the term EEC, which
stands for European Economic Community. The EEC is a con-
federation established by the treaty of Rome, which in-
cludes: Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom. The EEC is merely one of the
three communities embraced in the expression "European Com-
munities". But those three different entities are linked by
a single Council of Minister, a single commission and merged
executives. The two other, not so well-known communities
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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
2. According to Art. 19 (I) EEC-Directive.
3. United Kingdom: Consumer Protection Act of 1987; Spanis-
ches Konsumentenschutzgesetz in, Produkthaftung Internation-
al, 1985, S.1985. Currently, a draft of an act which is
supposed to implement the EC Directive is pending in thelegislature of the Netherlands.
4. Numbers published by the U.S.Department, Office for In-
dustry & Trade, show an increase of approximately 95 % with
regard to the export from Germany to the U.S. and about 90 %
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and France, have decreased in the same period of time. But
due to the weak dollar and the resulting cheap U.S. goods,
the U.S. exports in general, and especially in the countries
of the European Community have increased steadily during the
last year. Thus the consumer abroad and in the U.S. is fa-
cing more and more goods from an other country.
5. Concerning heavy machinery and factory equipment a dif-
ferent situation might exist because of the traditional
strength of nations like Us, Germany of France in this
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6. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 590 (5th ed. 1979); where
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brought action in the-United States and finally obtained a
compensation which they never would have gained in a Euro-pean court.
11. ~,~, Neuhaus, Abschied von Savigny? 46 RabelsZ4, 24 (1982).
12. See Kennelly, Transitory Tort Litigation - The Need for
Uniform Rules Pertaining to the Personam Jurisdiction: Forum
Non Conveniens, Choice of Law, and Comparative Negligence ,
22 Trial Lawyers Guide 422, 423-424 (1979).
13. See Vagts, An Introduction to International Civil Prac-tice,-r7 Vand.J.Trans-l.L.6 (1984).
14. See Text of the EC-Directive: Council Directive of 25
July 1985 O.J.No: C 210/29 (85/374/EEC).
15. Concerning the History of the Draft ~, 1 W. FREEDMAN,
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 5.17 (1986); see also,
Note, The European Community's Products Liability Directive:
Is the US Experience Applicable ?, 18 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus.
795, 798-809 (1986); Note, Defining the Limits of Liability:
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A Legal and Political Analysis of the European Community
Products Liability Directive, 25 Va.J.Int'l.L. 721 (1985)._
16. The European Community (EEC or EC) is often confused
with the Council of Europe, but both organizations are dif-
ferent and also work on different, however overlapping
areas. Also the countries which are in the two formations,
are not identical; the Council includes besides the EEC mem-
berstates also states like Austria and Switzerland. Unlike
the EEC which is action mainly on economic matters, the
Council is not restricted in its work. According to its _
charter, it has to deal with social, cultural, scientific
and legal matters; see 3 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM CYCLOPEDIA,
Western Europe (A) ECC Countries 681, 683 (1984).
17. Id.
18. UNIDROIT stands for "Institute for the Unification of
Private Law" an international institute; see D.T.WILSON, IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (2d ed.-r983).
19. English Text with an explanatory report of the Draftin: PL in Europe, 131-144.
20. Europ. T.S. No.91, February 1977)
21. Id.;~, also, 1 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 5.16.
The reason for the FRG not to ratify that convention was
because at the same time similar developments and efforts
had been started ( PHI, Sonderdruck, July 1987, 96).
22. See 1 W.Freedman, supra note 15, at § 5.16.
23. M.Will, Asides on the Nonharmonisation of PL Laws in
Europe 33, in HARMONIZATION OF LAWS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 28(ed.P.HERZOG 1975).
24. Id., at 40.
25. See 1 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 5.17.
26. Here, for the purpose of this contribution, the bystan-
der is defined in distinction to a consumer or user of a
product who is considered as being a natural or legal person
who has purchased a defective product.
27. Art.3 defines the producer as follows: "the manufac-
turer of a finished product, the producer of any raw ma-
terial or the manufacturer of a component part and any per-
son who by putting his name, trademark, or other distin-
guishing feature on the product presents himself as a itsproducer."
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28. The liability does not embrace the importers of the EC
itself; it is not applicable to imports from one EC-member-
state into the other. Only imports into the Communities are
subject to the "importer" rule of Art. 3 (II).
29. Schmidt-Salzer, Die EG-Richtlinie Produkthaftung, 1986
Der Betriebsberater [hereinafter BB] 1103, 1107.
30. Art.2:"[m]eans all moveable, with the exception of pri-
mary agricultural products and game, even though incorpo-
rated into another moveable or into an immoveable ....in-.
cludes electricity."
31. See Lorenz, Europaische Rechtsangleichung und Produzen-
tenhaftung, 1987 Zeitschrift fUr das gesamte Handelsrecht
[hereinafter ZHR] 1.
32. However the liability for those 'products' is
restricted under Art.7(b) of the Directive.
33. ".... protection of the consumer requires that all
producers involved in the production process should be made
liable, insofar as their finished product, component part or
any raw material supplied by them was defective."
34. See, 1 W.Freedman, supra note 15, at § 5.18.
35. See, D.TEBBENS, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY 146
(1979-)-,-Tebbens mentions the example of the elevator in a
building which is necsssary included.
36. I See, Taschner, Die kUnftige Produzentenhaftung in
Deutschland, 1986 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [herein-
after NJW] 611, 615: Taschner gives certain examples for the
scope of safety which can be asked for in the different
situations.
37. See Griffiths, Defectiveness in EEC Product Liability,
Journal of Business Law 222 (May 1987).
38. Art. 6: " 1. A product is defective when it does not
provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect,
taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could be reasonably be expected that
the product would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation."
39. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc. 573 P.
2d 443 (Cal. 1978); see also Keeton, Products Liability -
Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 Mich.L.Rev.
1329, 1335 (1966).
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40. See, official Reasoning for the new ProdHaftG (1st
Draft of the new Act).
41. See Art.6, supra note 38.
42. See Griffiths, supra note 37, at 223.
43. This defense of 'state of the art' belongs to the well-
known means of a producer to protect himself against the
liability for a defect product. But in European countries
which follow not the common-law system, such defense was not
explicitly used in this particular category. With the Di-
rective this legal term, which belongs to the anglo-american
legal terminology, is introduced in all member states of the
EC. However, it has to keep in mind that the interpretation
of this defense and it contents is a matter of the different
national courts and therefore a broad variety of understand-
ings might and probably will emerge. The term will not be
clear and unambiguous.
44. See Art. 10(1) of the EC Directive.
45. Art. 7(e) states: " The producer shall not be liable if
he proves: .....
(e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at
the time when he put the product into circulation was not
such as to enable the existence of the defect to be dis-
covered; or ....
46. See This provision also allows the parties to go 'forum
shopping' within the EC; see D.TEBBENS, supra, note 35, at
142.
47. This is a difference to the rules established by the
European Convention on Products LIability. There the ap-
plication of the provision to damages to property was ex-
plicitly excluded, see Albanese & Del Duca, Development in
European Product Liability,S Dick.J.Int.'l.L. 198 (1987).
48. See 1 W.FREEDMAN,supra note 15, at § 5.18. A reason to
include damages to the product itself does not exist, be-
cause such cases are governed by the 'sales law' of the va-
rious states. Therefore in such case an action for breach of
contract, based either on implied or expressed warranty for
the product can be started.
49. For the exchange of the ECU in the different currencies
of the EC-memberstates, declares Art. 18 (1),(2) that the
value has to be calculated based on the exchange rates of
the 25 July 1985.
50. Art. 9 (b) of the Directive.
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51. See Coe, Products Liability in the European Communities
- An Introduction to the 1985 Council Directive, 10 J.Prod.
Liab. 197 (1987). Art. 9 (b)(i)&(ii) states this require-
ment.
52. See 1 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 5.19.
53. See Official Reasoning to the ProdHaftG, PHI 1987, 116.
54. See Coe, supra note 51, at 211: This is a result of the
European practice in Products Liability actions which allow
not the recovery of such amounts which can be redressed in
US courts.
55. See Maddox, Products Liability in Europe, Towards a
Regime of Strict Liability, 19 J.W.T.L. 508, 521 (1985).
56. See Art.7 of the Directive, where the manufacturer can
escape liability if he proves that the defects where not
detectable according to the technical and scientific stan-
dard at the time the product was put into circulation. He
can also escape his general responsibility if he proves that
the defect of his product was caused by the accomplishment
with mandatory regulations of the government. But it has to
keep in mind that according Art. 15 (l)(b) the memberstates
can provide even in this cases a liability.
57. According to Art. 177 (b) of the Treaty of Rome, the
Court of Justice has the authority to decide on the inter-
pretation of acts of the European Institutions.
58. See Whincup, Product Liability in Common Market Coun-
tries, Common Market Law Review 52-54 (1982).
59. Id.; this includes countries like Spain, Italy, Por-
tugal and Greece.
60. Also Luxembourg, Belgian and Denmark belong to this
kind of country.
61. The proposal of the commission, for instance, did con-
tain a clause stating that the Directive was only a set of
minimum-standards; see Bourgoignie, Produkthaftung: Alte
Argumente fUr eine neue Debatte?, 1 Europaische Zeitschrift
fUr Verbraucherrecht 4 (1986).
62. This is at least the fear which the various consumer
protection groups already complaint of.
63. See Art. 15 EC-Directive.
64. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 15-22; see, also 1
W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 1.15.
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67. See M.S.SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, ~ 7.02
(1987-).-
72. See, ~ Jordan v. Sunnys10pe Appliance Propane &
Pluming Supplies Co., 660 P. 2d 1236 (Ct.App.1983).
to the user or consumer
"
68. See § 402A 1 Rest.2d, "
70. See, e.g., Wentworth v. Kawasaki, Inc. (1981 NH) 508
F. Supp. 1114; this corresponds also with the intentions of
the drafters of § 402A Restatement (2nd), as it is indicated
by the comments to this provision. According hereto, the
terms "user" and "consumer" were not meant to be literally
taken. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 727 F. 2d
506 (Miss. 1984), on reh, en banc, ques certified, vacated,
in part, on other grounds 757 F. 2d 614, certificate for
ques dismissed en banc (Miss) 469 So. 2d 99, later proceed-
ings on other grounds 781 F. 2d 394, cert. den. (US) 92 L.
Ed 743.
69. But note that the courts make distinctions: ~ res-
cuers were allowed to recover for breach in implied warran-
ty, because "...danger invites rescue"; see Guarino v. Mine
Safety Appliance Co., 255 N.E. 2d 173 (N.Y. 1969). See also
Court v. Grze1inski, 379 N.E. 2d 281 Ill. 1985), the court
held that the "...fireman's rule, saying that the landowner
does not owe a duty of care to a fireman fighting a negli-
gently started fire, was not pertinent to products liability
cases based on strict liability.
71. See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 451 P. 2d 84 (A1.
1984)~he courts held that the driver of a car involved in
a head-on collision, which was caused by a defect in the
other car, was a proper plaintiff against the seller of that
car; see, also Jackson v.Johns-Manvi11e Sales Corp., 727 F.
2d 50~51~th Cir. 1984), where the court held that all
those persons are protected by Products Liability who where
" within the area of [contemplated or normally] intended
use " and "...who can reasonably foreseen to be en-
dangered."
65. See UCC § 2-318, but this applies only if a warranty,
either expressed or implied, is found.
66. By doing this the courts overcome the "privity of con-
tract" principle in those cases. These were especially ad-
dresses to the development of liability of the seller of
food and beverages towards third person. As a result of that
development, the courts found that neither'vertica1' nor
'horizontal' privity was longer necessary to recover, and
finally this liability was also extended on products which
were not determined for human consumption, like animal food;
see D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 19.
150
73. See M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 16.02[2][a]; see
also South Austin Drive In Theater v. Thompson, 421 S.W. 2d
~(Tex.Civ.App. 1967); see also Baird v. Bell et.al., 491
F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. 1980)--.--
74. It has to be noted that this is only true under alter-
native c of the section, but not under the other alterna-
tives. Thus, it depends on the alternative which the dif-
ferent states have adopted whether a bystander can be a
plaintiff or not.
75. § 402A (1) Rest. 2d, mentions expressively "[O]ne who
sells any product ..•. is subject to liability ...".
76. See Comment f to § 402A Rest. 2d (1965) states that the
rule "...applies to any manufacturer".
77. See M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 10.03[6]; see also
Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F. 2d 267, 274 (5th Cir.
1962), where the court held that the buyer of an assembled
good does not distinguish between the assembler or manufac-
turer, thus the latter has to liable for the former. See
also Helene Curtis v. Pruitt, 385 F. 2d 841 (5th Cir.1967).
78. See Wiler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 95 Cal. Ap-
p.3d 621, 629-630 (1979).
79. See Bevard v. Ajax Mfg. Co., 473 F.Supp 35 (E.D. Mich
1979); the court held that a one time seller of a used
machine had a duty of care. See also Santiago v. Bliss Div.,
492 A. 2d 1089, 1090 (N.J. 1985)-.---
80. See, J.A. HENDERSON & A.D.TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
181 (1987); see also for an overview of the sates which have
enacted such kind of legislation, Stuby, Status and Trends
in State Product Liability Law: Theories of Recovery, 14
J.Legis. 216, 222 (1987).
81. See J.A.HENDERSON & A.D.TWERSKI, id., at 181.
82. However, in general companies which are acquiring the
assets of another corporation, do not assume its liability
by doing that. See Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F. 2d 443,
446 (7th Cir. 1979). See also R.W.HAMILTON, THE LAW OF COR-
PORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 42~27(1987).
83. This is the consequence of the fact that cash sales let
the relation between shareholders and their respective cor-
poration without change. Only in case of a merger, the
liability is transferred upon the new corporation; see,
~, Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F. 2d 690, 693
(lstCir.1984).
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84. See, ~ Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A. 2d
126,127 (Vt. 1984); this court mentioned that a transfer of
liability would result in a "...potential economic threat tosmall businesses".
85. See M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 13.01.Also, in case
the new company is nothing more than a continuation of the
seller's one. Finally, the succeeding corporation is held
liable where the transaction was only made to escape lia-
bil~ty for such obligation. See,~, Leamais v. Cincin-
nat1 Inc., 565 F. 2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977). See also
Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois et. al., 808 F. 2d 84a-(III.
1986); in this case asbestos or asbestos related products
were in involved. Since the contact with this material often
happened a long time ago, the question whether a succeeding
company is liable for her predecessor. In this particular
case the judge denied such succeeding responsibility.
86. See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d [hereinafter
Am Law Prod Liab 3d], § 7:3 Supplement, at 24 (1987).
87. See Orban, Product Liability: A Comparative Legal Res-
tatement - Foreign National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 Ga.
J. Int'l. & Compo L. 342, 353 (1978). The contractual lia-
bility originates from §§ 433, 459, 460 of the German Civil
Code (or "Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch" = "BGB"); the liability
based on torts is governed by §§ 823-831 BGB. The scope of
the possible redress has to be determined according to § 249
BGB. For a translation of those provisions see, A.T.VON MEH-
REN & J.R. GORDLEY, THE, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 557-560, 1190(1977).
88. See H.U.STUCKI & R.P.ALTENBURGER, PRODUCT LIABILITY: A
MANUAL OF PRACTICE (1981),- Germany -,at 36, 38. Generally,
only the victim who has a contractual relationship with the
defendant can sue him based on the contractual liability.
Other person, such as dependants, family members, etc. are
limited to the prospects of bystanders. Even German courts
does recognize a certain right of bystanders to sue based on
contractual liabilities ("Drittschadensliquidation"), this
very seldom the case, see BGH 1969 NJW 269. The claim of a
bystander against the distributor, for instance, is limited
to the same claim as he can initiate against a user.
89. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 79. That means that
plaintiff can combine his claims in torts and contracts as
alternative bases of a sought of recovery. This charac-
teristic of the German law is also know as 'parallelism of
the law of liability' ("Zweispurigkeit des Haftpflicht-
rechts")i ~ Esser, Die Zweispurigkeit unseres Haftpflicht-
rechts, 1953 Juristische Zeitung (JZ) 129. The principle of
the option to sue on torts as on contracts at the same time
has been explicitly recognized by the BUNDESGERICHTSHOF (the
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highest German court with jurisdiction in civil matters) in
the 'Fowl-pest case' ("Hlihnerpest-Fall"), see BGH 1977 NJW
378, as permissible in cases where the liability of the
manufacturer was challegend.
90. But certainly a plaintiff can not recover more than his
actual losses by initiating both claims, see H.U.STUCKI &
P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-Germany-, at 16.
91. See text of § 1 ProdHaftG;
92. Notice that in general the contractual liability is
only a limited one with regard to the possible recovery. The
remedy which the law offers the purchaser of such a product
depends on the kind of fault which is attached to the pro-
duct; thus the claim can result in nothing more than the
repair, return or price reduction, see H.U.STUCKI & P.R.AL-
TENBURGER, supra note 88,-Germany-, at 7, 9.
93. See BGH 1980 NJW 1219.
94. See De Leyssac, France in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE,
A COLLECTION OF REPORTS PREPARED FOR THE CONFERENCE ON PRO-
DUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE TO BE HELD IN AMSTERDAM ON 25TH AND
26TH SEPTEMBER 1975, 55, 56 (1975). But there is a limita-
tion due to the role of mere dealers in the chain of dis-
tribution: Because German courts do not require the seller
of a product to inspect it for hidden defects, they are not
liable for such kind of fault, see 1 W.FREEDMAN, supra note
15, at § 5.07.
95. See BGH, 1975 NJW 1827.
96. The 'head of the production' is an individual, for in-
stance the engineer who is responsible for a certain part of
the production.
97. See N.HORN, H.KOTZ & H.G.LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AND COM-
MERCIAL LAW AN INTRODUCTION 222 (1982).
98. Hereby the Act follow the rules of the EC Directive in
Art. 3.
99. See § 4 (1) of the Draft of the ProdHaftG.
100. Id.
101. See Ecolivet-Herzog, supra note 23. For more informa-
tion on the French Legal System see: A. VON MEHREN & J.GORD-
LEY, supra note 87, 579, 590-687;-D.TEBBENs,supra note 35,
at 83-97; Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 47, at 198;
1 W.Freedman, supra note 15 at § 5.08.
153
102. It is an established principle of French Law that bet-
ween parties in contractual relation, necessary is a direct
contractual privity, only a contractual action can be
brought to court; a claim based on tort liability is not
possible; see B. NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACTS 30, 53
(1982) and also D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 93.
103. See, Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 47, at 199. How-
ever, it has to be noted that French Courts had indicated
that it is not always necessary for a party to be in "direct
privity" with the vendor to be considered a contracting
party; it might be sufficient to be the owner of the defec-
tive product at the moment the fault was detected; see,
Ecolivet-Herzog, supra note 23, at 4. ---
104. See Orban, supra note 87, at 348.
105. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 87; a 'leapfrog' ac-
tion for economic reasons.
106. See, Posch, Recent Developments of Products Liability
Law in Europe and nearby, 163, 181, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (1983) [Ed. D.CAMP-
BELL/C.ROHWER].
107. See, Orban, supra note 87, at 347.
108. See, Ecolivet-Herzog, supra note 23, at 3; also Al-
banese & Del Duca, supra note 47, at 199; there they mention
decisions of the Cour'de cassation regarding actions against
both, the distributors and the producer of defective pro-
ducts.
109. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 87.
110. See De Leyssac, supra note 94, at 55, 56.
111. Negligence is recognized in alISO states, see Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Liability For Products, 44 Miss.
L.Rev. 825, 825-26 (1973). Recovery for breach of warranty,
provided by the UCC is also, with the exception of Louisi-
ana, generally available, see [1986] 1 Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)~
1023. Strict liability is recognized in 33 states which
courts have adopted the rules of the § 402A Restatement
(2d); in 8 more states the courts have adopted 'strict
liability' standards, and in 5 other states codification of
strict liability has been enacted; see Am Law Prod Liab, §
16:9, § 16:13, § 16:24.
112. See,~, Dubin v. Michael Reese Hospital, 393 N.E.
2d 588 (Ill.1979), rev'd, 415 N.E. 2d 350 (1980). Here the
Illinois Appellate Court held X-radiation to be a product
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but the Supreme Court of Illinois later said that it was not
necessary to decide whether such radiation was a 'product'.
113. Therefore even houses, rental apartments or a commer-
cial unit was held to be a 'product', see D.W.NOEL &
J.J.PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 1 (1980).
114. See Pierce v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 212 Cal.
Rptr. 283 (Cal. App. 1985); here 'electricity' was held to
not only a service but a 'product'.
115. See,~, Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co. (Div.of Hartz
Mountain Corp.) 404 N.Y.S. 2d 778 (N.Y. App.Div. 1977);
where a hamster was held to be a product and hence strict
liability was applied. But note that the table of products
given by the Restatement does not contain animals.
116. See Model Uniform Products Liability Act, which ex-
pressly excludes blood. Most states have adopted similar
statutes, thus precluding the strict liability in blood
transfusion cases' see, ~, St.Luke's Hospital v Schmaltz
534 P. 2d 781 (Colo. 1975). Today a growing number of states
have passed laws, which exclude 'blood' from strict
liability. The reason for this is based on policy, since
the states are trying to avoid a shortcome of 'blood' due to
strict liability. But see also Gallagher v. Cutter
Laboratories, cited in 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 15, §1.12,
note 142; there blood was considered as a product.
117. See Restatement, (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment d.
118. ~,Illinois Revised Statutes Chapter 110,
~ 13-213(a)(2).
119. See Model Uniform Products Liability Act, § 102[C];
"Product means any object possessing intrinsic value, ca-
pable of delivery either as assembled whole or as a com-
ponent part or parts, and produced for introduction into
trade or commerce. Human tissue and organs, including human
blood and its components are excluded from this term. The
"relevant product" under this Act is that product, or its
component part or parts, which gave rise to the product lia-
bility claim."
120. See 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 1.14, note 158.
See also A.S.WEINSTEIN, A.D.TWERSKI, H.R.PIEHLER & W.A.
DONAHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT
5-16 (1978).
121. D.W.NOEL & J.J. PHILLIPS, supra note 113, 8. But note
that this position is controversial; see M.S.SHAPO, supra
note 67, ~ 8.05.
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122. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A Comment i .
123. See M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 8.04[1].
124. See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of
'Defec~in the Manufacturer and Design of Products, 20
Syracuse L.Rev. 559, 568 (1969).
125. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Con-
scious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
Colum.L.Rev. 1531, 1538 (1973); however, the courts have_
hardly followed this view, see, e.g., Bernier v. Boston
Edison Co., 403 N.E. 2d 391, 396 (Mass. 1980).
126. This is for reasons that Louisiana as the only US-
State with a Civil Law system, had not had a respective
statute enacted. Today the UCC, which governs this remedy,
has been put into force in all states, but with regard to
certain provisions regulating the breach of warranties
Louisiana did not so, see [1986] 1 Prod.Liab.Rep. (CC) ~~1020, 1023. ---
127. ~ D.W.NOEL & J.J.PHILLIPS, supra note 113, at 17.
This position was stated by a English court in Winterbottom
v.Wright, 152 Eng.Rep. 402 (1842); the US courts followed
this position during the 19th century until the MacPhersondecision.
128. The leading case with regard to abolishment of the
'privity-requirement'_was Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc. , 32 N.J. 358 (1960); see also W.PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971)~or additional information
about this development see Noel, Manufacturer of Products-
The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 Tenn.L.Rev. 963(1957).
129. see D.W.NOEL & J.J.PHILLIPS, supra note 113, at 26.
Thus a claim against the remote manufacturer was not pos-sible.
130. See Am Law Prod Liab, § 18:1.
131. See,~, Baxter v. Ford Motors Co., 35 P. 2d 1090
(Wash. 1932); where the plaintiff relied on the advertised
quality of the good. The representation contained in the
advertisement was held to establish an express warranty. The
courts have held that producers who are using the modern
means of advertisement to make representations that their
products have special qualities, however they don't, then
those manufacturer should be liable.
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132. See M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 3.03. This respon-
sibility is even imposed on advertisers who are, with regard
to the chain of distribution, quite remote to the seller;
133. UCC § 2-313 (l)(a)
134. Id.
135. See D.TEBBENS, super note 35, at 17.
136. See § 2-314 (1) UCC.
137. See UCC § 2-314, Comment 3.
138. See UCC § 2-315; see also Prince v.Le Van 486 P. 2d
959 (Alaska 1971).
139. see, e.g., Williams v. Paducah Coca Cola Bottlery
Co., 98 N.E. 2d 164 (Ill.App. 1951).
140. See also UCC § 2-607 Comment 4 (1977).
141. See 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.Ct.App. 1916), where the court
refused to apply the "Winterbottom v. Wright" rule.
142. This rule is based on the case Winterbottom v. Wright
(1892), 10 M & W 109.
143. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 282-283 (1965).
144. See Robb, A Practical Approach to the Use of State of
the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability cases 77 Nw.u. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1982).The author states that often the
question of State-of-the-Art has been labeled as defense,
but he does consider this a "misnomer". According to his
understanding, state-of-the-art is merely a factor descri-
bing the owed duty of the manufacturer. This opinion is
shared by the most jurisdictions in the US, see id., at 7n.20. --- --
145. See Olson v. A.W.Chesterton Co., 256 N.W. 2d 530, 540
(N.D. 1977).
146. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, State of the Art and Strict
Products Liability, 21 Tort & Ins. L.J. 30 (1985).
147. See Am Law Prod Liab 3d, at § 12:5; the violation of
one of this rules can establish negligence per see
148. See M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 5.02.
149. See 377 P. 2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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150. See ide
151. Id.
152. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965).
153. See Comment f to § 402A Rest.2d.; however, the courts
did have done so in the past, see, e.g., Bevard v. Ajax
Mfg. Co., 473 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Mich 1979); the court stated
that even the one-time seller of a used machine had a dutyof care.
154. See Comment m to § 402A Rest. (2d) of Torts.
155. See Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft Inc. 707 S.W.2d 371-rMo. 1986).
156. The interpretation is derived from the comment i of
the Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A.
157. New York, Pennsylvania and California belong to this
states. There argument against this standard is that it in-
volves principles of negligence which can confuse a jury andthus misguide the jurors.
158. See Voss v. Black and Decker Mfg.,Co., 463 N.Y.S. 398
(Ct.Ap~1983). The New York standard has also been adopted
by the courts in Washington, See Kimble v. Waste Systems
International, Inc. 595 P. 2d-sG9 (1979).
159. See Azarello v. Black Brothers Co. Inc., 391 A. 2d1020 (Pa. 1978).
160. For an overview See [1986] 1 Prod.Liab.Rep. (CC) ~4016, 4026-27.
161. See Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W. 2d 129(Mich.1965).
162. MASS.GEN.LAWS ANN.Chp. 106, § 2-318 (West 1978); they
are using a liability theory which is an adaption of the
warranty principles to the needs of consumer protection.
163. Other states are Delaware, North Carolina and Vir-
ginia; ~ Stuby, supra note 80, 216, 220 (1987).
164. See Robb, supra note 144, at 10. This can be done by
proving that the product is not defective or that it was
unavoidable unsafe; ide at 10 n. 33 and 34.
165. This expression has been defined as "customary in-
dustry practice", but also as the "aggregate of product-re-
lated knowledge which may be feasibly be incorporated into a
158
product", and also as "the aggregate of product-related
knowledge existing at any given point in time", see Note,
Product Liability Reform Proposal: The state of the Art
Defense, 43 Alb.L.Rev. 941, 945-496 (1979). See generally
M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 10.01.
166. ~, Indiana Code § 33-1-1.5-4 (defense to strict
liability); for a survey see Am Law Prod Liab, 28-35.
167. See, e.g., DeSimone, The State of the Art Defense in
Products Liability: "Unreasonably Dangerous" to the injured
Consumer, 18 Duquesne L.Rev. 915 (1980). The author asks for
a limited admissibility as evidence.
168. See,~, Ward v. Hobart Mfg.Co. 450 F. 2d 1176 (5th
Cir. 1971).
169. See,~, 447 A. 2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
170. The defendant producer of the asbestos raised the
'state of the art defense', alleging that, at the time the
product was put into circulation, no one knew or could have
known, according to the stand of science and medicine at
that time, of the inherent danger of this product; see id,
at 542. - -
171. Id., at 205-208, 447.
172. For a more detailed representation of the issue, see
Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 146.
173. Id., at 545; here the court followed one of his ear-
lier decisions, Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 432
A. 2d 925 (N.J. 1981), where it stated that "...there is no
need to prove that the manufacturer knew or should have
known of any dangerous propensities of its product - such
knowledge is imputed."
174. Id., at 547-549.
175. ~, Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604
P. 2d 1059, 1063-64 (Alaska 1979).
176. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 146, at 33. The two
commentators mention that in case of a 'strict liability'
action the question of 'state of the art' is naturally
linked with the product and not with the conduct of the
manufacturer. Thus, in a case of failure to warn, the pro-
duct, due to the lack of knowledge of its defectiveness,
could not have been made safer by any warning - since nobody
knew about the necessity of a warning.
r
I
I
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177. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A. 2d 374
(N.J. 1984). In this case the teeth of a young woman were
permanently gray stained as a result of a drug which she had
taken as a little child. The plaintiff claimed that the
manufacturer failed to warn her from the risk of decolora-
tion.
178. Id., at 377.
179. Id., at 380.
180. Id., at 385.
181. Id.
182. The court referred to some of its former decisions,
see,~, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach.Co. 406 A. 2d
140 (N.J. 1979).
183. Id., at 386; see also O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.
2d 298-rN.J. 1983).
184. Id., at 387.
185. See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 391 A. 2d 1020 (pa.
1978).
186. Id.
187. It should be noted that after Feldman, defendants in
New Jersey courts have argued that even in asbestos cases
Besheda was not longer applicable; as a result in two cases
the judges agreed, see Herber v. Johns-Manville, No: 82-
2081. (D.N.J.Nov. 3~1984), and also Kreider v. Keene
Corp., No. 81-2794 (D.N.J. Oct. 1~984); in another case
the judge disagreed with this view, see In re Asbestos
Litigation Venued in Middlesex Count~No. L-2740-81
(N.J.Supr.Ct. Sept.21, 1984(Keefe,J.) Following this con-
fusion, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a court order
stating that Besheda still applies "...to all pending asbes-
tos cases.", see In re Asbestos Litigation Venued in Mid-
dlesex County~os.M-338/339/340/341 (N.J.Supr.Ct. Dec.4,
1984)(Clifford,J.) reh'g denied, No. 23, 265 (Dec. 19,
1984).
188. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 146, at 42.
189. See De Lousanoff, supra note 147, at 72, 79-80.
190. See M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 12.21 [5].
191. see, e.g., Sindell v. Abott Laboratories, 607 P. 2d
924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied 101 S.Ct. 286 (DES-case); see
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also Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Liability, 46
Fordham L.Rev. 963 (1978).
192. DES = Diethylstilbestrol
193. See Sindell v. Abott, 607 P. 2d 924, 937 (1980). The
court held, that a "substantial percentage is required", and
stated further that the liability of each defendant will be
limited according to his market-share.
194. See M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 12.21 [6].
195. See PALANDT-[AUTHOR]THOMAS, BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH,
at § 8~Anm. 16) D) (47.ed 1988); that is also the position
of the jurisdiction, see Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen
[hereinafter BGHZ] 51~1.
196. Because of the fact that the liability under tort law
is easier to substantiate and also easier to prove.
197. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823 Anm. 15)
a) •
198. This interest is known as "Nutzungsinteresse"; see
PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823 Anm. 15) A).---
199. This kind of interests which tort law has to protect
is called "Integritatsinteresse"; see PALANDT-THOMAS, supra
note 165, at § 823 Anm. 15) A).
200. See Merkel, Weiterfressende Mangel ohne Ende?, 1987
NJW 358.
201. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-Ger-
many-, at 6. Thus this understanding may differ from the
that in other european countries.
202. Id.
203. See BGH 1977 NJW 378.
204. See PALANDT-PUTZO, supra note 195, at § 433 Anm.l)a).
205. § 90 BGB: "Things in the understanding of the Act are
only material objects."
206. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 66-68.
207. § 459 BGB (Civil Code) states that the seller of a
product warrants that the sold product is free from defects
which might affect the value of the product or restrict its
normal use or the use as expressed or implied by the con-
tract.
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208. See Orban, supra note 87, at 353; also Albanese & Del
Duca, supra note 47, at 200; For a translation of the German
statute, see H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,
-Germany-, at 7. In addition, § 459(1)(2) states a fault
which is only insignificant, does not establish liability.
209. The expressed warranty of § 459 (II) BGB requires that
the seller explicitly guarantee a certain feature or quality
of the sold merchandise, see PALANDT-PUTZO, supra note 195,
at § 459 Anm.4) a). Note that this explicit warranty can be
concluded from an expressed as well from an implied declara-
tion of the vendor; whether such guarantee was given has to
be determined in any single case, see Semler, Warenbeschrei-
bungen oder Zusicherungen einer Eigenschaft, NJW 1976, 406.
The assumption of an implied warranty in such a case has to
be taken only cautious, see BGH 1980 NJW, 1619.
210. According to § 463 BGB.
211. See Orban, supra note 87, at 353; see also the text of
§ 462 BGB.
212. § 463 BGB gives the purchaser in such a case the
choice to ask, instead of price reduction or rescission of
the contract, for damages.
213. See Orban, supra note 87, at 353;see also PALANDT-
PUTZO, supra note 195, at § 459 Anm. 5) which gives a
detailed survey of the decisions of the German courts.
214. See Orban, supra note 87, at 353.
215. See K.ZWEIGERT & H.KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARA-
TIVE LAW: THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW 166 (1977).
216. For an survey of the development of this remedy see
N.HORN, H.KOTZ & H.G.LESER, supra note 97, at 105-7.
217. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-Ger-
many-, at 9. These 'additional obligations' are called in
German "positive Vertrags-(Forderungs-)verletzung (pVV)",
~ also TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 68. The development of
the pVV was initially based on a broad interpretation (by
the "Reichsgericht", the precursor of the "Bundesgerichtshof
(BGH)" of § 276 BGB. But today the base of that remedy is
seen in a legal gap which has to be closed by customary law.
This is done by analogy to §§ 286, 326 and 280, 325 BGB; see
BGHZ 11, 83; see also K.LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT: ALLGEMEINER
TElL, § 24 I a-T6th ed. 1983).
218. § 276 BGB: " A debtor is responsible, unless it is
otherwise provided, for wilful default and negligence. A
person who does not exercise ordinary care acts negligently.
----------------
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The provisions of §§ 827 and 828 apply." Translation from
A.T.VON MEHREN & J.R.GORDLEY, supra note 87, at 1190.
219. § 242 BGB, this is the so-called "Generalklausel
(General Rule)" of the German law; § 242: " The debtor is
bound to perform according to the requirements of good
faith, ordinary usage being taken into consideration";
translation from YON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 87, at1190.
220. See PALANDT-HEINRICHS, supra note 195, at § 276 Anm.7.
221. See N.HORN, H.KOTZ & H.G.LESER, supra note 97, at 107.
222. An other reason originates from the difficulties of
proof. The plaintiff has to prove the defendant was at fault
and this can be, especially in areas where the defendant has
alone control, very difficult and rather impossible.
223. ~A.T.VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 87, at 1193.
224. See TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 69.
225. Basically, this is an imputation of liability upon one
person for the actions of another individual, thus it is a
form of "indirect legal responsibility", see BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 1404 (5th ed. 1979). ---
226. § 831 BGB allows the employer to render an 'excul-
patory-proof', thus allowing to escape his liability in this
situation; ~ ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 215, at 296-297.
227. § 278 (2) BGB allows a disclaimer for the liability,
but only for intentional acts of the "Erflillungsgehilfe";
~ PALANDT-HEINRICHS, supra note 195, at § 278 Anm. 9). See
~ A.T.VON MEHREN & J.R.GORDLEY, supra note 87, at 1193.
228. § 823: "A person who, wilfully or negligently, unlaw-
fUlly injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or
other right of another is bound to compensate him for any
damage arising therefrom." Translation from A.T.VON MEHREN &J.R.GORDLEY, Supra note 87, at 557.
229. Especially by using the means of shifting the burden
of proof between the parties in favor of the plaintiff.
230. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823 Anm. 16)D) bb)-.-
231. Id.
-----------------
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232. See BGH 1972 Der Betriebsberater [hereinafter BB],13ff.
233. See BGH 1954 Versicherungsrecht [hereinafter VersR]100.
234. See BGH 1959 VersR 523,524.
235. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER -Germany-, supra note
87, at-r9; ~ also BGH 1972 VersR 559.
236. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 75.
237. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823 Anm. 15)
D) c) dd). But in such a case, the unavoidable risks cor-
respondents with higher standards of duties concerning the
proper warning and instructing of the consumer.
238. Id.
239. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 75; this includes
elements like economic situation and also the feasibilityof rigid safety measures.
240. See translation, supra note 228.
241. PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at Einf. v. § 823 Anm.
6) •
242. In German law that does mean that the defendant has to
act intentionally or negligently, pursuant to § 276 (I) (1)
BGB, for the text of that provision see A.T.VON MEHREN &
J.R.GORDLEY, supra note 87, at 1193.---
243. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-Ger-
many- at 19. Hereby the required degree of care follows
objective standards, and the subjective standard of the
party concerned is not material. Thus the party who is
responsible for the manufacture or distribution of the
product is obliged to take all precautions necessary, pos-
sible and adequate to avoid any defect occurring in the
product. But a definition of those obligations can't be
given in general terms since the necessary degree of care
will differ in the specific case.
244. See TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 74. One of the reason
for these difficulties is the fact that the actions which
has to be proven to be negligent usually have occurred in
the domain of the defendant manufacturer. Since the consumer
has no control over this area and also in general lacks
about this scope of activity, problems of proof are the
direct results of this circumstance.
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245. § 831 BGB:"A person who names another for a task is
obliged to compensate for any damage which the other unlaw-
fUlly causes to a third party in the performance of the
task. The duty to compensate does not arise if the principal
has exercised necessary care in the selection of the person
charged; and, where he has to supply apparatus or equipment
or to supervise carrying out of the task, has also exercised
ordinary care as regards such supply or supervision or if
the damage would have arisen notwithstanding the exercise of
such care." Translation from A.T.VON MEHREN & J.R.GORDLEY,supra note 87, at 559.
246. See N.HORN, H.KOTZ & H.G.LESER, supra note 77, at 157.
247. This proof is known as 'Exculpatory Proof' ("Entlas-tungsbeweis").
248. This defense, the "decentralized exculpatory evidence"
[("Dezentralisierter Entlastungsbeweis"); see BGH 1964 VersR
297] worked in favor of the big companies. For reasons of
this provision stating a form of vicarious liability, a
claim against a German company was not very likely to be
successful. The originate of the § 831 BGB was the time of
the beginning industrialization; it was Supposed to avoid
too many obstacles for the developing industry which were a
result of the low safety standards at that time.
249. See TEBBE~S, supra note 35, at 75.
250. ~ The violation of a duty to construct a device in
a safe manner corresponds a constructing defect as result.
251. See 87 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivil-sachen-rhereinafter RGZ] 1.
252. See 163 RGZ 21, ~ the defective brakes of an auto-mobile-.-
253. BGH 1959 NJW 1676, ~ to warn of the fact that a
certain product (here: anti-corrosion paint) was highly in-flammable.
254. See TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 75.
255. 'Protective Laws" is the literal translation of the
german term "Schutzgesetz". Those laws are aimed to protect
the rights of third parties, which includes in general also
the bystanders. § 832 II BGB: "The same obligation is placed
upon a person who infringes a statute intended for the pro-
tection of others. If according to the provisions of the
statute its infringement is possible even without fault, the
duty to make compensation arises only in the event of
fault." Translation from A.T.VON MEHREN & J.R.GORDLEY, supra
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note 87, at 557; see also H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER,
supra note 88,-Germany-, at 17.
256. See, example given:
- Geratesicherheitsgesetz (Equipment Safety Act)- Gerate-
sicherheitsgesetz of 24 June 1968, BGBl I 1968, p. 717,
amended 1 January 1980, BGBl I 1979, p. 1432;
- Gesetz liber den Verkehr mit Lebensmitteln, Tabakerzeugnis-
sen, kosmetischen Mitteln und sonstigen Bedarfsgegenstanden
(Law on the circulation of food, tobacco products, cosmetics
and other essential commodities) of 15 August 1974, BGB1- I
1974, p. 1946.
- Futtermittelgesetz (Feed Distribution Act) of 25 July 1975
BGBl I 1975, p. 1745.
257. See K.ZWEIGERT & H.KOTZ, supra note 215, at 270.
258. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-Ger-
many-, at 24; see also PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at §
823 Anm. 9).
259. Id., at § 823 Anm. 9) c).
260. "Arzneimittelgesetz" (Pharmaceutical Act) of 24 August
1976, BGBl I 1976, 2445.
261. Under very special circumstances § 826 BGB, can fur-
nish a base for a claim on products liability. But because
of the excessive and malicious conduct which is required
under the statute, such cases are very seldom. § 826 BGB:"A
person who wilfully causes damages to another in a manner
contrary to good morals is obliged to compensate the other
for the damage." Translation from A.T.VON MEHREN &
J.R.GORDLEY, supra note 87, at 558.
262. Note that besides the Pharmaceutical Act, the Atomic
Energy Act ("Atomgesetz") of the 31 October 1976, BGBl I
1976, 3053, provides also a strict liability for the owners
and operators of nuclear plants and ships using such source
of energy; see H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-
Germany-, at 32.
263. See Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 47, at 202.
264. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823 Anm. 16)
E) b).
265. See STUCKI & ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-Germany-, at
32.
266. See § 1 of the Draft.
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267. Such acts are for instance the Pharmaceutical Act, the
Law on Liability (of Railway, Electricity Supply,Mining etc.
Undertakings for Death, Personal Injury and Property Damage= Haftpflichtgesetz (HaftpflG) and the Road Traffic Act
(Strassenverkehrsgesetz (StVG».
268. See official "BegrUndung zu dem Gesetz Uber die Haf-
tung fUr fehlerhafte Produkte", Produkthaftpflicht Interna-
tional -Sonderdruck, July 1987, at 99.
269. Importers have become subject to liability because
this seemed in light of the so-called 'cheap-products'-im-
ports from countries with low production costs. To avoid a
distortion of the sales conditions between German manufac-
turers and the 'cheap-country' importers.
270. § 4 of the Draft is identical to Art.3 of the ECDirective.
271. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823 Anm. 16)
D) dd);this liability is known as "Ausreil3erhaf-
tung"('stray-shot liability').
272. See official" Offizielle BegrUndung ", supra note226, at 99.
273. § 3 ProdHaftG is, with regard to the text, identical
with Art. 6 of the EC Directive.
274. § 1 (1) No.5 of'the Draft states this exemption ofliability.
275. § 6 (2) of the Draft of the ProdHaftG; but for the
part of the damages which can be allocated to the actions of
the third party, the manufacturer has a claim for compensa-
tion against this third party.
276. § 1 & §§ 7-10 of the Draft of the ProdHaftG.
277. This was told by the German Justice Department uponoral request.
278. See § 10 of the german draft; which states, according
to art. 16 (1) of the EEC Directive, that "Any Member State
may provide that a producer's total liability for damages
resulting from a death or personal injury and caused by
identical items with the same defect shall be limited to an
amount which may not be less than 70 million ECU."
279. approximately 98 billion US $
280. The contractual liability covers also the obligation
which are based on the law of sales; because the part of the
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law is merely a certain aspect of contractual law, it can be
treated in the same chapter; see Albanese & Del Duca, supra
note 47, at 198. ---
281. See Orban, supra note 87, at 346.
282. See De Leyssac, supra note 94, at 55.
283. See Art. 1641 C.Civ., which defines such 'defect', see
also Ecolivet-Herzog, supra note 23, at 4. The issue whether
a product is defective is one of facts, thus the decisions
of the courts of the first instance will not be reviewed by
the French Cour de Cassation.
284. See Orban, see note 87, at 348; there is a brief, but
detailed review of the elements in a claim based oncontrac-
tual liability pursuant to 6
Art. 1641-1649 C.Civ.
285. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88, -
France-, at 20.
286. Art. 1645 C.Civ.; see also D.TEBBENS, supra note 35,
at 83.
287. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 84, 85.
288. See Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 47, at 198; see
also H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88, -France-,
at 16, 17.
289. See Orban, supra note 87, at 349; also Ecolivet-Her-
zog, supra note 23, at 7.
290. The courts have and still do distinguish between the
occasional seller, he is subject to Art. 1646, and the mer-
chant for whom selling is his business, here Art. 1645 ap-
plies; see Ecolivet-Herzog, supra note 23, at 7.
291. Id.
292. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 85.
293. See Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 47, at 197; also
Cass.civ. com., 84 Bull. Civ. I 69.
294. See Art. 1648 C.Civ.: according to that provision it
is necessary to enter such an action "dans un bref delai
suivant la nature des vices et l'usage du lieu ou la vente a
ete faite"; see also Orban, supra note 87,at 347; also De
Leyssac, supra note 94, at 58.
295. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 86.
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296. See Ecolivet-Herzog, supra note 23, at 8.
297. Id.
298. The Cour De Cassation is the highest French court with
regard to civil matters. Its authority covers only the legal
issues; therefore the court has to accept the factual find-
ings of the lower courts. See MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM CYCLO-
PEDIA, supra note 16, Supplement (1), P 30.67.
299. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88, _
France~at 25.
300. 'Marketing' is here understood as displaying productsfor sale.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. lId.
304. § 1384 (I):" A Person is liable not only for the
damages he causes by his own act, but also for that caused
by the acts of persons for.whom he is responsible or of
things that he has under his guard. Translation from A.T.VON
MEHREN & J.R.GORDLEY, see supra note 87, at 555.
305. Id., at 1193.
306. See 1 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 5.08.
307. See Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 47, at 199. They
mention there other duties of the producer, but those are
only derivations of the original liability created by the
Art. 1384 C.Civ.
308. See translation of Art. 1384 C.Civ. in A.T.VON MEHREN& J.R.GORDLEY, supra note 87, at 1190.
309. See De Leyssac, supra note 94, at 63.
310. See Orban, supra note 87, at 349.
311. See H.U.STUCKI & J.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-
France~at 27-30.
312. See Maddox, supra note 55, at 510. He mentions that by
the virtue of Art. 1384, other parties in the distributor
chain are liable, ~ not for inspecting the product ade-
quate. But note that this liability can be burdensome for
the innocent final user of a product, because he as the
'gardien' of the good (he has control over it) might be held
- ----~- ---------------- ..•...•.•---..,............,.
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responsible for injuries resulting from ~ exploding bot-
tle. Only for reasons that in such case the defendant can
sue the vendor seeking indemnity; ~ TEBBENS, supra note35, at 92.
313. For an overview see H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER,
supra note 88, -France-, at 32-34.
314. Art. 6 of the Law of July 8, 1941 imposes on the con-
structor or operator of a cable car a 'strict liability',
see H.U.STUCKI & J.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-France- at33.
315. Art. L. 141-2 of the Civil Aviation Code declares the
operator of an aircraft being strict liable to persons and
property located on the ground.
316. See Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 18, at 1110.
317. See § 8(c) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Affirma-
tive Defenses; see also 1 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at §
2.01.
318. In States which have already enacted Products Liabi-
lity laws, those statutes usually contains certain pro-
visions about defenses against such claims. For a survey see
Am Law Prod Liab, § 39:1.
319. ~ Hanlon v. Cyril Bath Co., 541 F. 2d 343 (3d Cir.
1975); where the accident was caused by a modified switch to
operate a press.
320. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Customs Ice Equipment Co., Inc.,
246 S.E. 2d 176 (S.C. 1978).
321. See Am Law Prod Liab, § 43 :1.
322. § 402A (I) (b) "... is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or
to his property if .... [b] it is expected to and does reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the con-
dition in which it is sold."
323. See,~, Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 393
N.E. 2d 598 (1st Dis. 1979). Also see § 402A where also the
"substantial change' requirement is mentioned. See, also
Banks v. Iran Hustler Corp. 475 A. 2d 1243 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.
1984).
324. See,~, Garcia v. Biro Mfg.Co. 475 N.Y.S. 2d 863
(1st Dis. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 469 N.E. 2d 834.
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325. For instance in Guffie v. Erie Strayer Co., 350 F. 2d
378 (3d Cir. 1965) ,where the plaintiff was injured in his
attempt to fix a defect which originated from the manufac-
turer.
326. ~ General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 535 S.W. 2d 880
(Tex.Civ.App. 1976).
327. See Am Law Prod Liab 3d, § 42:16, § 42:17; whether the
defense result in a bar or only in less recovery, depends on
the various statutes, and if the jurisdiction still follow
the traditionally contributory negligence rules, or if they
already have enacted comparative rules.
328. ~ under Tennessee and Indiana Statutes, Tennessee
Code § 29-28-108, and.Indiana Code § 33-1-1.5-4(b)(2); but
also the case law of some other states comes to the same
result, for an overview, see Am Law Prod Liab 2d, § 42:18n. 4.
329. See id., n.5.
330. See, e.g., Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co. 509 P. 2d 28
(Or. 1973), superseded by statutes on other grounds as
stated in Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of General Motors, 642
P. 2d 624 (1982).
331. See, e.g., Amburgey v. Holan Div. of Ohio Brass Co.,
606 P. 2d 21 (Ariz. 1980).
332. See for an overview, Am Law Prod Liab 3d, § 48:8.
333. See, also Comment h to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.
334. See Am Law Prod Liab, § 1:82.
335. See, e.g., Jones v. White Motor Corp., 401 N.E. 2d
223 (Ohio Ct.App. 1978).
336. See Am Law Prod Liab 3d, § 1:91.
337. See,~, Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg.Co., 660 S.W. 2d
404 (Mo. App. 1983).
338. See D.W.NOEL & J.J.PHILLIPS, supra note 113, at 37.
339. See Noonan v. Buick Co., 211 So. 2d 54 (Fla. App.
1968).
340. See S.M. Speiser, C.F.KRAUSE & A.W.GANS, THE AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS (hereinafter: SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS) § 12:46
(1983).
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341. Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 496B, comment b.
342. See SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra note 341, at § 12:49
343. Since only in case the exposure to these dangers was
an intentional or deliberate act of the plaintiff, he could
have been able to assume the additional risks. Only in case
he was able to avoid those risks, it is fair that the
manufacturer can use this fact as defense; see Am Law Prod
Liab, § 41:8. ---
344. ~ McAdams v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 602 S.W. 2d 374
(Tex.App.1980).
345. See also Vargo, Something New and Something Old:
Defenses to Strict Liability, 15 Trial 48 (1979); the author
demands that the claimant had to be presented with different
alternatives to give him a real choice.
346. See Am Law Prod Liab 3d, § 41:10.
347. see, e.g., Dura v. Horned, 703 P. 2d 396 (Alaska
1985); for an overview see also Am Law Prod Liab 3d, § 41:11
n. 80.
348. See Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Con-
tributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand.
L.Rev. 93, 121 (1973).
349. see, e.g., Christner v. E.W.Bliss Co., 524 F. Supp.
1122 (MD Pa 1981)( applying Pennsylvania law). The question
of comprehension increasingly gains importance in claims
against cigarette manufacturers. Especially, if minors are
deemed unable 'per set to understand the risks connected
with smoking, this might lead to extraordinary difficulties
for the tobacco industry; see Note, Plaintiff's Conduct as a
Defense to Claims against Cigarette Manufacturers, 99 Har-
vard L.Rev. 809, 815, 816 (1986).
350. see, e.g., Deere Co. v. Brooks, 299 S.E. 2d 704 (Ga
1983), on remand 305 S.E. 2d 675.
351. See Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc., 345
N.W. 2d 338 (ND 1984); it has been even questioned if the
'reasonable' assumption of risk was intended to be a defense
in 'strict liability' actions.
352. This is conform with § 496A Restatement (2d) of Torts.
353. ~ in Alabama, the 'contributory fault' principle is
still good law; see, e.g., Bonner Welders, Inc. v.
Knighton, 425 So. 2d 441 (Ala 1982);
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354. For an overview see Am Law Prod Liab 3d, § 41:25.
355. See, e.g., Hensely v. Sherman Car Wash Equipment Co.,
520 P. 2d 146 (Col.App. 1974).
356. However the Restatement 2d § 402A Comment n states
that negligence on behalf of the claimant, in case it con-
sists only of not discovering the defect, or not taking ap-
propriate safeguards against potential risks, does not free
the manufacturer from liability.
357. See, for further references, Am Law Prod Liab 3d, §
41: 28~25 and n.29. It should be mentioned that in
California 'assumption of risk' as separate defense has been
abolished as far as it has the effect of contributory
negligence; see id.
358. See, also Li.Yellow Cab.Co., 532 P.2d 1226,1241 (Cal.1975).--- ----
359. See Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng Rep
926 (1809); the origin of the theory of 'contributory negli-
gence' is usually attributed to this case.
360. See SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra note 341, at § 12:3.
361. See McGowne v. Challenger-Cook Bro. 672 F.2d 652 (8th
Cir. 1982).
362. See SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra note 341, at § 13:1.
363. See,~, Brown v. Keill, 580 P. 2d 867 (Kan. 1978).
364. See,~, Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E. 2d 886, 893 (Ill.1981).---
365. 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
366. Id.
367. See M.S.SHAPO, supra note 67, at ~ 17.06 [3].
368. ~ Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance v. McDonnell-Dou-
glas Corp., 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980); here a producer's
disclaimer from strict liability was held valid.
369. See M.S.Shapo, supra note 67, at ~ 17.02.
370. See § 2-316(2) UCC; See, also § 1-201 (10) for a de-
finition of the term 'conspicuous'.
371. See Comment 8 and § 2-316 [3][b].
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372. See § 2-316 (3)(c); see also B.STONE, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE IN A NUTSHELL, at 69 (1984).
373. See § 2-716 Comment i.
374. See Comment 1,3 to § 2-719(3) UCC.
375. Magnusson-Moss-Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act; 15 U.S.C.A. § 2301 et. seq.
376. See 15 U.S .C. § 2308 (a) (1982).
377. See J.B.MCDONNELL & E.J.COLEMAN, 1 COMMERCIAL AND CON-
SUMER WARRANTIES ~ 4.1 (1987).
378. See,~, Blanchard v. Monical Mach.Co., 269 N.W. 2d
564, 567 (Mich. 1978); where the court held that a UCC dis-
claimer does not bar a common-law tort liability for negli-
gence.
379. See, ~ Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 380
N.E. 2d 819, 823 (Ill.App. 1978); here the court held that
the 'strict liability' does not depend on the contractual
relations of the parties. Hence the disclaimer clause on a
rental ticket was held to be invalid to preclude the lessors
'strict' liability.
380. "... warranty must be given a new and different mean-
ing if used in connection with § 402A".
381. See Keystone Aeronautics Corp.v. R.J. Enstrom Corp.,
499 F. 2d 146,149. (3d Cir. 1974).
382. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823 Anm. 16)
bb) .
383. See Maddox, supra note 55, at 512.
384. See 51 BGHZ 91.
385. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-Ger-
many-, at 26.
386. BGH 1973 NJW 1602; that means he has to show that he
was not negligent with regard to every single employee.
387. Id.
388. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88, at
42-44; see, also PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823
Anm. 16). The manufacturer has to show that no "Organisa-
tionsmangel"( no fault in organizing the business) existed.
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389. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 75.
390. Id.
391. See, Taschner, supra note 36, at 614.
392. The literal translation of the German title of section
254 of the BGB is "Contributory Fault". Actually it is
similar to the US rules of "Comparative Fault", since it is
not a total bar to the claim of the victim but reduces the
damages the plaintiff can claim for.
393. § 254 BGB:" If any fault of the injured party has con-
tributed to causing the injury, the obligation to compensate
the injured party and the extent of the other compensation
to be made depend upon the circumstances, especially how far
the injury has been caused by one party or the other."
Translation from A.VON MEHREN & J.R.GORDLEY, supra note 87,
at 1191.
394. However this provisions is literally speaking of da-
mages, its major application is in allocation the different
degree's of faulty causation concerning accidents. Therefore
this rule is here and in addition later, under the subhead-
ing damages, mentioned.
395. See PALANDT-HEINRICHS, supra note 195, at § 254 Anm.2.
396. Since the current German Law is not based on standards
of 'strict liability', in this case the action of the defen-
dant is considered to be the only cause for the accident.
The fact that the producer has put this product into cir-
culation is without significance. This posture of the German
courts appears also from there definition of a 'defect'.
Because this definition contains the expression of "...use
it was made for.", thus eliminating misuse as cause of ac-
tion.
397. See, BGH 1968 VersR 804.
398. See Maddox, supra note 55, at 510.
399. See Orban, supra note 87, at 348 n. 18.
400. See De Leyssac, supra note 94, at 58.
401. Id.
402. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-
French=-:-at 28.
403. Id., at 50.
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404. Id.
405. 'Force Majeure': "..superior or irrestible force.";
see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (5th ed. 1979).
406. Such 'contributory negligence' does exist for instance
in case the plaintiff failed to comply with the manufac-
turers instructions,
407. Id.
408. See Ecolivet-Herzog, supra note 23, at 7 n 24.
409. See De Leyssac, supra note 94; see also Albanese & Del
Duca, supra note 47, at 200.
410. See De Leyssac, supra note 94, at 60. The main argu-
ment against such extensive warranty of the vendor and the
limitations concerning disclaimers is that hereby the future
development of technology is hampered and an unjust heavy
burden posed on the manufacturer of even new goods.
411. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, 35.
412. For a survey of the different time periods see Am Law
Prod Liab, § 47:2; note that various states have special
statutes of limitations in their Products Liability Laws.
413. See 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 135.
414. See Olsen v. Bell' Tel. Laboratories, Inc., 445 N.E. 2d
609 (Mass. 1983).
415. ~ G.D.Searle & Co. v. Superior Court of Sacramento
County, 122 Cal.Rptr. 218 (3d Dis. 1975).
416. ~, California Code of Civil Procedure § 340
(General Tort Statute), Louisiana Revised Statutes, Art.
3492 (General Tort Statute) - all one year -; Georgia Code
§ 9-3-33 (General Tort Statute) two years; New York Con-
solidated Laws CPLR § 214(5) (General Tort Statute) three
years, and up to 6 years in Maine, Maine Revised Statutes
Title 14 § 752 (General Tort Statute).
417. See Am Law Prod Liab, § 47:2.
418. See, ~ Daniel v. America Optical Corp. (Ga. 1983)
304 S.E. 2d 383. Some states have enacted special Products
Liability laws for personal injury, ~ Alabama Code § 6-5-
502(a)(1) (1 year), Florida Statutes § 95-11(3)(e) (4
years), or Tennessee Code § 29-28-103 (1 year).
419. The term "statutes of repose" is understood differ-
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ently; some authorities consider statute of limitations and
repose as being identical. See Merlo, Statutes and Trends in
Products Liability Law: Statute of Limitations and of
Repose, 14 J.Legis. 233, 234-35 (1987).
420. See Martin, A Statute of Repose for Products Liability
Claims, 50 Fordham L.Rev. 745, 749 (1982).
421. GA. Code Ann. § 105-106(b)(2) (1984):" ...within ten
years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption
of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing aboutthe injury."
422. See Martin, supra note 421, at 767-68.
423. See for an overview, Merlo, supra note 420, at 238 n38.
424. Merlo, supra note 420, at 241, states that the trend
with regard to the states statutes of repose is against this
kind of statutes; however because of the need to answer the
potential open-ended liability of the manufacturer, he asks
for a federal, thus uniform statute of repose.
425. Here it should be noted that the German law does not
know a statute of limitation ("Yerjahrung") concerning the
commencement of actions, but that only "Ansprliche", thus
"Rights by which the holder can demand that another person
should do something or something or refrain from doing some-
thing", see E.J.COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 70 (1968), can be
object to this kind of limitation. Also, it should be
noticed that absolute rights like ownership, cannot be ter-
minated by German "Yerjahrung".
426. See § 222 I BGB; see E.J.COHEN, supra note 426, at 90.
427. § 852 (1) BGB:"The claim for compensation for any
damage arising from the delict is barred by prescription in
three years from the time at which the injured party has
knowledge of the injury and of the identity of the person
bound to make compensation and, without regard to such
knowledge, in thirty years from the doing of the act."
Translation from A.YON MEHREN & J.R.GORDLEY, supra note 87,
at 566.
428. See § 852 BGB, ide
429. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 852 Anm.3
430. See BGH 1973 NJW 1077.
431. § 195 BGB; ~ E.J.COHEN, supra note 426, at 90.
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432. See N.HORN, H.KOTZ & H.G.LESER, supra note 77, at 131.
433. See id., at 131.
434. § 13 I ProdHaftG.
435. See De Leyssac, supra note 94, at 61.
436. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-
France- at 22. However, courts increasingly tend to ease
this burden for the claimant. Thus they held that the 'bref
delai' has to be of such length, to allow a diligent buyer
to commence his action in the particular case; see D.TEB-
BENS, , supra note 35, at 95. ---
437. Art 2262 C.Civ.: Toutes les actions, tant reelles que
personnelles, sont precrites par trente ans, sans que celui
qui allegue cette prescription soit oblige d'en rapporter un
titre, ou qu'on puisse lui opposer l'exception deduite de lamauvais foi.
" All actions, real as well as personal, are prescribed by
thirty years, without the one who alleges such prescription
being obligated to show a right thereto or an inferred ob-
jection of bad faith being able to be raised against him";
translation from J.H. CRABB, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE 406(1977).
438. See id., at 24.
439. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 95.
440. Id.; In case a felony has been committed it is 10
years, for a misdemeanor 3 years and for minor offenses only1 year.
441. See W.PAGE KEETON et.al., PROSSER & KEETON LAW OF
TORTS,~9 (5th. ed. 1984).
442. See Engberg v. Ford Motor Corp. (S.D. 1973), 205 N.W.
2d 104; overruled on other grounds in Smith v.Smith 278 N.W.2d 155.
443. see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 222 N.E.
2d 348 (4th Dist. 1966).
444. See Lanzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E. 2d 185(OH 1966).
445. See Lane v. Redman Mobil Homes, Inc. 624 P. 2d 984,
988 (1981);where the court held that in actions based on
negligence, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose and strict liability have as same elements
of proof: the existence of a defective product, which was in
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existence at the time the object left the control of the
producer and a causation link between defect and damages.
446. See Fuller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 186 Cal Rptr 26
(1982). It should be noted that 'res ipsa loquitur' does not
require an inference of defendant's negligent, but only
allow to make that conclusion; see Jenkins v. Whittaker
Corp. 785 F. 2d 720 (9th Cir. 1986), applying Hawaii law.
447. See Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F. 2d
130 (5th Dist. 1980).
448. See McGonigal v. Gearhart Industries, Inc., 788 F. 2d
321 (5th Cir. 1986), applying Texas law.
449. Restatement, Torts 2d § 328D, Comment (f).
450. See Querry v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 535 P. 2d 928
(Kan. 1975).
451. See Fuller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. 26
(Cal.App. 1982).
452. See Stalter v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 669 S.W. 2d 460
(Ark. 1984).
453. See Jagmin v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 211 N.W. 2d 810
(Wis. 1983). Here, a kind of 'res ipsa loquitur' inference
was used to·establish the defectiveness of a product. In
this case the plaintiff was able to show that he was using
the product in a proper way and that there were no other
causes for the defect since the product left the manufac-
turer's control.
454. See,~, Barret v. Atlas Powder Co., 150 Cal. Rptr.
339 (3d Dist. 1978).
455. See,~, Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F. 2d 720
(9th Dist. 1986).
456. See Dement v. Olin-Mathieson Chem.Corp., 282 F. 2d 76
(5th Cir. 1960).
457. See, Brothers v. General Motors Corp., 658 P. 2d 1108,
1110 (Mont. 1983); where in a car accident the existence of
a number of various effects precludes the inference of a
defect based on 'res ipsa loquitur'.
458. See Cronin v. J.B.E.Olson Corp., 501 P. 2d 1153, 1162
(Cal. 1972).
459. Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 573 P 2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
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460. See, id., at 236. Another case where the court shifted
the burden of proof is Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607
P. 2d 924, 935 (Cal. 1980). Here the defendant manufacturer
had to prove that they did not manufactured the drug which
injured the plaintiff; by establishing the so-called 'market
share liability' the court held that, since the defendant's
market share was "... a substantial percentage", "... the
injustice of shifting the burden of proof to defendants to
demonstrate that they could not have made the substance
which injured plaintiff is significantly diminished." See,id., at 937. --_
461. See J.B.MCDONNELL & E.J.COLEMAN, supra note 378, atchap. 1, ~ 1.03 [3].
462. Id.
463. See Hinderer v. Ryan 499 P. 2d 252 (Wash.Ct.App.
1972);-nDt a products liability case.
464. See Am Law Prod Liab, § 20:7.
465. However, this view is not generally accepted in alljurisdictions; ~ id. n.44.
466. See,~, Sheehan v. New Hampshire Liquor Commission,493 A. 2d 494 (N.H. 1985).
467. See Am Law Prod Liab, § 20:26.
468. See Rosener & Jahn, Germany, supra note 94, at 75.
469. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-Ger-many- at 27.
470. The difficulties arise from the fact that the manufac-
turer has to be at fault where the plaintiff, the consumer,
has no control. Usually the plaintiff has not the means to
show and also proof acts which happened in the factory of
the manufacturer. German Law does not know the extensive
rules of discovery as they exist in the US law.
471. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823 Anm. 16)
D) ff)-.-
472. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88, at27.
473. See 51 BGHZ 91; "Hlihnerpestfall"(Fowlpest-case); in
this case the a veterinarian was administering an insuffi-
ciently immunized vaccine to the chickens of the plaintiff,
a poultry farmer. As a result fowlpest occurred which causedabout 100,000 DM of damages.
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474. Translation from Mankiewicz, Products Liability - a
judicial breakthrough in West Germany 19 Int'l & Compo L.Q.
99 (1970).
475. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 77.
476. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-Ger-
many-, at 28.
477. Id.,at 13.
478. See PALANDT-HEINRICHS, supra note 195, at Vorbem v §
249 Anrn:-5) c).
479. See BGHZ 3, 268. However, in case where not a single
item which is built according to the specifications of the
buyer, but one which belongs to a certain kind, thus an in-
dustrial product is object of the sale, the seller has to
prove that there was not a defect when it left his control.
See, 26 BGHZ 224; see also PALANDT-PUTZO, supra note 195, at
§ 459 Anm . 6).
480. See amtl. Begrtindung to § 1 ProdHaftG.
481. See De Leyssac, supra note 94, at 57.
482. See Orban, supra note 87, at 348.
483. See Ecolivet-Herzog, supra note 23, 7.
484. See De Leyssac, supra note 94, at 59-60.
485. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-
France-, at 25.
486. Id.
487. See Minor, French Consumer Protection Law, 33 Int'l. &
Compo L.Q. 130 (1984).
488. See Albanese & Del Duca, supra note 47, at 199,200.
489. Id., at 348.
490. See, H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-
France-, at 51.
491. See Am Law Prod Liab 3d, § 60:1.
492. ~ medical expenses, loss of earnings, costs of
repairs, future pain and discomfort, see for a survey Am Law
Prod Liab, § 60:3.
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493. See La Brumley v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 459
So. 2d 572 (La.Ct.App. 1984).
494. See, e.g., Wolker v. Preformed Line Products Co., 600
F.Supp. 280 (W.D.La.1984).
495. See Croteau v. Olin Corp., 644 F. Supp. 208 (D.C. NH
1986).
496. See Rossell v. Volkswagen of America, 709 P. 2d 517
(Arz. 1985), cert. den.(US) 106 S.CT. 1957.
497. See Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhatten, Inc. 776 F. 2d
1492 (~Cir.1985).
498. See Howell v. Gould, Inc., 800 F. 2d 482 (5th
Cir.1986).
499. See Robertson v. Superior PMI, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 790
(W.D. La 1985), mod. on other grounds 791 F. 2d 402.
500. See Burns v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 510
A. 2d 810 (pa. 1986).
501. See Howell v. Gold, Inc., 800 F. 2d 482 (5th
Cir.1986). This kind of damages are also provided by sta-
tutes of some jurisdictions, ~ Florida Statute § 768-80.
502. See,~, Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Parker, 451 So.
2d 786 (Ala. 1984); ,the courts will reduce the amount if the
awarded sum show a clear abuse or passionate exercise.
503. See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Juris-
prudence, (1966) 66 Columbia Rev. 917.
504. ~ Berg v. General Motors Corp., 555 P. 2d 818,822
(Wash. 1976). In some, however only a few states, the
recovery for 'economic loss' under a 'strict liability' ac-
tion was allowed; ~ Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Com-
pany, 182 N.W. 2d 800 (Mich. 1970), see also for an overview
,Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Ser-
vice, Inc. 572 S.W. 2d 308, 310 (Tex.1978) [but in this case
the court held that there was no need to allow recovery for
economic loss under strict liability rules, especially,
where the contractual remedies allow the recovery of that
loss]. For a general overview, see Bieman, Overview of State
Strict Products Liability Laws,-ro J. Prod. Liab. 111
(1987).
505. Purely economic means where no personal injury or
property damages exist. See also Schwartz, Economic Loss in
American Tort Law, 23 San Diego L.Rev. 37, 75 (1986).
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506. See Am Prod Liab, § 60:4.
507. See,~, NY-Hole v. General Motors Corp. 442 N.Y.S.
2d 638 3d Dept. 1981).
508. See Am Law Prod Liab 3d § 60:17, § 60:9; Note that
hereby not only 'asbestos' cases, e.g., Eagle-Pichters In-
dustries, Inc.v. Cox (1985, Fla. App. D 3) 481 So. 2d 517,
are affected, see McAdams v. Eli Liliy & Co., 638 F.Supp
1173 (N.D.Ill.-r986).
509. See generally Am Law Prod Liab, § 60:9.
510~ Supra note 4.
511. See J.M.KAKALIK & N.M.PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION
PAID IN TORT LITIGATION, 32 (1986).
512. See 1 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 1.05.
513. ~ Stambaugh v. International Harvester, (111.1984)
where the trial court reduced a jury award of $ 15,650,000
to $ 8,150,000. See also Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 438 So.
2d 192 (Fla. Dis~Ct. App. 1983), the appellate court
upheld a jury verdict of $ 2,000,000 compensatory damages
and $ 3,000,000 in punitive damages; see generally 1
W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 1.06.
514. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 238 (5th ed. 1979).
515. See Branton, The Collateral Source Rule, 18 ST.MARY'S
L.J. 883 (1987).
516. Id. n.4 for an overview of those states which have
abolished this rules by statutes.
517. see, e.g., Morrison, One Member's Reflections on the
American Bar Association Tort Commission, 14 J.Legis. 167,
175.
518. See ABA Tort Commission, 14 J. LEGIS. 167, 175 (1987).
519. Especially, because in case the paid medical bills
would be deducted from the compensation, the insurance car-
rier might bring a claim against the tortfeaser to recover
these costs.
520. In addition it can be argued, that the tortfeasor is
not supposed to become punished or rewarded, but this would
be the result of the application of the collateral source
rule; see Vagley, Nuter & Beck, Working toward a Fairer
Civil Justice System 11 (1987).
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521. ~ Alaska, Arizona and Rhode Island concerning medi-
cal malpractice; Florida with regard to car accidents; and
New York, Massachusetts and Oregon have basically abolished
this rule, see NCSL State Legislative Report In Resolving
the Liability Insurance Crisis: State Legislative Activitiesin 1986.
522. See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Liti-
gation, 74 Mich. L.Rev. 1257 (1976). ~ also Owen, Problems
in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 58 (1982). The award
of punitive damages require that the plaintiff is entitled
to the award of compensatory damages, but it is not neces-
sary that such damages are actual granted to him; see Am LawProd Liab, § 60:37. ---
523. Restatement (Second) of Torts 2d, § 908 (2) (1965).
524. See 29 ALR 3d 988.
525. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757;
the jury awarded punitive damages in the amount of $ 125
million, however this sum was later reduced by the court to
$ 3.5 million. Also, ~ Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield,
319 S.E. 2d 470 (GA. 1984), $ 8 million in a case in which
the fuel tank of a car (Ford Mustang) caused the accident;
for further references see Owen, Foreword: The Use and the
Control of Punitive Damages, 11 Wm.Mitchell L.Rev. 309-10(1985).
526. See Birnbaum & Wheeler, Punitive Damages lower Paves
Way for Massive Design Defect Awards, Nat'l.J. Nov. 17,
1986, at 40 col.2.
527. See Schwartz & Moshogian, The Need for National
PolicY~4 J.Legis. 151, 160 (1987).
528. ~ Gilmartin, Status and Trends in Products Liability
Laws: Punitive Damages, 14 J.Legis. 249, 256-60 (1987); as
means used by the states to limit 'punitive damages', espe-
cially for "excessive Verdicts", are the enactment of sta-
tutory caps or the proposal that only judges should deter-
mine the amount and not the jury; see also Fulton, Punitive
Damages in Product Liability Cases~5 Forum 117 (1979).
529. ~, New Hampshire has abolished punitive damages in
products liability cases by statute (N.H. Revised Statutes §
507:16) and in Louisiana, due to the lack of special
provision allowing punitive damages, they are not permis-
sible in Products Liability cases; see, ~, Philippe v.
Browning Arms Co., 375 So. 2d 151 (Ca.App. 1979), aff'd, 375So.2d 310.
~---
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530. See,~, American Tobacco Cop. v. Transport Corp. &
United States Lines, Inc., 277 F.Supp. 457, 458 (E.D. V.A.1967).
531. See J.HENDERSON & A.TWERSKI, supra note 80, at 46.
532. See ABA Tort Commission, 14 J.Legis. 167, 174 (1987).
The Commission recommended the abolishment of joint and
several liability in case of 'substantial disproportionate
shares of liability' between the various tortfeasors.
533. See J.A.HENDERSON & A.D.TWERSKI, supra note 80, at 47.
See also Coney v. J.L.G.Industries, Inc. 454 N.E. 2d 197,
204-206 (Ill. 1983)
534. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 823 Arum. 12).
535. § 249 BGB: "A person who is bound to make compensation
shall bring about the condition that would have existed if
the circumstances making him liable to compensate had not
occurred. If compensation is required to be made for injury
to e person or damage to a thing, the creditor may demand,
instead restitution in kind, the sum of money necessary to
effect such restitution." Translation from A.VON MEHREN &
J.R.GORDLEY, supra note 87, at 1191.
536. See E.J.COHN, supra note 426, at 105.
537. Since it can be executed only in the case the damaged
object still exists and, in addition, in such case the
recovery is limited to the amount which is necessary to
repair the object; see PALANDT-HEINRICHS, supra note 195, at
§ 249 Arum. 2) b)aa).
543. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 80,-Ger-
many-, at 30.
544. Id., at 30.
545. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 82.
546. See N.HORN, H.KOTZ & H.G.LESER, supra note 77, at 154.
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547. See PALANDT-THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 844 Arum. 4).
548. § 847 I BGB:"In the case of injury to the body or
liberty, the injured party ,may also demand fair compensa-
tion in money for nonpecuniary damage. The claim is not
transferable, and does not pass to the heirs, unless it has
been acknowledged by contract or an action on it has been
commenced."Translation from A.VON MEHREN & J.R.GORDLEY,
supra note 87, at 565.
549. Id., at 1193.
550. This obligation includes for instance the duty of the
plaintiff to notify the defendant if he anticipates an ex-
treme degree of damages to happen.
551. See PALANDT-HEINRICHS, supra note 195, at Vorbem v §
249 Arum. 7) A).
552. See 49 BGHZ 61. The causal connection has to be a
'adequate' one, thus risks which are allocated to the ge-
neral risks of life do not comply with this requirement.
553. See 10 BGHZ 108; see, also 91 BGHZ 210, 361; the
deduction also must obey the purpose of the compensation.
However, despite this jurisdiction, German authorities chal-
lenge these guidelines as not appropriate and not clear
enough. But so far the courts follow the traditional rules.
554. According to § 67 VVG ("Vertragsversicherungsge-
setz"="Insurance Contract Act"), the claims of the injured
party are transferred to the insurance carrier. Thus the
carrier will bring action against the tortfeaser or against
his insurance company.
555. Pursuant to § 116 SGB X (Sozialgesetzbuch Teil X =
"Social Welfare Act, Chapter X) the claims of the employer
who received compensation for his lost wages, are trans-
ferred to his social insurance carrier.
556. ~ severeness and degree of damages, the economic
situation of claimant and defendant; also factors like the
degree of impediment for the personal lifestyle, even the
time the victim was separated from his family; see PALANDT-
THOMAS, supra note 195, at § 847 Arum. 4) a).
557. Under the current exchange rate this about $ 300,000.
558. Approximately $ 60,000 and $ 85,000. See N.HORN,H.KOTZ
& H.G.LESER, supra note 77, at 155; although their numbers
are not up-to-date they show the basic policy of the German
courts with regard to the compensation for injuries.
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559. See § 8 ProdHaftG.
560. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-
France-, at 5.
561. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 84, 96.Note that this
include even unforeseeable economic loss of commercial pur-
chasers.
562. See H.U.Stucki & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-
France-at 5.
563. Id.
564. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 84, 96. Note that
this includes even unforeseeable economic loss of commercial
purchaser.
565. ~, where someone is unable, because of his injuries
to obtain abetter job, even he has the necessary qualifica-
tion.
566. See De Leyssac, supra note 94, at 65.
567. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,S (5th ed 1979).
568. Id., at 38. In cases where it is difficult to estab-
lish a claim the rate may be higher, and in an easy case it
might be lower.
569. For instance in cases where the loss was in the range
between $ 500,000 to $ 1000,000, the rate of recovery was
only about 67 %. In contrast hereto, in cases where the los-
ses were small or no loss at all, the rate of recovery was
the highest; see Dodd, A Proposal for Making Product
Liability Fair, Efficient and Predictable, 14 J.Legis. 133,
138 (1987); the author used a study of the 'Insurance Ser-
vice Office: A Technical Analysis of Survey Results 1977,
11, which showed that in actions where the losses were below
$ 100,000 the rate of recovery by the plaintiff was even
higher than 100 %.
570. See 1 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 1.05.
571. The Federal Tort Claims Act (if the US are a defen-
dant) and some states, ~ California have limiting pro-
visions; see J.S.KAKALIK & N.M.PACE, supra note 512, at 38.
572. See,~, Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
573. This is the result of studies in court districts in
San Francisco and Chicago; see M.A. PETERSON, Civil Juries in
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the 1980's- Trends in Jury Trials and Verdicts in California
and Cook-County, Illinois, vii (1987).
574. 'Deep-pocket" describes defendants who have rich
financial sources to make compensatory payments, like com-
panies and factories.
575. See, supra note 574, at vii.
576. Id., at vii. With regard to the difference of the
awards granted by juries in rural and in urban areas, the
study showed that the average award did not differ very
much. Only the extraordinary high awards were more likely to
obtain in urban places,see id., at xii.
577. Such means are, for example, depositions (FED.R.CIV.P.
30, 31 & 28(a), interrogatories (FED.R.CIV.P. 33 & 34), re-
quests for admission (FED.R.CIV.P. 26 (b) and production of
documents or other tangible things (FED. R. CIV. P. 34).
578. See Note, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis
based on Good Faith, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1320 (1983).
579. See 1 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 9.04.
580. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospitale v. u.S.
District Court for the District of Iowa, 782 F.2d 120 (8th
Cir. 1986). Here the US court decided that the Convention
does generally not prevail against US pretrial discovery
rules, but that each case has to be decided on the basis of
'comity' .
581. §§ 114-127 GKG ("Gerichtskostengesetz" = "Statute on
Court Costs").
582. It must be noticed that in Germany the fees of wit-
nesses and experts are regulated by the law. Thus, according
to this Act (ZSEG ("Zeugen- & Sachverstandigenent-
schadigungsgesetz" = Witnesses and Experts Fees Act), the
regular compensation (They obtain compensation not fees!) is
about $ 25-35 per hour.
583. See N.HORN, H.KOTZ & H.G.LESER, supra note 77, at 49,
50.
584. District Court. With regard to the organization of the
German courts ~ H.J.LIEBESNEY, FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 296-298 (1981). The description as a
local court does not mean that it has to be a real small
court; some German 'Amtsgerichte' have hundreds of judges.
585. "Superior Court"
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586. See H.J.LIEBESNEY, supra note 585, at 330.
587. See Rosener & Jahn, supra note 94, at 82. In such case
the potential plaintiff or defendant goes to an attorney of
his choice and the lawyer will submit a petition for legal
aid with the claim. Then the court decides the petition and
grants the aid if two conditions are fulfilled: That the
allegation in the claim -assumed they are true- establish a
prima-facie case, and the financial assets of the petitioner
(savings, wages and all property) does not exceed a certainlimit.
588. Id., at 81,82.
589. See H.J.LIEBESNEY, supra note 583, at 297.
590. Id., at 65.
591. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-France=-it 33.
592. See H.J.LIEBESNEY, supra note 583, at 309.
593. See L.BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION IN THE AMERICAN FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 19 (1986).
594. But Federal Courts have only limited jurisdiction, as
it is explicitly conferred by federal statutes; see 28
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
595. See Kennelly, supra note 12, at 469. To bring action
as a foreigner not even residency is required, see Kloeckner
Reederei und KOhlenhandlung v. A/S Hakedal, 210~2d 754,756.
596. According to studies of the RAND institute, see
J.S.KAKALIK & N.M.PACE, supra note 425, at 13, only 5% of
the approximately 911,000 tort filings (in 1985) were
brought in Federal Courts. However, in transnational claims,
it is more likely to bring action in Federal Courts.
597. See Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Co. (1982) 689 F.2d103.
598. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 1332 (a).
599. See pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878).
600. See,~, H.J.STEINER & D.F.VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
PROBLEMS 29 (1986).
601. See Lilly, supra note 506, at 85, 89. Those statutes
are constitutionally permissible if they comply with Inter-
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national Shoe's standard of minimal contact and, in addi-
tion, contain provisions for notice of the absent defendant.
602. ~, California as such a statute; See West's Ann.Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10.
603. See,~, § 1.03 of the Uniform Interstate and Inter-
national Procedure Act; § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 461 (1979).
604. See § 4 (e) Fedr. R.Civil Procedure.
605. See 326 U.S.310 (1945).
606. See Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic and Alien Defen-
dants, 69 Va. L. Rev. 85, 95, 116 (1983). However this case
involved two US parties, though from different states, the
standard found in here is also applicable to foreigners.
607. See, also Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (Revised), Tentative Draft No.2, §441 (1981).
608. Id.; quoting Milliken v.Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463(1940):--
609. See Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in US and in the
European-Communities: A Comparison, 82 Mich.L.Rev. 1195(1984).
610. See Delagi v. VOlkswagen, 35 A.D.2d 952, 317 N.Y.S.2d881 (1970).
611. See Marc Rich & Co. AG v. US, 707 F.2d 663; but see,
Manes, jurisdiction over foreign Corporations, 25 Har~In-t'l.L.J. 250 (1984).
612. See 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
613. Id., at 279.
614. Id.
615. See Wheeler, Personal Jurisdiction-Foreign Manufac-
turer not subject to domestic Jurisdiction in Absence of
Minimum Contacts, 22 Texas Int'l.L.J. 403 (1987).
616. Id.
617. See Wheeler, supra note 515, at 23.
618. See Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471(1985):--
619. See 466 U.S. 408.
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620. Id.
621. See 107 S.Ct. 1026 (1987).
622. Id. ,at 94.
623. Id. Here, the japanese company involved in the actionhad not this necessary contacts.
624. The majority of the jUdges sustained Justice O'Connor,
but on different grounds. Most of them indicated that in.
general they still adhered the "stream of commerce" test a
major requirement to impose jurisdiction over a foreigndefendant.
625. See Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.1979) .
626. See Wellboum, SUbsidiary Corporation in New York, 22Buffalo L.Rev. 681 (1973).
627. See Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law, § 52 Com-
ment BT52: "Foreign Corporation -Other Relationships.
A state has the power to exercise judicial jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation, not only in circumstances stated
in §§ 43-51, but also in other situations where the foreign
corporation has such relationship to the state that it is
reasonable for the state to exercise jurisdiction."
628. See V.P.NANDA & ,D.K.PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DISPUTES IN THE USA § 1.05 [3] (1986).
629. See Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors corp., 589
F.Supp~t 1201 (D.D.C. 1984).
630. Id.
631. This kind of expansion of jurisdiction is especially
of importance in antitrust suits since the United States
exercise in this kind of cases a far reaching jurisdiction;
it is enough that the actions have an effect on the US
economical relations, see Swan, International Antitrust: The
Reach and the Efficacy of United States Laws, 63 Or.L.Rev.177,188 (1984).
632. See United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. at 814;
This was-an antitrust-case where the defendant violated theClayton-Act.
633. See, ~ Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-
Country Corporate Defendant, 63 Oreg, L.Rev. 431 (1984).
634. See Shaffner v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Here the
Supreme-court stated that an nonresident director's stock
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642. See Gulf oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
647. See Kennelly, supra note 12, at 458.
See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at § 1.03
Id.
See Shaffner v. Heitner, supra note 635.
See, ~, Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamship
285 U.S. 413 (1932); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
501 (1947) and Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637
775 (D.C.Cir.1980).
648. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at ~ 4.03[3] [b--].--
646. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at §
4.03[3][a]. According to the court the less favorable laws
in the alternate forum can never be a barr since this is
usually the case; see Piper Aircraft Co. v.Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 at 250. But see, supra note 639.
649. Id., at 737.
650. See Farmanfairmainan v. Gulf oil Corp., 437 F.Supp.
910, 927(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
643. 479 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
644. Id.
640. See Paris, Which Way to the Best Forum?, 5 Cal. Law.
59 (1985). The author illustrates a development in Califor-
nia, where a court in Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc.,
202 Cal. Rptr. 773 (Ct.App. 1984), used the 'forum non con-
veniens' theory to expand its jurisdiction.
639.
Ltd.
U.S.
F.2d
645. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 630 F.2d. 149, 164
(3d Ci~1980).
637.
[4].
635. Since the jurisdiction is not over the property, the
thing itself [ = in rem jurisdiction ], but over the rights
of individuals in the thing [ = quasi in rem ], see
W.M.RICHMAN & W.L.REYNOLDS, Understanding Conflicts of Law,
2 (1984).
641. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 528, § 4.01
(1986)--.--
636.
638.
(plus other corporate rights) could not be seized by the
forum state.
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651. See 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 8.02, § 8.03.
There he gives a detailed survey of the jurisdiction of US-
courts with regard to that subject. See also In re Union
Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bopha~ndia, in Decem-
ber 1984, 634 F.Supp. 842 (S.D. N.Y. 1986), aff'd as
modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987); here the judge
granted Union Carbides motion to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds.
652. Id.
653. See Piper, supra note 646, at 256.
654. Id.
655. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, Foreign Plaintiffs and the
American Manufacturer: Is a court in the United States a
Forum Non Conveniens?, 20 Forum 59, 67 (1985).
656. However in §§ 24-26 ZPO actions for 'in rem' are pos-
sible ("dingliche Gerichtsstande"), but they haver in com-
parison to the Common law jurisdiction only a limited effect
concerning 'res judicata' and 'collateral estoppel', since
they bind only those persons who were parties in actions 'in
rem' .
657. The term of residency on which this practice is based,
is determined by §§ 7,8,9, & 11 BGB (German Code of Civil
Laws). In case the individual does not have a residency and
even the latest one can not be detected, yet one abroad, the
place where he was living the last time, rather his
domicile, will be commanding.
658. See Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and Commercial
Matters under the German Code of Civil Process 16 In-
t. 'l.Law. 671, 676 (1982). However here exist a particular
problem with regard to the definition of the term "site/-
seat" ("sitz") of a commercial entity. Usually it is the
seat according to the charter of the company.
659. This is of quite importance, since foreign companies
have to consider how far they want to expand their business
activities in Germany without becoming subject to jurisdic-
tion of the German courts.
660. Zivilproze~ordnung (ZPO) of 9/12/1950, BGBl 535, BGBl
III 3 Nr. 310-4; German Code of Civil Procedure.
661. ZOLLER-[author], ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, 14th ed., at § 1
note 8 (1984).
662. See, BGH 44, 47; 63, 220; 69, 44. This is the view of
the majority and is today the rule the courts do follow.
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However, even if the international jurisdiction of German
courts is given, it is still uncertain, whether the neces-
sary jurisdiction of one specific German court can be es-
tablished. Because the finding of international jurisdiction
does not provide the jurisdiction of a certain court. Even
if the international jurisdiction has been established a
dismissal based on lack of subject matter and local juris-
diction can occur, see, ROSENBERG-SCHWAB, Zivilproze~recht
97 (1981). This is a result of the different functions of
international and local jurisdiction. Especially in cases of
'forum non conveniens' dismissal in other countries, it is
possible to have a local jurisdiction but not an interna-
tional jurisdiction in a certain case.
663. See "Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz" of 25 May 1975, BGBl
I, 107~
664. Pursuant to § 71 The German Superior Court (Land-
gericht) is authorized for all civil claims in his district
if not the District Court (Amtsgericht) is competent to hear
the case. The District Court has the subject matter juris-
diction if the amount in dispute does not exceed 5000 DM.
665. See B.GROSSFELD, INTERNATIONALES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT:
DAS ORGANISATIONSRECHT TRANSNATIONALER UNTERNEHMER 137
(1986).
666. See 2 E.J.COHN, supra note 426, at 173.
667. See B.Grossfeld, supra note 666, at 137.
668. See ZOLLER-VOLLKOMMER, supra note 662, at § 23 Anm. I )
1) .
669. See Dryander, supra note 659, at 671.
670. Which is not unique to Germany, ~ Swiss, Austria,
Japan, Denmark and Greece have similar laws.
671. See for an overview of the critics, ZOLLER-VOLLKOMMER,
supra note 662, at § 23 Anm. 7) I) 1).
672. Id.
673. See Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt, Wertpapiermitteilun-
gen (WM-r-754 (1982).
674. See ZOLLER-GEIMER, supra note 662, at IZPR Anm. 342.
Although some authorities support the introduction of those
principles into german law, see, ~, OLG Frankfurt, Das
Standesamt (StaZ) 1975, 98; LG Hbg. Wertpapiermitteilungen
(WM) 78, 985.)
---------".~----- --_-_-_.......-o !!!!!!!!!! _
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675. See ZOLLER-GEIMER, supra note 662, at IZPR Arum. 344.
676. The case, which is unpublished, is reported in: Schu-
mann, Aktuelle Fragen des Gerichtsstandes des Vermogens (§23
ZPO), 93 Zeitschrift fUr Zivilproze~ (ZZP) 408, 422 (1980).
677. See H.J.STEINER & D.F.VAGTS, supra note 601, at 45.
678. See De Winter, Excessive Jurisdiction in Private
International Law, 17 Int'l. & Compo L.Q. 707, 707-08
(1968).
679. Id.
680. See H.J.LIEBESNEY, supra note 583, at 299.
681. See Art. 46 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
682. See 2 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 11.07.The intend
of the Convention was to facilitate and to unify the law
within Europe, in particular in the field of laws. However,
so far the Convention has been signed only by nine states,
only members of the EC. Thus, a real harmonization of the
judicial process in Europe has been not reached, since most
countries are not willing to give up parts of their sover-
eignty - this includes jurisdiction.
6~3. See Art. 13, § 4 of the Convention.
684. See Art. 6 (1) of the Convention.
685. In Veluco Conservenfabrieken BV v. Michel de Marc,
cited in 2 W.FREEDMAN" supra note 15, at § 11.07, the Bel-
gium court held that due to the lack of an agreement of the
foreign defendants, the Belgium court had no jurisdiction.
686. See Art. 13-15 of the Convention.
687. See 2 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 15.05.
688. Id.
689. See Dryander, supra note 659, at 673.
690. See V.P.NANDA & D.P.PANSIUS, supra note 629 at § 2.01.
691. Fed. R.Civ.P. 4 (e),(l).
692. See Bishop, Service of Process And Discovery in Inter-
national Tort Litigation, 23 Tort & Ins.L.J. 70, 72 (1987).
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693. Other methods permitted under these rules, are using
letter rogatory, or means furnished by the law of the other
country. Also service is finally available through local
attorneys, and even by mail addressed and dispatched by the
clerk of the court. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra
note 629, at § 2.02 [2].
694. For a list of the member states see 8 MARTINDALE
HUBELL LAW DICTIONARY 2 (1987). The most West European
states are members of this convention.
695. See Bishop, supra note 693, at 75; the exact process
of service can be made as prescribed by the internal laws
and according to any specific manner required by the ap-
plicant, unless this is incompatible with the countrieslaws.
696. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at § 2.02[2].
697. Id.
698. See ZOLLER-GEIMER, supra note 662., at § 166 Anm.1.
699. However, proper service is necessary to render a
jUdgement on the merits valid, ~ Id.
700. For instance, §§ 181, 183, 184, 187 and 295 ZPO allow
such measurements.
701. See Dryander, supra note 659, at 675.
702. Id., see also § 328 ZPO (recognition of foreign judg-ments)-.- -- ---
703. See Reese, American Choice of Law, 30 Am. J.Comp.L.
135 (1966); ~, also D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 219-277;
and ~, arguing in favor of an 'Interest Analysis' ,
Kozyris, A Postscript to the Symposium, 46 Ohio St.L.J. 569(1985).
704. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 220.
705. See Restatement, Conflicts of Laws (Second), §§
189,190(1971).
706. See Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds Inc., 326 A. 2d 90
(N.J. 1974).
707. See Weintraub, Choice of Law for, 44 Tex. L. Rev.1429 (1966).
718. See Kozyris, supra note 704, at 569.
717. ~ 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 15, § 8.04.
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708. Rest. 2d, § 191.
709. Id.
710. See Comment d to Restatement, Conflicts of Law (Se-cond),~145 (1971).
712. ~ Babcock v. Jackson, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1963).
713. See, also Kilberg v. North East Airlines 211 N.Y.S. 2d133 (1961).-
720. Introductory Law to the Civil Code of the 25 July
1984, BGBI I 1142. Art. 38 states: "A tort committed abroad
shall not entitle [the victim] to claims against a German
national in excess of those granted by German law." Transla-
tion from DROBNING, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONALLAW, 213-223 (2nd. ed. 1972).
711. See Juenger, Conflicts Law, 30 Am.J.Comp. L. 117, 122(1966):--
716. See Kasel v. Remington Arms Co. 101 Cal.Rep. 314 (Cal.App. 1m).
714. Neumeir, 335 N.Y.S. 2d 64 (1972).
715. See TH.M. DE BOER, BEYOND LEX LOCI DELICTI 6-356 TO 6-372 (1987).
721. See PALANDT-HELDRICH, supra note 195, at Art.38 EGBG
Arum 3) A);~, ~ BGH 1981 NJW 606.
719. See 198 Reichsgericht in Zivilsachen [hereinafter RGZ]205 (1903).
722. "Alternative Ankniipfung"; See D.TEBBENS, supra note
35, at 192 note 129.This rule allows the courts to adjudi-
cate an action based on the law of one of the 'loci delic-
ti', whether or not the condition of liability under theother local laws are given.
723. With regard to the higher damages which are in other
nations are rewarded, ~ in the United States. Thus isrestricts the foreign claims.
724. See Morse, Choice of Law, 32 Am.J.Comp.L. 51, 57(1984):--
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725. BGH 1987 NJW 1606.
726. See PALANDT-HE1DRICH, supra note 195, at § 38 EGBGB
Anm . 2c ) cc) .
727. Id.
728. See PALANDT-HELDRICH, supra note 195, Art. 6 EGBGB
Anm. 1-).-
729. However some German authors question if this 'ordre
public' could not be used to deny an US request for pretrial
discovery.
730. Art. 3 (1) "Les Lois de police et de surete obligent
tous ceux qui habitent le territoire."
731. See TribCiv Versailles 12 March 1957, (1957)
RevFrDrAer 276 (Veuve de Franceschi c, Hiller Helicopters);
this case is described in D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 303.
The case involved a French test pilot who dies while testing
a Californian made helicopter.
732. Id.
733. See TriCiv Sarrguemines 30 October 1957, in JURIS-
CLASSEUR, DROIT INTERNATIONALE, SOURCES EXTRA-CONTRACTUELLES
DES OBLIGATIONS, facs. 553, Suppl.2, 1968, at p. 2 (No.
28s.) In this case the pollution of a transboundary river
pollution was subject of the decision.
734. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 304.
735. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 304. TEBBENS refers
to the studies of Bourel, case note on TribGl Paris 18 April
1969, (1971) RevCrit 282, 292-293.
736. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 304 note 52. A very
frequent form of this kind of tort are car accident abroad.
737. Id.
738. See Morse, supra note 725, at 51, 54.
739. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to was ap-
proved by the 'The Hague Conference" on Private Internation-
al Law on October 2, 1973. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at
333.
740. As result of the Convention, a French court which had
to decide a case involving a German or US consumer against
the French producer, had to apply the german or american
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rules on Products Liability even non of both states is a
member of the Convention.
741. See D.TEBBENS , supra note 35, at 334.
742. See 2 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 11.02, where he
gives a list of the provisions which shows these principles.
743. Id.
744. See 2 Freedman, supra note 15, at § 10.02 note 11;
there is a table of the most important provision of that
convention given. See, also Reese, The Hague Convention on
the Law applicable to Products Liability, 8 Int.'l. Law. 606(1974).
745. See 2 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 11.02.
746. See D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 337-338; ~, also 2
W.Freedman, supra note 15, at § 11.02.
747. Id.
748. See C.G.J.MORSE, TORTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
341, 342 (1978); see also 2 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at §11.02. ---
749. U.S. Constitution, Art.Iv, § 1.
750. See,~, Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum
Corp. 453 F. 2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971, cert. denied 405
U.S. 1017 (1972).See also Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
of Law § 98, comment ~971).
751. See Von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgement in
the United States, 17 Va.J.Int'l. 401, 404 (1977).
752. ~ 2 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 14.03; However,
most courts hold in favor of the state authority, ~, ~,
Hyde v.Hyde, 562 S.W. 2d 194 (Tenn. 1978), an argument
against this posture is that state courts invade the field
of foreign affairs, see, ~., , Zschernig v. Miller, 304
U.S. 64, (1938). See, also Dryander, supra note 659, at 429.
753. Comity as opposed to the legal obligation "is neither
a matter of absolute Obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy nd good will, upon the other"; 159 U.S. at
163-64 (1895).
754. See 159 U.S. 113 (1985); "Comity" in the legal sense,
is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand,
nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other ...."
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755. See Bishop & Burnette, United States Practice Concern-
ing the--Recognition of Foreign JUdgments, 16 Int'l.Lawy.425 (1982).
756. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at §11.02 TIT.
757. ~,~, Griffin v.Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946); here
the court stated that 'due process' requires that no other
jurisdiction can given effect without complying with 'dueprocess'.
758. See Royal Bank of Canada v,. Trentham Corp., 491F.SuPP:-404 (D.O. Tex. 1980).
759. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.
453 F. 2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017,31 L.Ed. 2d 479(1972).
760. ~ Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 755; ~, see Reese,
The Status in this Country of JUdgments rendered abroad, 50Colum. L. Rev. 785, 791 (1950).
761. See Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal.Rptr. 796 (Ct.App. 1972).
762. See Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Dominicana de AViacion,556 F.~ 611 (1st Cir. 1977).
763. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. VEB Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293
F.SuPP.892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 433 F.2d 686(2d Cir.
1970), cert.denied, 403 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 2205, 29 L.Ed. 2d680(1971).
764. See Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 755, at 227-28.
765. See Reese, supra note 761, at 791.
766. ~
767. 13 U.L.A. 270 (1980).
768. See generally Note, The Recognition and Enforcement
of Forei n Countr Jud ents and Arbitral Awards: A North _
South Perspective, 11 Ga. J. Int'l & Compo L. 635, 638-641(1981).
769. 13 U.L.A. 270 (1980)
770. This Act has been put into force in several states;
for a table of those states ~ 2 Freedman, supra note §14.10.
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771. ~ § 2 of the Act.
772. However, as stated above, the 'full faith and credit'
does not apply directly to the jUdgement of foreign states,
but due to its general importance in the United States
courts uses its standards to evaluate the foreign judgement;
~, ~ Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185(1912).
773. See 2 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 14.11.
774. ~
775. §§ 328 ZPO regulates the recognition of foreign
jUdgement, while the enforcement of the recognized jUdgementis covered by §§ 722, 723 ZPO.
776. See Bertram-Nothnagel, Enforcement of Foreign JUdg-
ments and Arbitral Awards in West Germany, 17 Va. J. Int.'l.385 (1977).
777. See ZOLLER-GEIMER,supra note 662, § 328 Anm. 51.
778. See ROSENBERG-SCHWAB, supra note 663, at § 158 (1981).
779. See BGH 22, 24; This expression has the character of a
so-called "general-clause", thus it is determined by the
various decisions of the German court, but not by the law
itself. Also, as a "general-clause" the definition is not a
fixed one, but changes with the modification of the social
structure and the standard of values in the German society.
Examples for the violation of the German public policy
('Ordre public') are cases where the foreign jUdgement was
obtained through means of bribery or fraud; see Kraus, En-
forcement of Forei n Mone Jud ents in the Federal Re ublic
of Germany - some Aspects of Public Policy 17 Tex. Int'l.J.195, 196 (1982).
780. See Note, 22 Juristische Zeitung (JZ) 903, 906 (1983).
Punitive damages are similar to fines in German Criminal
Law, but have no alike counterparts in the civil law. Hence
they are an extraordinary infringement of the basic prin-
ciples of the German legal system. Thus they violate the
'ordre public' and 'per se' can not be recognize This rule
also allows to shorten excessive attorney's fees; at least
in case where the lawyer is a member of the German bar his
fees has to stay in the German range, which much lower thanin the United States; see 51 BGHZ 290 (1969).
781. ~ V.P.NANDA & D:K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at §12.02 (4).
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782. 15 O.J.Eur.Comm. (No. L. 299) 32 (1972); the Conven-
tion is also known as " Brussels Convention ".
783. See Brenscheidt, The Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal Republic of Germany,
11 Int.'l Law. 261, 273 (1977).
784. See Kraus, supra note 780, at 196 n.10.
785. Id.
786. See Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 777, at 389.
787. The "Brussels Convention" is the European Convention
on the Jurisdiction of Courts and the Recognition and En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, see
supra note 685. See also D.TEBBENS, supra note 35, at 292-
297.
788. Art. 27 and 28 of the Convention.
789. See Note, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
France Under the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile, 4 B.C.I-
nt'l & Comp.L.Rev. 149, 149 n.1, 152 (1981).
790. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at §
12.05.
791. See H.J.STEINER & D.F.VAGTS, supra note 601, at 68.
792. Id.
793. See Yates, Substantive Law Aspects of Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Between Foreigners in France: The Com-
petence Question, 9 Int'l Law. 251, 253 (1975).
794. See H.J.STEINER & D.F.VAGTS, supra note 601, at 73.
795. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at §
12.05 ffi.
796. Particularity the latter kind of damages are unique to
American laws and have nothing close in French civil law.
797. See H.U.STUCKI & P.R.ALTENBURGER, supra note 88,-
France- at 32.
798. See 2 W.FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at § 14.11. The in-
tend of the Convention was to facilitate and to unify the
law within Europe, in particular in the field of laws.
However, so far the Convention has been signed only by nine
states, only members of the EC. Thus, a real harmonization
of the judicial process in Europe has been not reached,
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since most countries are not willing to give up parts of
their sovereignty - this includes jurisdiction.
799. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at §12.02.
800. See Art. 26 of the Convention.
801. See Art. 27 of the Convention.
802. See V.P.NANDA & D.K.PANSIUS, supra note 629, at §
12.03 (4). Other grounds for refusing the rejection are,
e.g., where a default jUdgment was rendered but no proper
service was made and under 'res jUdicata', where a state has
already rendered another, contrary sentence.
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